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the	 new	 york  satirical magazine Vanity Fair (unrelated to its latter-
day lounge-lizard/coffee-table/hairdressing salon namesake) ran from 
1859 to 1863. Page 215 of the October 27, 1860, edition earned the peri-
odical enduring fame, because the first known use of the word “makeover” 
appeared there, in a notice headed “Adornment.” It referred to a fictional 
figure: “Miss Angelica Makeover. The men like her and the women wonder 
why.” Angelica’s gift was the ability to transform her “coarse” hair “into 
waves of beauty” through “miracles of art and patience.” Her “eyes were by 
no means handsome, but she . . . learned how to use them,” utilizing “art 
and culture” to pass “for a fine woman” (“Adornment” 1860).1
 The word “makeover” reappeared in women’s magazines of the 1920s and 
1960s. In 1936, Mademoiselle magazine offered what has been described as 
the first formal makeover of an “average” reader, who had asked for tips on 
how to “make the most” of a self that she deemed “homely as a hedgehog” 
[We live in] a State where there is no fever of speculation, no inflamed desire 
for sudden wealth, where the poor are all simple-minded and contented, and 
the rich are all honest and generous, where society is in a condition of primitive 
purity and politics is the occupation of only the capable and the patriotic.
 —mark Twain and Charles dudley Warner (1874)
ready for a free, fun, no-hassle virtual makeover? The makeover-o-matic virtual 
makeover game lets you try on virtual hairstyles, makeup and accessories with 
your own photo or a model photo. find your best online virtual makeover look 
and style using the latest beauty products, without the risk! Select from hun-
dreds of hairstyles, cosmetic colors and accessories in the privacy of your own 
home. blend, highlight, mix and match to create your new online look. What are 
you waiting for? Go ahead and get beautiful!
 —http://beauty.ivillage.com/0,,9jlxfdd5,00.html
i N t r o d u C t i o N
Miller_final.indb   1 8/20/2008   10:36:00 PM
	  	 ✴   I n t r o d u c t I o n
and “too skinny” (quoted in Fraser 2007: 177). The article turned into a 
regular feature, and the term “makeover” entered routine parlance in the 
1970s. I argue in this book that it describes a long-term tendency in US 
culture that has intensified in the contemporary moment.
 The grand promise of the United States is that what its people were 
born as need not define them ever more. The Latin@ writer James Truslow 
Adams coined the signal term “the American Dream” in 1931 as the core 
of his wide-ranging overview of national history, The Epic of America.2 
Adams argued that since the 17th century, voluntary immigrants had been 
attracted here not only by “the economic motive” but also by “the hope of 
a better and freer life, a life in which a man might think as he would and 
develop as he willed” (1941: 31). The “American Dream” was “of a land 
in which life should be better and richer and fuller . . . , with opportunity 
for each according to his ability or achievement.” Measured by something 
beyond commodities (“merely material plenty”), it was “a dream of being 
able to grow to fullest development as man and woman,” defying class bar-
riers (405, 411).3
 That grand meritocratic promise still has the power to fascinate. It is 
expressed and achieved through the ultimate Yanqui desire: self-inven-
tion via commodities. This is an irony, for, as Marx noted, commodities 
originate “outside us” (1987: 43). But commodities are quickly internal-
ized, wooing consumers by appearing attractive in ways that borrow from 
romantic love but reverse that relationship: People learn about romance 
from commodities, which proceed to become part of them through the 
double-sided nature of advertising and “the good life” of luxury: the culture 
industries encourage competition between consumers at the same time as 
they standardize processes to manufacture unity in the face of diversity. 
Transcendence is articulated to objects, and commodities dominate the 
human and natural landscape. The corollary is the simultaneous triumph 
and emptiness of the sign as a source and measure of value. Commodities 
hide not only the work of their creation but their postpurchase existence 
as well. Designated with human characteristics (beauty, taste, serenity, and 
so on), they compensate for the absence of these qualities in everyday capi-
talism via a “permanent opium war” (Debord 1995: 26–27, 29–30). Wolf-
gang Haug’s term “commodity aesthetics” captures this paradox (1986: 17, 
19, 35), what Seyla Benhabib calls “the promesse du bonheur that advanced 
capitalism always holds before [consumers], but never quite delivers” 
(2002: 3). It is embodied in the difference between those with and those 
without the class position and capital to define luxury and encourage emu-
lation through identity goods such as fashion items (Sarah Berry 2000).
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 Commodities appeal because they provide a way to dodge that old Hege-
lian dilemma: what to do about ethical substance? In the United States, a 
sense of ethical incompleteness comes courtesy of origins in the under-
class of Europe and Asia, the enslaved of Africa, and the dispossessed of 
the Americas. It encourages an ongoing self-criticism that falls back on 
faith and consumerism as means of surviving and thriving. One alternately 
loving and severe world of superstition (AKA religion) is matched by a 
second alternately loving and severe world of superstition (AKA consump-
tion). In times of economic dynamism and uncertainty, these worlds merge 
with old myths about meritocracy and religion to inform the way we think 
about the nation. D. H. Lawrence identified “the true myth of America” 
as: “She starts old, old, wrinkled and writhing in an old skin. And there is 
a gradual sloughing of the old skin, towards a new youth” (1953: 64). The 
detritus of other lands needs remaking, as do successive newcomers and 
newborns.
 Life is very much a project in the United States—but not a straightfor-
wardly individual one. A duality of free choice and disciplinary gover-
nance is the grand national paradox. For example, many migrants arrive 
here cognizant of the country’s extravagant claims to being laissez-faire—
but they encounter the most administered society they have lived in! From 
dawn to dusk, life is laid out across a bewildering array of public and pri-
vate institutions. Various forms of government are present every day and 
in every way, from municipal to state to federal agencies, along with less 
accountable intruders such as church and business bureaucrats—not to 
mention the venerable third sector of venture philanthropists, nosy foun-
dations, and do-gooder associations. Even the summer break from school 
for young people is orchestrated via the bizarre ritual of camp, while those 
preparing for college entry must ritualistically embark on volunteerism 
to boost their application packets. Simply being—leading life without 
a bumper sticker avowing one’s elective institutional affinities—seems 
implausible. The corollary is an earnest search for a self that can operate 
within this disciplinary complex. Wander through virtually any bookstore 
across the country, for example, and you will be swamped by the self-help 
section, edging its way closer and closer to the heart of the shop, as the 
ancestral roots of an unsure immigrant culture are stimulated anew by 
today’s risky neoliberal one. In the three decades to 2000, the number 
of self-help books in the United States more than doubled. Between a 
third and a half of Yanquis buy them, lending their credit to a $2.48 bil-
lion-a-year industry of tapes, DVDs, videos, books, and “seminars” on 
making oneself anew, frequently with “spiritual” alibis—a whole array of 
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consumables in place of adequate social security. Each item promises ful-
fillment but delivers a never-ending project of work on the self (McGee 
2005: 11–12). Consider another powerful instance: Hollywood’s promise 
of the makeover, of turning an off-screen farm girl into a film star, or an 
on-screen librarian into a siren. It stands at the heart of such projects and 
has been advertised as such ever since 1930s fan magazines promoted the 
emulation of actresses through cosmetics, with stars like Joan Blondell 
instructing readers that “the whole secret of beauty is change” (quoted in 
Sarah Berry 2000: 106; also see 107, 27).
 Many cultural critics demonize such tendencies. For example, Christo-
pher Lasch’s influential 1970s tract, The Culture of Narcissism, a requiem 
for the national “character,” was rejected by most scholars but embraced by 
pop intellectuals and then-President Jimmy Carter. Lasch identified a turn 
for the worse caused by “bureaucracy, the proliferation of images, thera-
peutic ideologies, the rationalization of the inner life, the cult of consump-
tion, and in the last analysis . . . changes in family life and . . . changing 
patterns of socialization.” He discerned a “pathological narcissism” of the 
“performing self.” People had become “connoisseurs of their own perfor-
mance and that of others,” with the “whole man” fragmented. This critique 
bought into a longstanding obsession, exhibited since the 19th century in 
literature and philosophy, that associated the nation with Adam prior to 
the Fall, as a site where new forms of life could be invented that reprised 
a life before desire (Lasch 1978: 32, 67–68, 93; Stearns 2006: 203; Crawley 
2006).
 This perverse US fixation on “character” is invoked with inquisito-
rial reverence in election campaign after election campaign to question 
presidential candidates. Distinctions are avidly drawn between “person-
ality”—the psychological cards one is dealt—and “character”—how one 
plays them. A failing that derives from “personality” (which seems to be 
about fun and the id) can be overcome by “character” (which seems to 
be about repression and the ego/superego). In the 2000 elections, George 
Bush Minor’s character was routinely valorized by the bourgeois media as 
distinct from the Republican norm, because of his putative compassion and 
bipartisan tendencies. He was not evaluated on the measurable materiality 
of his public service—spectacular public-educational underachievement 
and record high rates of execution while governor of somewhere named 
Texas—or his recreational drug record, nepotistic affirmative-action entry 
to the Ivy League, and sordid business history. It took years for Newsweek’s 
alarming 2003 cover story “Bush and God” to uncover the policy implica-
tions of Minor’s alcohol-addiction- and business-failure-fueled conversion 
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to evangelical Protestantism and its electoral appeal (Republicans were 
overwhelmingly supported across class lines by white Protestants during 
the 2003 Iraq crisis and the 2004 presidential election). Conversely, Al 
Gore Minor’s character was routinely problematized in 2000 because of his 
fundraising activities on behalf of Democrats and putative tall tales about 
inventing the Internet, inspiring Love Story, and investigating Love Canal. 
He was not evaluated on the measurable materiality of his public service—
spectacular economic growth and record high rates of educational attain-
ment under his vice-presidency (Newport and Carroll 2003; Pew Research 
Center for the People & the Press 2004).
 This obsession with personality versus character has a long history. In 
Ancient Greece and Rome, the body was the locus for an ethics of the self, 
a combat with pleasure and pain that enabled people to find the truth by 
mastering themselves. Austerity and hedonism could be combined. Xeno-
phon, Socrates, and Diogenes believed that decadence led to professional 
failure unless accompanied by regular examination of the conscience and 
by physical training. Carefully modulated desire could be a sign of fitness 
to govern others: Aristotle and Plato went so far as to favor regular flirta-
tions with excess (Foucault 1986: 66–69, 72–73, 104, 120, 197–98). For 
Solon, the key task of any ruler was “to check the desires that are exces-
sive” in order to “make crooked judgments straight” (1994: 39). This did 
not mean wishing pleasure away but modifying oneself to account for it. 
Five hundred years later, the sexual ethics of Ancient Rome saw spirituality 
emerge to complicate exercises of the self as training for governance:
within an ethics that posits that death, disease, or even physical suffering do 
not constitute true ills and that it is better to take pains over one’s soul than 
to devote one’s care to the maintenance of the body. But in fact the focus of 
attention in these practices of the self is the point where the ills of the body 
and those of the soul can communicate with one another and exchange 
their distresses; where the bad habits of the soul can entail physical miseries, 
while the excesses of the body manifest and maintain the failings of the soul. 
(Foucault 1988: 56–57)
In place of the excesses that had preoccupied 4th-century B.C. Athens, 1st-
century A.D. Rome was principally concerned with frailty: the finitude of 
life and fitness. Moral arguments were imbued with “nature and reason,” so 
exercises of the self were joined to a more elevated search for truth (Fou-
cault 1988: 238–39). For his part, Saint Augustine explained Adam and 
Eve’s postapple physical shame as a problem of control: what had been 
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easily managed organs prior to the Fall suddenly became liable to “a novel 
disturbance in their disobedient flesh,” as per Adam’s disobedience of God. 
The result: the rest of us are left with original sin. The pudenda, or “parts 
of shame,” were named as such because lust could “arouse those mem-
bers independently of decision.” The “movements of their body” mani-
fest “indecent novelty” and hence shame, because the “genital organs have 
become as it were the private property of lust” (Augustine 1976: 522–23, 
578, 581). Such feelings derived from the capacity of desire to get out of 
whack. As Foucault puts it, what were once “like the fingers” in obeying 
the will of their owner came to elude the owner’s control, a punishment 
for Adam’s own attempt to evade God’s will. Man exemplifies the Fall in 
the mutability of his penis. So Renaissance paintings of Jesus routinely 
depict him pointing to or touching his genitals as a sign of his human side: 
a begotten rather than a created Son (Foucault and Sennett 1982; Porter 
1991: 206). For Kant, while the distinctively human capacity for intellec-
tion is laden with a moral purpose, it is indissoluble from a craven desire 
that comes from being alive and mediates access to knowledge. The two 
modulate each other, with principle and pleasure in a constant combat that 
is an entirely normal occurrence. Virtue derives not from resolving the 
conflict, which is impossible, but from governing it (McHoul and Rapley 
2001: 439–40).
 In the United States, I sense that all this palaver about personality, char-
acter, and the control and expression of drives works as a grand metaphor 
for managing the differences and difficulties of language, history, race, 
gender, class, and faith that color the nation’s history. It references the risk 
and opportunity embodied in the longest-standing makeover aspect of US 
society: immigration. A triad of personality-character-immigrant indexes 
the coterminous pleasure and pain of a “touch-and-go” existence, a sud-
denly anonymous personal history of “individual independence and dif-
ferentiation” and the “right to distrust,” alongside a need to map new selves 
and spaces (Simmel 1976: 88–89; Jameson 1991; Gabaccia 2006).
 Ironically, today’s encounter with difference is finally making the United 
States look truly American—it is coming to resemble the Americas. The first 
great wave of immigrants at the turn of the 20th century left the country 
87% white/Euro-American, a proportion that remained static through 
the 1950s. The 20th century saw the US population increase by 250% (the 
equivalent figures are below 60% for both France and Britain). In the past 
decade, its Asian and Pacific Islander population increased by 43%, and its 
Latin@ population by 38.8%. Latin@s and Asians are increasing at ten times 
the rate of Euros. The minority population topped 100 million in 2007—
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44 million Latin@s, 40 million African Americans, 15 million Asians, 4.5 
million Native Americans, and a million Pacific Islanders. Most people 
who live in California, Texas, New Mexico, and Hawaii are minorities. If 
today’s trends continue, 82% of the increase in US population between 
now and 2050 will come from immigrants and their offspring. Whites will 
be a minority. The foreign-born segment of the country is 36 million—
double the proportion from 1970, half as many again as in 1995, and back 
to Depression-era levels—and across the 1990s immigration was up 37.7% 
from the previous decade. Almost half the people living in Los Angeles 
and Miami were born beyond the border, and Latin@s accounted for half 
the growth in the nation’s population between 2003 and 2004. Of course, 
these official figures do not disclose the full picture. It has been suggested 
that 9 million new residents lack immigration documents, and they are 
joined by 300,000 new arrivals annually. There was a net increase of 2.5 
million people without papers between 2002 and 2006. A reaction of fear 
is clear in events such as the 2007 scuttling of immigration reform. And 
hybridity is increasingly the norm. In 1990, one in twenty-three US mar-
riages crossed race and ethnicity. In 2005, the figure was one in fifteen, an 
increase of 65%. As for the labor force, in 1960, one in seventeen workers 
was born outside the United States, the majority in Europe. Today, the pro-
portion is one in six, mostly from Latin America and Asia. And the trend 
is accelerating: between 1996 and 2000, people born overseas comprised 
close to half the net increase in labor (“Hispanic” 2000; Hispanic 2005: 46; 
“Centrifugal” 2005; El Nasser and Grant 2005b; United Nations Develop-
ment Programme 2004: 99; Pew Hispanic Center 2006; “The Americano” 
2005; US Census Bureau News 2007; Pew Research Center 2008; “Open 
Up” 2008; Massey 2003: 143; Bloemraad 2006: 27; Hispanic 2005; El Nasser 
and Grant 2005b; Mosisa 2002: 3, 9; Tienda 2002; Castles and Miller 2003: 
5; Schweder et al. 2002: 27).
 Coinciding with these cultural changes, economic life for many US resi-
dents, both long-term and recent, is getting worse and worse. Successive 
population waves—no longer just white ones—have fled the inner city, in 
vain search of a turn to Arcady. The United States recently became the 
first nation in the world to have more than half its people living in sub-
urbia—a quarter of whom are minorities—and 75% of new office space 
is constructed there. But as this historic demographic shift continues the 
trend from a rural to an urban to a suburban country, middle-class people 
are increasingly disarticulated from subsistence, from the state, and from 
the experience of country and city life. By contrast with European wel-
fare systems, the capacity to exit poverty in the United States has dimin-
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ished over the last three decades of neoliberalism and suburbanization, 
thanks to a gigantic clumping of wealth at the apex of the nation, atop a 
poor, unskilled, and unhealthy base. For twenty years, the state has pur-
sued monetary policies that favor financial over productive capital, with 
obvious results—40% of corporate profit is in finance sectors, which 
employ just 5% of private-sector workers (“The Gentleman’s Bailout” 2008; 
“Wall Street’s Crisis” 2008: 11). Forty-six million US residents are indigent 
(even the Bush Minor administration admits that 13.3% of the population 
lives in poverty, the greatest proportion in the Global North); 52 million 
are functionally analphabetic; and 46 million lack health insurance, with 
an additional 36 million going without it at some point in the two years 
to 2003. One in six adults who has medical insurance experiences severe 
difficulties meeting his or her medical expenses. And access to money and 
net worth are massively stratified by class, race, and gender. In 2003, black 
men earned 73% of the hourly wage rate of white people, for instance, 
and the gaps are widening. Migrants are disproportionately represented 
amongst the poor, with wages averaging 75 cents for every dollar paid to 
Yanquis. In the first six years of his rule, George Bush Minor presided over 
a 9% increase in the poverty rate, a 12% increase in people without heath 
insurance, and immobile family income. Minor himself has been forced to 
proclaim that “income inequality is real—it’s been rising for more than 25 
years” (Younge 2007; Minor quoted in Sawhill and Morton 2008: 3). 
 Twenty years ago, neoclassical economists hailed the impact of market 
precepts over social democracy, because just 20% of the public’s future 
income was predictable based on paternal income. By the 1990s, and two 
more decades of deregulation, that figure had doubled. Some figures sug-
gest it now stands at 60%. In the two decades from 1979, the highest-paid 
1% of the population doubled its share of national pretax income, to 18%. 
Incomes of the top 1% increased by 194%; the top 20%, by 70%—and 
the bottom 20%, by just 6.4%. In 1967, chief executive officers (CEOs) of 
corporations were paid 24 times the average wage of employees. Thirty 
years later, they received 300 times that amount. The average Yanqui CEO 
“makes” more in an hour than an employee does in a month. The Con-
gressional Budget Office reports that during the late 1990s, the wealthiest 
1% of US households had a greater combined income than the poorest 
40%. In California, where I live, the economy is larger than all but a few 
sovereign states around the world. So what? Working-class family income 
in California has increased by 4% since 1969, while its ruling-class equiv-
alent has grown by 41%. Nationally, corporate profits are at their highest 
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level in five decades, while wages and salaries have the lowest share of the 
national pie on record. Over Bush Minor’s first term, corporate profits 
rose by 60%, but wages by just 10%. In 2004, after-tax profits for corpora-
tions grew to their highest proportion of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
since the Depression. In the eyes of Fortune magazine, corporations 
“deserve credit for their restraint,” because “[i]nstead of hiring recklessly, 
they found ways to produce a trim workforce.” The Fortune 500 group of 
companies received $785 billion of income in 2006, up 29% from 2005, 
adding up to the biggest profits in the half-century life of the index. Half 
the money made goes to a tenth of the population, even as the tax burden 
has shifted dramatically away from companies and onto workers. In the 
three years 2003–6, hourly wages (adjusted for inflation) declined, despite 
the increase in productivity. Between 1999 and 2004, the bottom 90% of 
US households saw their income rise by 2%; for those “earning” over $1 
million annually, income grew by more than 87%. In 2005, real wages fell 
for all but the top 5%, while productivity rose by 3% and GDP by 3.2%. 
The Gini index saw inequality attain the same level as during the Great 
Depression. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment categorizes the US halfway down its thirty member-nations in terms 
of the average worker’s net income. Only Hungary has greater income 
inequality. Whereas there were 290,000 individual bankruptcies in 1980, 
2005 saw more than 2 million. Over a similar period, mortgage foreclo-
sures increased five times over, and the personal savings rate became neg-
ative for the first time since the pit of the Depression (Lexington 2005; 
Skocpol 2004; Webster and Bishaw 2006; Thelen 2000: 552; Freeman 
2004; “Centrifugal” 2005; Sered and Fernandopulle 2007: 213, 222; Pat-
rick Harris 2006; “Ever Higher” 2005; Madrick 2007: 20; “Breaking” 2005; 
Yates 2005; Hutton 2003b: 133, 148; Taibo 2003: 24; Bernstein 2006: 6, 
34, 120; Henwood 2006; Kotkin and Friedman 2006; Hacker 2006: 13, 
94, 138, ix, 2; Tully 2007; Wallechinsky 2006; “Time to Act” 2007; Francis 
2005; Francis 2007; Sawhill and Morton 2008: 3).
 Put another way, the gap between what labor produces and what it reaps 
is greater than at any point in recorded history. This bizarre reconcentra-
tion of wealth in the hands of the bourgeoisie is unprecedented in world 
history since the advent of working-class electoral franchises. No wonder 
The Economist captioned a photo of the Queen of England greeting Bush 
Minor and his wife, Laura, as “Liz, meet the royals.” We are back in what 
Mark Twain and Charles Dudley Warner (1874) bitingly satirized as The 
Gilded Age, the 19th-century heyday of capital when Andrew Carnegie 
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coined the term “The Gospel of Wealth” to legitimize his race, class, and 
gender privilege. No wonder Warren Buffet avowed in a 2003 letter to 
Berkshire investors that “if class warfare is being waged in America, my 
class is clearly winning” (“Ever Higher” 2005; Garfinkle 2006: 15). Even 
some unrepentant fans of capitalism complain that “many Americans are 
one lost job and one medical emergency away from bankruptcy,” while 
James Glassman, one of the reactionary American Enterprise Institute’s 
pop thinkers, acknowledges that “we’ve redistributed income about as 
much as we can.” Almost half the population does not see hard work as 
the means to a better life. Employment is less secure and fluctuations 
in household income are more intense than people were brought up to 
remember. Risk is “offloaded by governments and corporations onto 
the increasingly fragile balance sheets of workers and their families.” In 
sum, if we juxtapose aggregate prosperity against personal insecurity, the 
economy is doing well by ruling-class indices; but it is doing poorly by 
working-class indices, in terms of both inequality and instability. Non-
supervisory employees remain driven by the “Dream”—and it’s not about 
wealth but simply economic comfort. Despite this modest objective, their 
pursuit of it has failed in their own eyes, wrecked on the shoals of stag-
nating wages, accelerating costs of basic needs, agglomerating debt, and 
perishing retirement income. Workers are far from sanguine about their 
own future and their children’s—and this anxiety is felt by college gradu-
ates, for the first time (Lake Research Partners 2006; Tully 2007; Cohen and 
DeLong 2005: 113; Glassman quoted in Hall 2006). Even the intellectual 
bloc of the plutocracy, represented by the American Enterprise Institute, 
the Brookings Institution, the Heritage Foundation, and the Urban Insti-
tute, concurs that the Dream has been disrupted by our national decline 
in economic mobility. They are posing the ultimate political quandary for 
capital: “What happens if the public begins to question its prospects for 
upward mobility?” (Sawhill and Morton 2008: 2).
 And the reaction to these shocks and shifts in culture and economy? 
As immigration has become more diverse and complex, and wealth 
has been systematically redistributed upwards, vast numbers of people 
have pledged themselves to two potent forms of makeover: religion and 
psycho-pharmacology. These developments are reshaping a tendency 
toward reinvention that is central to the mythology and lived experi-
ence of the entire nation. Each trend comes complete with transforma-
tive claims, as if they were rescue columns promising deliverance from 
peril. I address them in turn.
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god-Botherers
True conservatism flows from a singular unifying belief: God. in private life 
and in the public square good liberals can take him or leave him, but true 
conservatives must always seek him and strive to heed him. in the conser-
vative creed human beings are moral and spiritual beings. each of us has 
God-given personal rights and God-given social duties, God-given individual 
liber ties and God-given moral responsibilities.
 —John J. diiulio, Jr., bush minor’s first director of the White house Office  
    of faith-based and Community initiatives (2003: 218)
At the time of its formation, the United States was not very religious (per-
haps 15% to 20% of the population were God-botherers). In 1683, 83% of 
Salem (Salem!) taxpayers were not aligned with any church (“O Come” 
2007: 8, 10). Three hundred years later, the same proportion of the US 
population regarded the Bible as the word. Its annual sales veered between 
$425 and $650 million (“The Battle” 2007: 80). Puritanism had long been 
the object of obloquy and mockery as much as adherence. The Constitu-
tion did not mention God, and 1797’s Treaty of Tripoli specified that the 
country “is not in any sense founded on the Christian religion” (Kevin 
Phillips 2006: 108; Elliott 2001: ix; Treaty quoted in Allen 2005). But a clear 
relationship developed between immigration, economic change, and reli-
gious uptake in the United States. Religion offered comfort to new arrivals 
and reaction for nativists, very much as for today’s right-wing religious 
rapture; and it became a national player because churches provided ser-
vices in competition with one another to recruit migrants, who were not 
aided by the state. For free settlers and enslaved ones alike, faith provided 
reasons to flee, forms of succor, and means of collective identification. It 
helped maintain ethnic solidarity in a new environment, leavened a lack 
of class bearings, gave solace throughout the horrors of slavery, and deliv-
ered social services denied by the brutality of capital and the plutocracy 
of the state. With the emergence of industrial capitalism and its collec-
tive pressures, the selfish aspects of Protestant religion also offered a form 
of possessive individualism to counter the dictates of obedience at work. 
Immigration and economic change coincided between 1890 and 1920, 
as the mass arrival of Eastern and Central Europeans changed the ethnic 
equilibrium and factory life developed. 
 Now the two trends are cycling again via new racial formations and 
postindustrialization. Each period has been providential for the particular 
superstitions of Evangelicals, characterized by a demonization of secular 
positivism—most obviously evolutionary theory—and by imperialistic 
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desire and militarism. These bigotries tie into a longstanding obsession 
with fertility and conversion as means of defending and expanding terrain. 
The nation’s repeated bursts of God-bothering are called Great Awaken-
ings. As measured by leaps in the percentage of the population attending 
and affiliating with churches, these bursts occurred in 1850 (34%), 1890 
(45%), 1926 (56%), and 1980 (62%). Those dates correlate with devastating 
forms of economic faith: nutty Malthusian racism, embodied in the 1885 
Chinese Exclusion Act; contractionary class inequality and the 1924 Immi-
gration Act under Depression-era Republicans; and the neoliberal warlock 
craft of the contemporary moment, as per welfare reform and regressive 
taxation (Peck 1993: 11–14, 36, 81; Kaufmann 2006; Phillips 2006: 116; 
Greene 1999: 39, 44; Portes and Rumbaut 2006: 316).
 Time magazine ran a cover story in 1966 entitled “Is God Dead?” and 
The Economist published his obituary in its millennial issue (“In God’s 
Name” 2007: 5). Such secularism is inconceivable today. We can discern 
a homology between what Marx called “the mist-enveloped regions of the 
religious world,” which conceal the secular reality of human action forging 
faith, and the way that the value of commodities is disarticulated from the 
labor that makes them (1987: 77, 84). Based on his extensive interviews 
with true believers across the country, Pulitzer Prize–winning former New 
York Times journalist and Harvard Divinity School graduate Chris Hedges 
suggests that the “engine that drives the radical Christian right in the 
United States, the most dangerous mass movement in American history, 
is not religiosity, but despair.” Whereas capital, government, and suburbia 
were failing much of the population, the magical hereafter promised them 
relief and release that could not be falsified by their drab diurnal existence 
(2007). And one Puritan element that was never compromised? A bold 
and fierce nationalism that claimed for the United States something akin to 
predestined domination (Fessenden et al. 2001: 2).
 Of course, for all these compelling sociological explanations that show 
why people sign up to believe, the United States constantly surprises in the 
fervor of its commitment to, well, magic. Evangelical Christians speak of 
an almost physical, trancelike transformation, from a faith based in ideas 
to something that resembles transubstantiation. Not surprisingly, they 
have powerful ties to millenarianism and the supernatural (Luhrmann 
2004; Peck 1993: 8). One must ponder hard a nation where the vast 
majority attests to the existence of a devil and individuated angels; 45% of 
people say aliens have visited Earth; three times more people know there 
are ghosts than was the case a quarter-century ago; over one-third think 
houses can be haunted; 84% credit posthumous survival of the soul, up 
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24% from 1972; only 25% subscribe to evolution; almost two-thirds antici-
pate millennial doom and rebirth; 55% are certain that Satan exists; 44% 
know there are demons (the same national proportion that has seen Mel 
Gibson’s anti-Semitic paean to sadomasochism, The Passion of the Christ 
[2004], where his screen and social identities of oleaginous businessman, 
vengeful messiah, anti-authoritarian larrikin, and right-wing real-estate 
magnate collided); and in the South, 44% believe lightning is sent by God 
to punish wrongdoers. The country has approximately 335,000 religious 
congregations, and 79% of its citizens identify as Christian, with 41% 
converts to fundamentalist evangelism across a bizarre array of groups, 
and 18% aligned with the religious right. The latter are the most skeptical 
people in the Yanqui population about environmental protection. Appar-
ently there is no future for the planet. God’s design is to destroy it and 
deliver true believers to safety in a kinky theological draft of wind (Hutton 
2003a; Mann 2003: 103; Pew Internet & American Life Project 2004; Gallup 
2002–3; O’Connor 2005: 8; Grossberg 2005: 140–41; Newport and Carroll 
2003; “The God Slot” 2006; Association of Religion Data Archives 2006; 
Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life 2004b; Hartford Institute for Reli-
gious Research 2007; Pew Research Center 2005a: 17; Baylor Institute for 
the Study of Religion 2006; Stearns 2006: 70–71). Yet people in the United 
States know almost nothing about the Bible—60% can’t recite even half of 
the Ten Commandments, 50% don’t know the name of the first book in it 
or who preached the Sermon on the Mount, 25% don’t know what Easter 
is, and 12% believe that Noah married Joan of Arc (“The Battle” 2007: 81). 
The proportions of the Bush Cabinet covered in this survey are not avail-
able.
 The population’s embrace of superstition places the United States alone 
amongst nations with advanced economies and educational systems. 
The 96% of people who believe in a higher power, and the 59% who state 
that religion is crucial to their life, represent more than twice the pro-
portions for Japan, South Korea, Western Europe, and the former Soviet 
bloc. Unlike any other First World country, most US residents connect 
belief in God to morality and wealth. Unlike their fellow antisecularists in 
much of the Third World, they reject state intervention to assuage social 
ills, so forbiddingly individual is their account of person and deity. (In 
the late 1990s, 94% of US citizens between aged 15 and 24 equated citi-
zenship with assisting other people individually.) But they do favor state 
intervention to destroy and punish others: preachers were key firebrands 
in many US conflicts, perhaps most notably the War of 1812, the Civil War, 
the Spanish-American War, and the oily Oedipal invasions of Iraq. Don’t 
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bother yourself with social justice, political representation, or inequality. 
Just help the next person across the street, or defeat them in battle, and 
all will be well. It’s a grotesque national smackdown, pitting Albert Camus 
against Norman Vincent Peale on pay-per-view in hysterical mode, with a 
quarter of the population sufficiently deluded to speak in tongues. Perhaps 
the best exemplification of this trend is the megachurch—churches with 
weekly attendances in excess of 2,000 people. By 2006 there were over a 
thousand such entities. That number has doubled since 2001, as has their 
average attendance. The megachurches use satellites more and more, and 
four megachurch pastor-authors have featured on the New York Times’ 
bestseller list, with tens of millions in sales (Luhrmann 2004: 520; Pew 
Research Center for the People & the Press 2002b and 2003b; Kevin Phil-
lips 2006: 122; Westheimer and Kahne 2004: 6; Pew Forum on Religion & 
Public Life 2006b; Baylor Institute for the Study of Religion 2006; Redden 
2002: 34; Thumma et al. 2006).
 This is not quite what social science predicted—neither right-wing 
modernization theory nor Marxist developmentalism. Secular modernity 
was conceived as postreligious. But we are witnessing the dread revival of 
superstition, its ironic triumph as a postsecular phenomenon. The United 
States seems to be a society where transcendence in the hic et nunc can be 
followed or trumped by deliverance (or at least persistence) after death. 
And true believers want to transform others, not just themselves. Faith is 
regarded as a sign of moral superiority that must be carried into public life. 
In the 1960s, 53% of the population favored no role for religion in politics. 
Today, 54% favor direct participation by religious organizations in govern-
ment, and 60% of white Evangelicals want the Bible to guide lawmaking 
over the will of the population (Pace 2007; “Therapy” 2003: 13; Jeffries 
2006; Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life 2006a).
 The re-enchantment of politics dates from Jimmy Carter’s decision to roll 
back special privileges accorded to Christian academies that had exempted 
them from federal taxes. The end to that outrageous subsidy pushed creepy 
Christians into the political domain. And since Richard Nixon had scored 
zero on political morality, post-Watergate Republicans proceeded to stress 
personal morality, targeting the left and social movements in areas of sym-
bolic power. Campaigns for civil rights, feminism, and gay liberation pro-
voked counteroffensives by fundamentalists (anti-obscenity and anti-abor-
tion), nationalists (anti–flag burning and pro–English Only), and political 
conservatives (anti–affirmative action and anti–civil rights). Time-series 
analysis demonstrates that the last three decades have seen activist Demo-
crats become more secular and modern, and activist Republicans more 
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religious and antimodern (Flint and Porter 2005; Rieder 2003: 30; Schmidt 
2000). Democratic partisans have favored abortion, queer rights, and wom-
en’s issues, and Republicans have opposed them, from the moment they 
ably alliterated the 1972 Democrats as the party of “Acid, Amnesty, and 
Abortion” (quoted in Rieder 2003: 23). Migrating “southward down the 
Twisting Tail of Rhetoric,” Republicans focused on “the misty-eyed flag-
waving of Ronald Reagan who, while George McGovern flew bombers in 
World War II, took a pass and made training films in Long Beach” (Keillor 
2004).
 Yet Bill Clinton affiliated with a strangely fervent Christianity, his 
hypocrisy matched only by the righteous selfishness of reactionary US 
Protestants and their claims to superiority over others (Hutton 2003b: 28). 
Consider Clinton’s two inauguration speeches—grotesque assortments of 
biblical and Catholic teaching plus clichés from the Gipper that signaled 
an ecumenical but strong religiosity indebted to conservatives. A form of 
“civil religion,” these addresses troped the United States as a chosen land, 
even alluding to the Bible’s claim that God changed history by referring to 
the end of the Cold War as a sign of “the fullness of time” (Pitney 1997; 
Clinton quoted in Bacevich 2003: 1). Clinton was indebted to reactionary 
politics, despite being animated by progressive social movements. Lib-
eral on cultural questions and neoliberal on financial ones, but avowedly a 
god-botherer of the first order, he was like many progay, prochoice, anti-
welfare suburbanites. In keeping with his indebtedness to this group, the 
economic dividend that Clinton was presented by the end of the Cold 
War in the form of mounting surpluses was not spent combating internal 
and external poverty (Falk 2004: 26)—the secondary moral outrage of his 
presidency after the failure to act in Rwanda.
 But even Clinton’s level of superstition was not enough for the right.
 The Homeland Security Act (House of Representatives 5005, 2002) man-
dates bankrolling “faith-based” groups to further “civic engagement and 
integration.” Of course, during Minor’s first term, all such support went 
to Christians, and not a brass razoo to Sikhs, Jews, Muslims, or Buddhists 
(Kaplan 2004: 22). For example, “MentorKids USA” received funding until 
Constitutional watchdogs protested that the organization required volun-
teers to sign a pledge avowing that “the Bible is God’s authoritative and 
inspired word that is without error . . . including creation, history, its origi-
nals and salvation” (quoted in Freedom from Religion 2004).
 Evangelical organizations generally intervene in sex, not economics, 
and resolutely oppose adequate welfare and proworker policies. Instead, 
they fight to diminish privacy. For example, anal and oral sex and the use 
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of vibrators remained crimes in many states until a 2003 US Supreme 
Court decision. In the same session, the court upheld new rules severely 
restricting family visits to prisoners. Only one of these decisions (decrimi-
nalizing non-procreative penetrative sex) drew the wrath of so-called 
family-oriented religious think tanks and lobby groups. They showed 
no interest in the 1.3 million children whose fathers were (and possibly 
still are) incarcerated. These protestors were not animated by the mate-
rial well-being of the groups in whose name they spoke. There was no call 
to strengthen families rent asunder by prison. Protestant evangelist Pat 
Robertson was too busy mobilizing his Christian Broadcasting Network, 
calling on creepy Christians to pray for the removal of three judges who 
had voted to decriminalize volitional sex (he chose those with significant 
health problems) in order to aid Bush Minor’s project of altering the court. 
Operation Rescue, an anti-abortion group, set up six coffins outside a fed-
eral courthouse, each one inscribed with Supreme Court decisions that 
displeased the organization, and proceeded to set fire to them, a reaction 
in keeping with two decades of terrorism by the Christian right over sex. 
Of course, religious attendance correlates strongly with both committing 
crimes and heralding punishment of others (no wonder, given the malevo-
lent moralism and prying pressure of prelates). Those states of the union 
dominated by this unremitting, unforgiving, and above all hypocritical, 
censoriousness have the highest proportions of teenage pregnancy, out-
of-wedlock births, murder, and divorce, even as bastions of morality like 
Chuck Colson, the Concerned Women of America, the American Spectator, 
Linda Chavez, and the Heritage Foundation blame torture at Abu Ghraib 
in 2003 on pornography, gay culture, feminism, and Hollywood (DiIulio Jr. 
2003: 219; Jakobsen and Pellegrini 2003: 3–5; Pollard 2003: 70; Risol 2003; 
Rosen 2003: 48; Coltrane 2001; “Us” 2003: 12; Rich 2004; Portes and Rum-
baut 2006: 329; Douglas 2004).
 Despite the poll numbers, it would be wrong to regard the makeover 
right as an organic movement that operates from the ground up. Its ideas 
come from an elite of over three hundred “coin-operated” think tanks in 
Washington. Funded by such wealthy US foundations and families as Olin, 
Scaife, Koch, Castle Rock, and Smith Richardson, these organizations 
ideologize extravagantly on everything from sexuality to foreign policy. 
Ghostwriters render the prose of resident intellectuals attractive as part of 
a project that is concerned more with marketing opinion than with con-
ducting research—for each “study” they fund is essentially the alibi for 
an op-ed piece. Their immediate audience comprises a second-tier grass-
roots network stretching across the National Right to Life Committee, the 
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American Family Association, the Liberty Alliance, the Eagle Forum, the 
Family Research Council, the Christian Action Network, and the Christian 
Coalition. Then there is a more public audience. Progressive think tanks 
had just a one-sixth share of media quotations compared to reactionary 
institutions during the 1990s. In the decade 1995–2005, the right aver-
aged 51% of citations, and progressives 14%. The people who appear on 
the three major television networks’ newscasts as expert commentators 
on society and culture are indices of this success: 92% of such mavens are 
white, 85% are male, and 75% are Republican. In all, 90% of news inter-
viewees on these networks are white men born between 1945 and 1960 
(Kallick 2002; Karr 2005; Alterman 2003: 85; Dolny 2003 and 2005; Hart 
2004: 52; Claussen 2004: 56; Love 2003: 246; Cohen 2004; Rendall and 
Broughel 2003).
 These civil-society tactics, both protests and op-ed pieces, came from 
somewhere uncomfortably close to the left. Having learned from progres-
sive social movements that the personal and the cultural were political, 
the right declared itself the ideological foe not only of subaltern groups 
seeking enfranchisement, but also of liberal, humanistic expressions 
of universality and secularism. Minorities and feminists had protested 
antidefamation with great impact, so why shouldn’t the right protest the 
defamation of its values—fundamentalism, homophobia, and nation-
alism? Such methods parroted civil-rights legislation and the rhetoric of 
subject positions around which contemporary social movements waged 
their struggles. The National Rifle Association, for example, was a rather 
mild-mannered, Clark-Kentish advocate for field sports for a long time. 
Following an internal coup in the mid-1970s, it left New York City for 
the wilds, campaigned for people owning guns as a Constitutional right/
responsibility—and overtly borrowed tactics from the civil-rights move-
ment. The same period marked the advent of the Moral Majority, again 
drawing on the rhetoric and methods of civil rights. Ten years later, this 
indebtedness to civil-rights activism was carried forward by the United 
Shareholders Association, whose consumerist politics disempowered 
workers and turned corporations into ventures of speculation rather than 
generators of infrastructure. Then evangelical Christians modeled their 
anti–queer marriage movement on anti-tobacco activism. Today, both 
Stanford and UCLA feature organizations dedicated to undoing “insti-
tutional racism”—a concept long derided by the white right that is now 
perversely embraced by it to claim that groups such as the Movimiento 
Estudiantil Chicano de Aztlán, formed at the height of creative Chican@ 
cultural politics in the 1970s, have become so powerful on campus that 
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they must be stopped for fear of disadvantaging white folks. In 2004, the 
Sierra Club fended off a takeover by anti-Latin@ candidates who opposed 
immigration on environmental grounds. All of these groups were under-
written by far-right think tanks and foundations—artful practitioners 
of an identity politics they profess to despise, rearticulated through the 
supposedly benign and unquestionable dogmas of faith and opportunity 
(Hutton 2003b: 85, 104; Coltrane 2001: 395; Lovato 2004).
 Earlier battles that had been won by the left through the use of spectacle 
have been waged anew, with spectacle as much a tactic of reactionaries 
as of radicals. The umbrella term for this front, “culture war,” originated 
toward the end of Reagan’s presidency. It became media orthodoxy when 
Republican Congressman Henry Hyde sought to condemn flag burning as 
“one front in a larger culture war” in 1990 (quoted in DiMaggio 2003: 80). 
(A decade on, after his service as chair of the congressional committee that 
recommended Clinton’s impeachment, Hyde further distinguished himself 
by writing to Bush Minor upon the election of the leftist Luiz Inácio Lula 
da Silva to the presidency of Brazil in 2002 that a new nation had joined the 
“axis of evil” purportedly formed by Iraq, North Korea, and Iran [quoted in 
Youngers 2003]). Grover Norquist, a key zealot and Republican apparatchik 
who heads an antitax front organization for the party, has summed up the 
times with his tasteless statement, “Bipartisanship is another form of date 
rape” (quoted in Keillor 2004), while public broadcasting’s McLaughlin 
Group TV show dedicated much discussion to the notion that Clinton was 
Satan. This virulent think tank and social-movement anti-statism subsided 
once the Republicans took control of both the executive branch and Con-
gress. A previous hostility to the state transformed into a warm embrace. 
Sixty-nine percent of the Republican Party soon held that government 
functioned for the good of all (Alterman 2003: 145; Pew Research Center 
for the People & the Press 2003d: 2, 8).
 Here is a recent, rather secular ethno/demography of these magician-
nativists:
Hairy-backed swamp developers and corporate shills, faith-based econo-
mists, fundamentalist bullies with Bibles, Christians of convenience, free-
lance racists, misanthropic frat boys, shrieking midgets of AM radio, tax 
cheats, nihilists in golf pants, brownshirts in pinstripes, sweatshop tycoons, 
hacks, fakirs, aggressive dorks, Lamborghini libertarians, people who believe 
Neil Armstrong’s moonwalk was filmed in Roswell, New Mexico, little honk-
ers out to diminish the rest of us.
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Is this the irritated rant of an urban hipster, mercilessly mocking those 
beyond the world of downtown lofts and polymorphous pleasure? Did 
these words drop from a laptop as it hurtled across the fly-over states? No. 
The quotation comes from a true son of the Midwest: Prairie Home Com-
panion’s Garrison Keillor (2004) was responding to the latest wave of right-
wing reaction to the difference that colors US life. That politics follows 
many of the tenets and life forms of fundamentalism more generally in its 
identification of an inviolable ancient text with a contemporary sociopo-
litical strategy, thereby offering internal cohesion and external power. But 
in keeping with the traditional characteristics of reactionaries, despite the 
purportedly positive guidance provided by an originary text such as the 
Bible, it is used in a negative way, to construct an ideology known by what 
it opposes as much as if not more than what it supports. No wonder the 
distinguished former president of Argentina, Raúl Alfonsín, worried aloud 
that the United States was headed for neofascism because of the far-right 
forces unleashed by creepy Christianity (Pace 2007; Anguita and Colectivo 
Prometeo 2003: 43).
Pi l l -Poppers
The neurogenetic-industrial complex . . . becomes ever more powerful. 
Undeterred by the way that molecular biologists, confronted with the outputs 
from the human Genome Project, are beginning to row back from genetic 
determinist claims, psychometricians and behavior geneticists, sometimes in 
combination and sometimes in competition with evolutionary psychologists, 
are claiming genetic roots to areas of human belief, intentions and actions 
long assumed to lie outside biological explanation . . . [:] political tendency, 
religiosity and likelihood of mid-life divorce.
 —Steven rose (2006: 6–7)
In addition to religiosity as a response to cultural and economic change, 
there is a more rational, less ideological, but equally far-reaching, reaction 
to cultural change. For nowadays, nestling alongside big faith, “‘big science’ 
and ‘big technology’ can sit on your desk, reside in a pillbox, or inside your 
body” (Clarke et al. 2003: 167, 164), offering “personalised medicine” via 
cosmetic pharmacology (“Billion” 2007: 71). One trend remodels belief. 
The other remodels the brain. The selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors 
(SSRIs) world of the psychological makeover through pharmacology pro-
vides a strange meeting point of the body’s exterior and its interior, a site 
where commodities encounter emotions, mediated formally and informally 
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through professional knowledge and intervention, and mass-produced in 
pill form. Pharmaceutical corporations promote fast, efficient solutions to 
life’s problems—a call to stop reading and start swallowing.
 In the quarter-century to 2003, US expenditure on pharmaceuticals grew 
from $12 billion to $197 billion, a seventeenfold increase at a time when 
spending on cars and clothes doubled and tripled respectively. Expendi-
ture on pharmaceutical psy-drugs increased by 638% in the United States 
between 1990 and 2000 (as opposed to 50% in Japan and 126% in Europe), 
and dosages of psy-drugs increased by 70%. During that period, as a pro-
portion of the overall market for pharmacology, the United States was 
more obsessed with mental health than anything or anybody else, with 
psy-drugs accounting for 18% of the pharmaceutical market. By the turn 
of the 21st century, 38 million people in the United States had tried Prozac, 
and over 10 million new prescriptions were written for it in 1999 alone. In 
2004, 91 million people, 45% of the population, took prescription drugs 
regularly, and only a quarter never did so. That represents 64% of all house-
holds, filling 3 billion prescriptions a year. In the ten years to 2000, a period 
of minimal inflation, US expenditure on pharmaceuticals doubled, to $100 
billion. A decade ago, US residents averaged seven prescriptions a year; 
now it is twelve (Rose 2007: 209; Erica Goode 2000; Fox 2004; Petersen 
2008; Rowe 2006).
 This is the era when the head of AstraZeneca can smile as he offers this 
tidbit of grandiose pharma-hubris: “Death is optional” (quoted in “Billion” 
2007: 69). For if the self is “a cultural invention” (Kessen 1979: 815), and 
we are en route to a “posthuman self ” (Davis 2000), then the newest “dar-
lings of Wall Street”—pharmacorps—are its leading manufacturers (Healy 
2002: 2, 353). The drug makeover experience clearly appeals to people who 
have decided to abandon former existences. They are living out the latest 
trend in a makeover nation: “SSRIs, hormones, brain boosters, neurotrans-
mitters.” Instead of old-style recreational objects that Yanquis liked to put 
in their mouths (alcohol, tobacco, coffee, and illegal substances), which 
promised instantaneous joy and release—tied in some cases to eventual 
death, disability, pain, contempt, or incarceration—the new substances, 
legal and controlled, offer a general overhaul (Davis 2000; Elliott 2003a). 
No huddling outside the office building, no stains on the paperwork or key-
board, no obvious need to be like others. No quick pleasure, no hangover, 
no nightly snoring or morning cough driving those around you to distrac-
tion, no staggering to the bathroom to be ill, no breathlessness walking 
up two flights of stairs, no emanations from the mouth, hair, or clothes to 
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mark one out. Instead, a quiet daily insurance backs up the gains made the 
day before within one’s not-so-hard drive of a body, and without the fear of 
employer drug testing. Rather than forming illicit, informal relationships 
with others through the shared experience of ingestion, new drugs “melt 
invisibly into the texture of the everyday” (Davis 2000). They forge a ster-
ling relationship with the self that can be invisible to others and oneself—a 
preparty preparation, the perfect makeover. Or more publicly, they can 
be redisposed as membership badges via water-cooler discussions about 
whether last week’s Prozac has taken hold yet, almost as per Evangelicals’ 
seemingly insatiable need for recognition of their status as “born again” 
(a charming critique of mothers and birthing centers). These drugs ful-
fill the dream of learning the code, cracking the means of making oneself 
anew, leaving life as something more than when one arrived—and doing 
so in a seamless way that does not draw attention to itself unless desired. 
What may have begun as a search for authentic feelings via confession and 
therapy—the real me revealed—turns commodified transmogrification 
into authenticity itself (Elliott 2003b: 22, 29–30). For Prozac guru Peter D. 
Kramer, enhancement pharmacology may be “the American ideal” (2003: 
xi). Instead of illness cured, one type of wellness substitutes for another 
(Elliott 2003b: 50–51). Some say this is the corollary of a macroeconomic 
change, that “the scientific management of production, so prevalent in the 
early days of the twentieth century, has been displaced by a new scientific 
management of consumption” (Hansen et al. 2003: 1). What differentiates 
this era of enhancement technologies from others is the sense that con-
sumer purchases displace political activism as a means of improvement. 
The mythic quest to “restore a lost normativity” looks modest by contrast 
with this hyperconsumerism (Hogle 2005; Rose 2007: 81).
 Enhancement technologies have become topics of everyday conver-
sation with the spread of brain boosters to improve concentration (Hib-
bert 2007).What used to be part of drug subculture—pills to transform 
the self—has become central to corporate capital. To quote the New York 
Times, “Big Pharma Ogles Yasgur’s Farm.” So we find Viagra sponsoring 
a tour by Earth, Wind & Fire, a ’70s rhythm and blues/soul/funk group, 
as part of a search by its manufacturer, Pfizer, for consumers who once 
associated popular music with illegal, recreational drug use and who might 
now be open to a legal life-style equivalent (Leland 2001).
 Deregulation has propelled marketing into the forefront of drug devel-
opment, and pharmaceutical companies deem conventional scholarly 
research and education too slow for their financial rhythms. The phar-
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maceutical industry’s proportion of US health research grew from 13% 
in 1980 to 52% in 1995. Marketing, not medicine, decides how to develop 
a new pharmacological compound once it has been uncovered, asking 
the following questions: Will it be announced as a counter to depression 
or premature ejaculation? Will it be announced in journal x or y? Which 
scholars will be chosen to front it and produce consensus over its benefits? 
Major advertising agencies that work with pharmaceutical corporations, 
such as Interpublic, WPP, and Omnicom, have subsidiaries like Scirex that 
conduct clinical trials. Known as medical education and communications 
companies, they aim to get “closer to the test tube.” These desires for sales 
and speed versus protocol meet, ironically, in scholarly journals. Despite 
the cult of speed, scholarly legitimacy is a key part of this merchandising. 
Pfizer describes academic publication as a means “to support, directly or 
indirectly, the marketing of our product” (quoted in Moffatt and Elliott 
2007). Medical education and communications companies provide ghost-
writing services, paid for by corporations, that deliver copy to academics 
and clinicians—and then pay them for signing it. Many faculty shill for cor-
porations by allowing their names to go on articles that they have neither 
researched nor written—for all the world like football players or basket-
ballers who have not even read, let alone penned, their “autobiographies.” 
Instead, these corporate subsidiaries write papers on behalf of academics. 
Such practices are increasingly common across the domain of big pharma, 
with few if any concessions to the notion of a conflict of interest or even 
to the notion of open declaration of this cash-for-research-and-comment 
love fest.
 Thankfully, the whistle is occasionally blown by potential recruits who 
reject an offer (Fugh-Berman 2005). Such revelations have led the Inter-
national Committee of Medical Journal Editors to establish criteria that 
investigate who does the research and writing that medical journals pub-
lish. Even with these criteria in place, one in ten papers in leading medical 
outlets is the work of ghostwriters, and an astounding 90% of articles pub-
lished in the Journal of the American Medical Association derive from people 
paid by pharmacorps, which pressure medical journals to print favorable 
research findings in return for lucrative advertising copy (Healy et al. 2003; 
Moynihan 2004). The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (2003) offers 
a wry column about these authorial phantoms. Entitled “Ghostwriting: 
The Basics,” it lays out the dimensions and norms of the scam, noting 
the scandal of Fen-Phen as the most prominent disaster resulting from 
cash-register research of this kind: people shopping for weight reduction 
ended up with heart and lung damage. Similar investigative reports have 
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come from ABC News, the Wall Street Journal, Forbes, and many other 
media outlets. Of course, pretend authorship is only part of the conflict of 
interest. Away from ghostwriting, pseudoscholars from medical schools 
and professional practice routinely accept monetary and travel gifts from 
companies in a quiet quid pro quo for favorable publicity. Pharmacorps’ 
budgets for marketing to clinicians are skyrocketing (Moffatt and Elliott 
2007: 19). The result? The permanently ethically and intellectually chal-
lenged oxymoronic notion of the “business school” has been overtaken by 
the medical academy in the collegial disgrace stakes. 
 The deregulatory, deprofessionalizing impulses of privatization have 
also been applied to the creation of drug consumers as patients, reinter-
pellated as sovereign consumer-citizens able to govern themselves orally. 
TV commercials for prescription drugs, banned for thirty years by UN 
protocols that restricted direct-to-consumer marketing by pharmacorps, 
have been washed away from US obligations (the only other nation to do 
this, Aotearoa/New Zealand, is rethinking the policy).  In 2001, $2 bil-
lion was spent promoting pharma to Yanquis, up from $300 million three 
years earlier. By 2004, the figure was $4 billion; in 2006, $4.5 billion. More 
money is spent selling psychiatric “wonder drugs” than on medical school 
and residency training—in 1998, Eli Lilly and Company paid $95 million 
just to market Prozac. The Government Accountability Office has found 
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) at fault for lack of oversight of 
false pharma commercials, while the Kaiser Family Foundation says that 
direct address of consumers in advertisements has increased prescription 
drug sales by 12% (Allen 2007). The key site of promotion is new diseases 
as much as their treatment—companies vend the problem coevally with 
the cure. Companies are forever developing products to deal with circum-
stances that have been newly defined as maladies, like baldness, obesity, 
and impotence: “insomnia, sadness, [and] twitchy legs” become “sleep dis-
order, depression [and] restless leg syndrome” as part of “the medicalization 
of everyday life” (Welch et al. 2007). There are also carefully orchestrated 
product placements undertaken by front organizations. The 2004 Academy 
Awards telecast saw a Boomer Coalition commercial urging adults to have 
their cholesterol tested, without disclosing that the coalition was invented 
by an advertising agency and underwritten by Pfizer. TV commercials 
promote pills to counter hair loss, muscle loss, and erection loss—in fact, 
everything bar Lacanian loss. In 2005, drug manufacturers outlaid $240 
million to create and sustain erections. Republican Bob Dole, baseballer 
Rafael Palmeiro, race-car driver Jeff Fuller, “football”4 coach Mike Ditka, 
and a National Association for Stock Car Auto Racing (NASCAR) event all 
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need help with their erections, and “footballer” Ricky Williams seeks alle-
viation from anxiety. Big pharma has devoted such massive proportions of 
its wealth to the creation of need via promotional expenditure that approx-
imately one-fifth of its revenue goes to research and development versus 
one-third to marketing. Pfizer even stations marketers inside laboratories 
to ensure that scientists don’t waste time looking to create compounds 
that nobody can be made to want. The corollary is a drastic drop-off in 
new medications coming to market (Jaramillo 2006: 272; Scherer 2005: 
72; Esposito 2006; Rose 2003: 51, 56; Healy 1997: 25; Rubin 2004: 373–74; 
Gates et al. 2002; Hearn 2005; Kovac 2001; Sollisch 2000; Reitman 2003; 
“Billion” 2007: 71; Jack 2006; Bloom 2000; “Beyond the Pill” 2007; Petersen 
2008).5 Even waking up is set to become easier. Drugs are planned for 
the “sleep market” (Marsa 2005) and to enhance memory—matters of far 
greater interest to pharmacorps than the treatment of illness (Breithaupt 
and Weigmann 2004), since their military and educational market poten-
tial outstrips the temporal and spatial limitations of sickness. The British 
Medical Journal has conducted a febrile debate over what it astringently 
refers to as “non-diseases,” appositely deriding such commercial projects 
as “disease mongering” for profit via “an ill for every pill” (Moynihan et al. 
2002; Moynihan and Smith 2002: 859). Even the always-awful Los Angeles 
Times, located in the center of imagined disorders, wonders about the will 
“to treat . . . benign personality traits” (Gottlieb 2000).
 In order to ensure a neat articulation between the politics, economics, 
and culture of drugs, and despite criticism from the Association of Amer-
ican Physicians and Surgeons, Bush Minor’s administration introduced 
a New Freedom Commission on Mental Health (2003), featuring former 
drug-company mavens, to screen US residents for mental illness. Children 
were the first targets for mandatory evaluation, because the commission’s 
pharmacorps members recognized schools as ideal testing venues for iden-
tifying 50 million potential customers. Their favored method was the Texas 
Medication Algorithm Project, a policy adopted during Minor’s disastrous 
governorship. The project dressed up in mathematical discourse what 
amounted to a flowchart ratcheting medical treatment up from one drug 
to another, culminating in electroconvulsive therapy. Officials associated 
with the project were implicated in bribes from companies whose products 
they placed on the critical path. So who could be surprised when it was 
recommended nationally by the president’s New Freedom Commission on 
Mental Health in 2003, even as the International Committee of Medical 
Journal Editors and the New York Attorney General criticized the phar-
maceutical sector for hiding negative clinical trials from professional and 
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public evaluation (Graham 2004a and 2004b; “Executive Summary” 2005; 
Rose 2007: 249; President’s New Freedom Commission on Mental Health 
2003: 68–69; Lenzer and Paul 2006; “Trials” 2004)? Or that early in 2008, 
a comprehensive study basically found that antidepressants are the same 
as placebos in their impact on what they are supposed to treat—based on 
unpublished studies conducted by pharma (Kirsch 2008)?
 Meanwhile, cost pressures militate against complex psychotherapy, 
encouraging self-help software and company-sponsored electronic lis-
teners in addition to Texas warlock craft. Corporate intranets provide 
around-the-clock access to cognitive-behavioral band-aid therapy through 
employee assistance programs. The American Psychological Association 
(APA) offers “Questions to Ask Your Employer’s Benefits Manager” on its 
Web site as part of a “Consumer Help Center” (Hansen et al. 2003: 106, 
123, 56), and the HSM Group’s “Productivity Impact Model” (2004) esti-
mates the cost of employee depression to company revenues. It operates 
from the assumption that 50% of depressed workers are “untreated” and 
miss between thirty and fifty days of work a year as a consequence. To start 
the depression evaluation/treatment process, simply log on to http://www.
depressioncalculator.com, the neoliberal employer’s perfect wake-up page, 
no doubt.
 The grand industrial-era projects of land reclamation and skyscraper 
construction have contemporary nano- and digital equivalents in biomedi-
cine and the Internet. The trade in spare human parts is worth hundreds of 
millions of dollars annually, and the United States has over a thousand firms 
that sell products made from dead people (who are vended for upwards 
of $230,000 each). Biotechnology offers the prospect of absolute control/
development of people through drugs that destroy or augment memory, 
block or enhance fertility, create hypermusculature, and defy resistance to 
bacteria; and micromachines that give sight and hearing to the disabled—
or take them away. The next phase, genetic engineering, promises to alter 
the who, what, when, where, and how of being human. Newsweek predicts 
“made-to-order, off-the-shelf personalities.” The promise is “a shift from 
reactive to preventative and more personalized medicine” that will be at 
the center of economic prosperity, both as objects in themselves and as 
stimuli to productivity—even if the reality so far is a story of incremental 
development, especially in pharmaceuticals. The fact that forty cognitive-
enhancing drugs were in commercial development in 2004 both excited 
and terrified social critics of all casts. For Jürgen Habermas, there is a 
sinister aspect to all this. Elements of chance and choice that character-
ized the meeting of genes, society, and individuality in the past are being 
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superseded, as “the depth of the organic substrate” becomes susceptible to 
prenatal intervention and recoding (2003: 12–13, 23). But for the Organi-
zation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD), this is part 
of a “transition to a more biobased economy,” which all actors should wel-
come by removing “inappropriate barriers” and stimulating “opportuni-
ties” (Sharp 2006: 11; Kass 2003; “Supercharging” 2004; Newsweek quoted 
in DeGrandpre 2006: 57; Nightingale and Martin 2004: 564, 566; OECD 
2004: 3).
 This recoding appeals as much as anything because medical-enhance-
ment technologies provide a convenient way into contemporary reinven-
tion, at least rhetorically—and as pills, machines, and surgeries, they can 
easily be counted. The search for new selves is restless, imbued with cosmic 
ambivalence. It accompanies immigrant underclass culture as an animator 
of capitalist innovation and retardation and social chaos and cohesion. The 
next question is how to conceptualize religious and psychotropic responses 
to difference and economic inequality.
Conceptual i zat ion
Suicide by race, by color, by occupation, by sex, by seasons of the year, by 
time of day. Suicide, how committed: by poisons, by firearms, by drowning, 
by leaps. Suicide by poison, subdivided by types of poison, such as cor-
rosive, irritant, systemic, gaseous, narcotic, alkaloid, protein, and so for th. 
Suicide by leaps, subdivided by leaps from high places, under the wheels of 
trains, under the wheels of trucks, under the feet of horses, from steam-
boats.
 —edward G. robinson in his role as an insurance investigator, 
    Double Indemnity (1944)
“Risk society” (Risikogesellschaft in German sociology of the mid-1980s) 
and “moral panic” (from British criminology of the early 1970s) help 
explain the makeover nation during this revolutionary reallocation of 
resources of finance, faith, and pharmacology. Unusually for sociological 
and cultural theories, these concepts are freely used by, for example, the 
mainstream UK, Australasian, and Filipino media; the British National 
Council for Civil Liberties; and the British Academy, while The Lancet has 
run a column called “Doctoring the Risk Society.” Slow as ever, even the US 
media recently caught on.6 The New Yorker’s venerable “Talk of the Town” 
column, the New York Times’ Women’s Fashion Magazine, Slate, and the 
libertarians over at Reason have deployed the idea of risk society, and “risk” 
appeared in the title of several new magazines in the 1990s. Risk periodical 
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began, aptly enough, in the 1987 stock-market crash year. Its Web site, 
http://www.risk.net, is for “anyone who needs to manage risk” (for which 
read, those in search of derivatives). Numerous professional associations 
advertise risky elements of their occupations, and the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention have utilized the rather ominously named “Youth 
Risk Behavior Surveillance System” since 1990. Academically, while risk 
society is mobilized in sociology and media studies through to anesthe-
siology and philanthropy, moral-panic discourse is prominent in critical 
criminology and media and cultural studies. The former is manifested 
almost as a technical specification from beyond ideology, while the latter is 
used mostly by progressive critics. The British Medical Journal cares enough 
to have attacked the moral-panic framework, while the reactionary com-
munitarian Alan Wolfe has begrudgingly utilized it to criticize the way 
Republicans focus on terrorism rather than economic distress7 (Fitzpat-
rick 2003; Barker 1999; Wichtel 2002; Critcher 2003: 2, 53; “An Avalanche” 
2002; Tan 2001; Shafer 2005; Power 2004: 12; Gillespie 2003; Žižek 2005; 
Daniels 1998; Wolfe 2006; Jeffries 2006).
 What do the terms “risk society” and “moral panic” mean? According 
to Ulrich Beck, society is characterized by “institutions of monitoring and 
protection” that seek to protect people from “social, political, economic 
and individual risks,” servicing the time-discipline required by capitalism. 
Risk society “organises what cannot be organised.” It embodies and pro-
pels the desires of capital and state to make sense of and respond to prob-
lems, whether of their own making or not. If early modernity was about 
producing and distributing goods in a struggle for the most effective and 
efficient forms of industrialization, with devil take the hindmost and no 
thought for the environment, risk society is about enumerating and man-
aging those dangers. Rather than being occasional, risk is now a constitu-
tive component of being and organization that can be sold, pooled, and 
redisposed. This second modernity is characterized by an ever-increasing 
number of sophisticated mechanisms for measuring risk, even as the range 
and impact of risks grow less controllable. As technologies and markets 
become “better,” they cause greater potential and actual harm—which in 
turn become the object of predictive technologies and markets (Beck et 
al. 1994: 5; Beck 1999: 135; Power 2004: 10, 17; Smutniak 2004; Jeffries 
2006).
 Risk society references the psychological impact of structural economic 
changes and other shocks that (sometimes) accidentally accompany them. 
Ideological commitments to Marxism, feminism, or superstition weaken. 
Unlike the notion of a broad left that once infused such struggles, issues 
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are delinked, such that a position adopted on ecology says nothing about 
a position on popular democracy. Through governmental knowledges 
that offer both aggregated and variegated statistics to define, measure, 
and model populations in the interest of social control, advanced indus-
trial/postindustrial societies induce massively increased feelings of risk in 
people. They admit and even promote the irrationality of the economy—as 
a means, paradoxically, of governing populations. Risk is calculated diur-
nally, via finance, and registered expressively, by emotion. Feelings become 
metonyms of economic problems. Routine environmental despoliation, 
global labor competition, cyclical recession, declining life-long employ-
ment, massive international migration, developing communication tech-
nology, and the rolling back of the welfare state, alongside income redis-
tribution toward the wealthy, have left denizens of postindustrial societies 
factoring costs and benefits into everyday life as never before, while their 
sense of being able to determine their future through choice is diminished 
(Latour with Kastrissianakis 2007; Rigakos and Hadden 2001; O’Malley 
2001).
 Risk has a storied history, generally interlaced with religious ideology. 
Churches ply their trade through fear, with sin leading to damnation. This 
is especially salient in cases where Christians have stolen and then mar-
keted rituals from paganism, such as Halloween, or Christmas, which was 
traditionally a time of dread for children because they would be punished 
for misdeeds, until it was commodified. In the United States, radical-right 
Protestantism rejects the merciful aspects of Catholicism in favor of a 
judgmental divinity—a key recruitment device for Evangelicals since the 
18th century. Away from superstition, the appearance of stock exchanges 
in Western Europe from the 15th to the 17th centuries, often articulated to 
shipping fortunes, represented new class formations and financial and gov-
ernmental problems, understood as actuarial rather than accidental. From 
the Industrial Revolution, working people were advised to be prudent and 
secure their future through insurance. In the United States, the shop was 
set up to cater to individuals rather than companies in the 19th century. 
What began as a means of paying for burials led to predicting calculations 
of every conceivable misfortune. We can see this played out by Edward G. 
Robinson’s maniacally recited list of the ways that people can off them-
selves, quoted above.
 Risk became an interventionist category during the 19th-century trans-
formation of capitalism that the economic historian Karl Polanyi called 
“the discovery of society.” Paupers came to be marked as part of the social, 
and hence deserving of enumeration, inclusion, and aid. The well-being of 
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the poor was incorporated into collective subjectivity as a right, a problem, 
a statistic, and a law, and juxtaposed to the well-being of the self-governing 
worker or owner. Society was held to be simultaneously more and less than 
the promises and precepts of the market, with risk understood and coun-
tered as a collective problem and liability. In some sense, these formally 
unproductive citizens became the litmus test of society. Along came public 
education, mothers’ pensions, and Civil War benefits. During the 20th 
century, this tendency was confirmed by state interventions that provided 
superannuation to retirees, with contributions and benefits assumed by all. 
Today, we find such publicly subsidized schemes criticized as drains on indi-
vidual initiative, and citizens are encouraged to assume risk directly via the 
market. So whereas the state once underwrote export-credit insurance (in 
the United States via the Overseas Private Investment Corporation [OPIC] 
and the ExIm Bank), nowadays that service is privatized, sending risk out 
into the community. The result: a shift, expressed in general welfare terms 
but also in the particular field of insurance, away from pooling risk, the 
better to allocate protection. Flavors of the millennium include allocating 
individuals to risk groups in order to calculate their likely future—then 
expecting them to bet against it. The same period has seen the explosion of 
tort law, because poor people have come to use the legal system to obtain 
redress against the wealthy and corporations in ways that a mature system 
of income redistribution, or adequate industrial regulation, would have 
rendered unnecessary (Polanyi 2001: 89, 82–85; Watts 2000: 197; Skocpol 
2003; Stearns 2006: 67–68, 126, 120–21, 123; Briggs and Burke 2003: 30; 
Rose 1999: 158–59; Rose 2007: 123; Lawrence and Herbert-Cheshire 2003; 
Strange 2000: 126).
 Risk has long been a core advertising method. Since the 1920s and ’30s, 
magazines, especially those directed at the proletariat, have used fear to 
sell products at an accelerating rate, with threats to children a particular 
favorite. The preferred term in the industry is “scare copy.” Consider the 
song “In the Year 2525 (Exordium and Terminus)” by Zager and Evans. 
It was a worldwide success in 1969, most notably in the United States. A 
blend of millennial doom, environmentalism, and the Rapture, its dystopic 
account of technology picked up on fears of a dehumanized future pro-
grammed through machines and pills. But a few decades later, such a future 
gave cause for delight. What appeared to epitomize an ecumenical, equal-
opportunity loss of humanness had become both a leftist rallying cry, via 
the passion for cyborgian self-invention, and a capitalist rallying cry, via the 
passion for consumer self-satisfaction. In 2007, the song was even troped 
in a commercial for Embarq, an Internet service provider. Such dual-faced 
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panics and celebrations are commonplace: IBM, to name just one com-
pany, is notorious for its “FUD campaigns.” Orchestrated around “Fear, 
Uncertainty, and Doubt,” they predict dire consequences absent use of the 
corporation’s products and services (Stearns 2006: 151, 155).
 Harvard’s Center for Cancer Prevention now offers a Web site which 
permits visitors to calculate the likelihood of various maladies entering 
their lives (http://www.yourdiseaserisk.harvard.edu). Fear has become 
“an independent variable,” with “exceptional events” transformed into 
“normal risk” (Furedi 2005). In 2006 the Center for American Progress 
and Foreign Policy magazine launched their rather fearsomely named “Ter-
rorism Index,” which surveys “100 of America’s top foreign-policy hands.” 
It duly found that 81% “see a world that is growing more dangerous for 
the American people” (2007: 2). But when Inspector Jefe Javier Falcón of 
Sevilla suggests to the expatriate Yanquis Maddy and Marty Krugman in 
Robert Wilson’s neo-noir novel The Vanished Hands that the United States 
has been a society driven by fear since September 11, 2001, he is quickly 
rebuked: “It’s always been fear” (2004: 41). Of course, close to three thou-
sand people died that day, a day that supposedly “changed everything.” Yet 
six weeks beforehand, polls revealed that 90% of the public already feared 
terrorism. And that same year in the United States, 150,000 people died 
from lung cancer, 38,000 in cars, and 30,000 by gunshot, while 250,000 
were raped. Risk society is abetted and indexed by incidents like the media 
hysteria over anthrax in October 2001—responses that were out of all pro-
portion to reality, given the under-reported plenitude of industrial chemi-
cals and organisms confronting US workers every day and the extraordi-
nary dangers posed by chemical plants to literally millions should there be 
an accidental or deliberate release of their deadly product. This country is 
very, very unsafe, because of the immense risks generated by local com-
merce and masculinity—but ignored by Homeland Security. No wonder 
New York’s Museum of Modern Art featured a 2005 exhibit entitled “The 
Perils of Modern Living” (Kellner 2003: 82–83; Furedi 2005). The country 
is physically founded on risk, with its most expensive real estate built on 
fault lines and hurricane sites—its wealth distributed to guarantee mas-
sive insurance premiums and gambling. This has given rise to gruesomely 
named and administered catastrophe bonds, which bet on avoiding these 
cataclysmic events. Between summer 2004 and the end of 2005, US hur-
ricanes saw $81 billion in losses incurred by insurance companies. Mean-
while, the very US financial institutions that invent these fancy instru-
ments for sharing risk have been shown to be incompetent, irrational, and 
unseemly: the subprime mortgage fiasco has seen them veer away from a 
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love of deregulation and in favor of regulatory rescue, depending on their 
needs (Lewis 2007; Leonard 2007).
 We might date the ideological welcome of economic risk to a 1971 report 
for presidential advisors that referred glowingly to “the development of 
flexible citizens who, as many people have already realized, are the kind of 
citizen the twenty-first century is going to need.” No wonder, then, that by 
the 1990s, Business Week was bluntly referring to the “New Economy” as 
“the rise of risk capital.” The idea of risk as something for which everyone 
became responsible had become part of the neoliberal discourse of indi-
vidual mastery of one’s life. As of 1997, the Federal Department of Trans-
portation decreed that automobile “Crashes Aren’t Accidents”—they are 
caused by human error (quoted in Mattelart 2003: 109, Hutton 2003b: 122; 
Stearns 2006: 131).
 Today’s risks are quantified by everything from earthquake modeling to 
actuarial estimates and share-price responses. The United States is the risk 
society, with 50% of the population participating in stock market invest-
ments. Risk is brought into the home as an everyday ritual, an almost blind 
faith (sometimes disappointed) in mutual funds patrolling retirement 
income. The insurance costs alone of September 11 have been calculated 
at $21 billion. In 2005, US residents spent $1.1 trillion on insurance—
more than they paid for food, and more than one-third of the world’s total 
insurance expenditure. The industry’s global revenues exceed the GDP 
of all countries bar the top three. At one level, this represents a careful 
calculation of risk, its incorporation into lifelong and posthumous plan-
ning—prudence as a way of life. At another, it is a wager on hopelessness 
and fear that has since emerged in religion and pills, because so many risks 
that Yanquis worry about are uninsurable. As dangers mount, safeguards 
diminish. So whether we are discussing nuclear power plants or genetically 
modified foods, the respective captains of industry argue that they pose no 
risks, but insurance companies decline to write policies on them for citi-
zens—because they are risky. Much of this relates to the deregulatory intel-
lectual and policy fashions of the last three decades, which have aided the 
historic redistribution of income upwards by opposing the universaliza-
tion of Medicare, reducing labor protection, and ideologizing against col-
lective action other than in the private sphere—at the same time as people 
confront spiraling health costs and multiplying economic changes (Martin 
2002: 6, 12; Zorach 2003; Mann 2003: 103; Strange 2000: 127; World Trade 
Organization 2003: 2; Smutniak 2004; Stearns 2006: 191; “Covered” 2004; 
“Time for a Makeover” 2006; Beck 1999: 53, 105; Kline 2003; Bernstein 
2006: 4–5; Martin 2004: 8–10).
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 This also connects to the financialization of the everyday and the domi-
nance of related myths: that consumption is sovereign, labor is a problem, 
the economy works because of entrepreneurs and executives, meritocracy 
is real and omnipresent, and collective action (by progressives) is wrong. 
Financialization has created a surge in one sector of the economy, such 
that by 2004, almost 40% of all profits in the US economy were “made” by 
finance firms. On TV, news stories are presented in terms of their mon-
etary significance to viewers. Neoclassical economic theory is deemed pal-
atable in a way that theory is not accepted elsewhere. The leading sources 
of wholesale television and Internet news, such as Reuters, make most of 
their money from finance reporting, which infuses their overall delivery 
of news as a commodity; primarily political journalists at Reuters refer 
to themselves as “cavaliers,” and their primarily financial counterparts as 
“roundheads,” severe metaphors from the English Civil War (Kevin Phil-
lips 2006: 266; Palmer et al. 1998). Business advisors dominate discussion 
on dedicated finance cable stations like CNBC and Bloomberg, and these 
advisors are granted something akin to the status of seers when they appear 
on MSNBC, CNN, and the networks. Former Federal Reserve Chair Alan 
Greenspan was filmed getting in and out of cars as if he were en route to a 
meeting to decide the fate of nations. Each sclerotic upturned eyebrow or 
wrinkled frown was subject to hyperinterpretation by a bevy of needy fol-
lowers. The focus of “news” has become stock markets in Asia, Europe, and 
New York; reports on company earnings, profits, and stocks; and portfolio 
management. There is a sense of vigilant markets stalking everyday secu-
rity and politics in order to punish anxieties and uncertainties or strike 
against political activities that might restrain capital. The veneration, the 
surveillance, and the reportage of the market are on notice to reveal infrac-
tions of this anthropomorphized, yet oddly subject-free, sphere as a means 
of constructing moral panics around the conduct of whoever raises its ire. 
In short, economic and labor news has been transmogrified into corporate 
news, and politics is measured in terms of its reception by business.
 Bush Minor’s presidential addresses captured political helplessness and 
diurnal risk very effectively, emphasizing the evils and perils of the world 
in ways that directly articulate to superstition. Ever ready with a phrase 
describing or predicting catastrophic, apocalyptic terror, Minor had a lex-
icon in which the ratio of pessimistic words to optimistic ones was vastly 
greater than in those of FDR, Reagan, Bush the Elder, or Clinton. In his 
first term, the word “evil” appeared over 350 times in formal speeches. The 
2004 presidential election testified to the efficacy of this approach, as risk 
of attack was the key issue in determining voters’ choices. It also made 
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money for his apparatchiks: Paul Bremer, Minor’s patron of Iraq after the 
invasion, was one of the first to profit from September 11, quickly estab-
lishing a Crisis Consulting Practice. He falls into the emergent category of 
“risk managers,” who quantify danger and the cost of meeting it (“Congres-
sional Report” 2005; Brooks 2003; “Faith” 2004: 27; Pew Research Center 
2005: 4; Feldman 2005; Allan 2002: 90).
 Media reactions to limit cases of risky-ness, played out in highly exagger-
ated ways and frequently projected onto scapegoats or “folk devils,” amount 
to “moral panics,” a term first coined in the early 1970s to describe media 
messages that announced an increase in the crime rate and the subsequent 
establishment of specialist police units to deal with the alleged problem. 
Moral panics are usually short-lived spasms that speak of ideological con-
tradictions about economic inequality. Exaggerating a social problem, 
they symbolize it in certain groups, predict its future, and then conclude 
or change. Part of society is used to represent (and sometimes distort) a 
wider problem: Youth violence is a suitable case for panic about citizenship; 
systemic class inequality is not. Adolescent behavior and cultural style are 
questionable; capitalist degeneracy is not. Rap is a problem; the situation of 
urban youth is not. Particular kinds of individuals are labeled as dangerous 
to social well-being because of their “deviance” from agreed-upon norms 
of the general good. Once the individuals have been identified, their life-
practices are then interpreted from membership of a group, and vice versa. 
Critics of the process rightly ask not “Why do people behave like this?” but 
“Why is this conduct deemed ‘deviant,’ and whose interest does that serve?” 
(Thompson 1998: 7; Erich Goode 2000; P. Cohen 1999: 192–93; Stanley 
Cohen 1973: 9–13; Yúdice 1990; Wichtel 2002).
 Moral panics are often generated by the state or the media and then 
picked up by interest groups and social movements (or vice versa), and 
hence their impact is generally disproportionate to the “problems” they 
bring into being. The dual role of experts and media critics in the con-
stitution of moral panics sees the former testifying to their existence, and 
the latter sensationalizing and diurnalizing them—making the risks attrib-
uted to a particular panic seem like a new, terrifying part of everyday life. 
The cumulative impact of this alliance between specialist and popular 
knowledge is a heightened, yet curiously normalized, sense of risk about 
and amongst the citizenry in general. When TV ratings are measured—
each February, May, July, and November—news programs allocate mas-
sive space to supposed risks to viewers. The idea is to turn anxiety and 
sensation into spectatorship and money. The epithet once used to deride 
local TV journalism in the United States—“if it bleeds, it leads”—today 
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applies to network news, where the correlation between national crime sta-
tistics and crime coverage shows no rational linkage. The drive to create 
“human interest” stories from blood has become a key means of generating 
belief in a risk society through moral panics about personal safety. Such 
human interest stories occupied 16% of network news in 1997, up from 
8% in 1977. Even when crime rates plunge, media discourse about crime 
rises: as the number of murders declines, press attention to them does the 
opposite. Similarly, school drug use may diminish, but audiences believe 
that it increases. The classic case of such absurdities is the popular rhetoric 
about young African-American men. Rates of violence, homicide, and drug 
use have fallen dramatically amongst black men under age 30 in the past 
decade, but media panic about their conduct has headed in the opposite 
direction (Barker 1999; Jenkins 1999: 4–5; Shaps 1994; Thompson 1998: 3, 
12, 91; Wagner 1997: 46; Hickey 2004; Lowry 2003; Glassner 1999: xi, xxi, 
29; Males 2004).
 Moral panics are a displacement from socioeconomic crises and fis-
sures, a means of dealing with risk society via appeals to “values.” They 
both contribute to, and are symptomatic of, risk society. But rather than 
being straightforward mechanisms of functional control that necessarily 
displace systemic social critique onto particular scapegoats, moral panics 
have themselves been transformed by the discourse of risk society. Because 
certain dangers seem ineradicable, moral panics are mobilized to highlight 
particular aspects of them that may be less intractable, but are nevertheless 
emblematic of wider problems in a way that deflects danger and anxiety 
away from their sources in the political economy. A recent example is the 
British Home Office’s 2004–8 Strategic Plan, which focuses on “anti-social 
behavior” as something that just is on the rise. It is not articulated to the 
economy (Ungar 2001; Hier 2003; Thompson 1998; Critcher 2003: 164; 
Squires 2006).
Conclus ion
most of her life, flying, she’d felt most vulnerable right here, suspended in 
a void, above trackless water, but now her conscious flying-fears are about 
things that might be arranged to happen over populous human settlements, 
fears of ground-to-air, of scripted Cnn moments.
 —advertising consultant Cayce Pollard in William Gibson’s Pattern 
    Recognition (2003: 120)
Despite the fact that the nation fails them abysmally, most of its residents 
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embrace the United States ideologically. Why? Because the right orches-
trates moral panics that explain and place blame for the risk society in 
which people find themselves, even as it trumpets a national capacity for 
effective makeovers. Whereas the left and the center focus on public policy 
logics, researching problems and duly, dutifully, dully coming up with rea-
soned recommendations, the right leaves policy proposals to its corporate 
masters and does not undertake rational analyses aimed at technocratic 
outcomes. It prefers a blend of grass-roots religious superstition and public 
outreach that stresses column inches and shouted seconds, not cost-benefit 
policy options: the politics of spectacle. The outcome? The largest technoc-
racy in history—the United States—has re-enchanted its world, turning 
capitalism and statecraft into magic.
 There is a special appeal to this latest Great Awakening. It is a consum-
erist one, with selfishness and chauvinism characterizing a revocation of 
traditional Christianity, as if the latter embodied Great Society liberalism. 
An organic link is posited between apparent logocentric opposites: church 
and market. Perhaps these creepy Christians hear that famous tag line from 
San Diego televangelism—“prosperity is your divine right”—ringing in 
their ears (quoted in Murdock 1997: 96). The market may have torn these 
people’s lives apart, but the capitalistic basis to today’s Great Awakening 
gives them ideological backing (and a choice of their superstition) in a way 
that formal monetary markets do not. The illogic of supporting neoliberal 
economic policy is of little import. The market has become “an agent of 
morality, rewarding good and punishing evil” (Grossberg 2005: 117), for all 
the world a secular fate divinely decreed by a truly invisible hand.
 The New Protestantism sometimes seems like a very Old Testament 
form, so lacking is it in the socialist principles of love and mercy offered 
by Christ’s teachings. Judgment, harsh and unbending, is its basis. And it 
makes two bizarre alliances—with pro-Zionist Jews, who might be unac-
ceptable as neighbors, philanthropists, or intellectuals in the United States 
but are a good fit as custodians of Palestine until they are destroyed by the 
Rapture; and with corporations, which might be unacceptable as vendors 
of craven objects of consumption that articulate to sexual pleasure, science, 
and medicine but are a good fit as brutal bureaucracies that do not forgive 
failure and do oppose secular collectives such as unions.
 The faith makeover and the drug makeover both invest in transforma-
tion through consumption. The culture industries are central to this com-
pulsion to buy, through the double-sided nature of advertising and “the 
good life” of luxury: they encourage competition at the same time as they 
standardize processes to manufacture unity in the face of diversity. With all 
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the pleasurable affluence suggested by material goods, the idea of people 
achieving transcendence has been displaced by the overwhelming force of 
objects. Commodities dominate a formerly human and natural landscape. 
The corollary is the simultaneous triumph and emptiness of the sign as 
a source and a measure of value. Beginning as a reflection of reality, the 
commodity sign is transformed into a perversion of reality, with represen-
tation of the truth displaced by false information. Then these two, deline-
able, phases of truth and lies become indistinct. Underlying reality is lost. 
Finally, the sign refers to itself, with no residual need of correspondence to 
the real. It has adopted the form of its own simulation (Baudrillard 1988: 
10–11, 29, 170). When people embrace risk, “human needs, relationships 
and fears, the deepest recesses of the human psyche, become mere means 
for the expansion of the commodity universe” (McChesney and Foster 
2003: 1).
 Is there an alternative, a world where a person can “hunt in the morning, 
fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticize after dinner . . . 
without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, shepherd or critic” (Marx and 
Engels 1995: 53), consuming and producing with pleasure and politics 
joined? A world that will rebut dehumanizing commodity fetishism, turning 
instead to the Xhosa saying that “a person is a person through other per-
sons” (quoted in Dean 2001: 502)? Where we live between the promise of 
cosmopolitanism and the loss of national identity (García Canclini 2002: 
50) rather than as “desiccated calculators . . . rational-choice rodents moved 
exclusively by the short range and the quantifiable” (Nairn 2003: 7), with 
“freedom to choose” once “the major political, economic, and social deci-
sions have already been made” (Mosco 2004: 60)?
 Such challenges inform what I have written here. I have come neither to 
bury nor to praise the makeover, but to criticize it, even as I stand alternately 
bewildered, amused, appalled, and attracted by it. Foundational myths of 
the “American Dream” permeate this book. And dreams reference and dis-
tort reality. They attract and please even as they horrify and disappoint. So 
I look at the power of various forms of knowledge about people and their 
emotions applied to the US population through case studies of therapy, 
drug treatments, and male bodies that illustrate how sublime makeovers 
see people actually become commodities, mediated through the psy-func-
tion, capital, and culture. If we are to understand an absurdly wealthy and 
wasteful country, we must question the pleasures of reinvention as well as 
embrace them, teasing out as we do so the mystification of moral panics 
and the reality of risk society.
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this	 chapter	 addresses a key secular technique of makeovers—the 
“psy-function”—and how it targets potential citizens of tomorrow who 
must be made over: youth. The psy-function describes a shifting field of 
knowledge and power over the mind. It comprises psychoanalysis, psy-
chology, psychotherapy, psychiatry, social psychology, criminology, and 
psycho-pharmacology, and their success in other sites of discipline—edu-
cational, military, industrial, and carceral (Foucault 2006: 85–86; also 
see 189–90).1 In both its commercial and governmental forms, the psy-
function references and generates makeover culture like no other form of 
knowledge, notably via its authority over young people, who have become 
key deictic pointers to shifts in cultural norms and anxieties, as per many 
1
The human condition is now so thoroughly medicalized that few people can 
claim to be normal.
 —New Scientist (quoted in Susan hansen et al. 2003: 12)
north american psychology looked to the natural sciences for a method and con-
cepts that would legitimate it as a science. and in order to get social position 
and rank, it negotiated how it would contribute to the needs of the established 
power structure.
 —ignacio martín-baró (1996: 20)
The fundamental role of the psychological function, which historically is entirely 
derived from the dissemination of psychiatric power in other directions beyond 
the asylum, is to intensify reality as power and to intensify power by asserting it 
as reality.
 —michel foucault (2006: 190)
t h e  P s y - F u N C t i o N
Making	over	Minds
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moral panics. The psy-function trumps other forms of discourse with its 
dual claims to describe and manage the mind.
 In 1900, the noted Swedish reformer Ellen Key predicted a forthcoming 
“century of childhood,” with women and the young revolting against patri-
archy (quoted in Ennew 2002: 339). But a hundred years later, Roy Porter 
looked back at what he called the “psychiatric century” (2002: 9); and Judith 
Ennew concluded that rather than “being a century of children,” the 20th 
century had become “a century of child experts” (2002: 339): for the emer-
gence of the psy-function defined young people as a group with distinct 
desires and needs that it could theorize and adjudicate. “Youth” references 
a collective mantle—the responsibility of running the country one day and 
making it over. So the psy-function deals both with children undergoing 
“normal” development toward the assumption of adult responsibilities and 
with those whose development is blocked by disability, race, gender, or 
class. The psy-function and its down-at-heel relatives in sociology, edu-
cation, and communication studies construct children as future citizens 
unready to assume full responsibility for themselves and others. Currently 
incomplete projects, they must be endowed with the skills to regulate their 
passions and maximize their productivity.
 Despite its successes, the psy-function frequently attracts controversy. 
Consider the antipsychiatry work of R. D. Laing and others, critiques of 
Freudianism, denial of public funds for therapy, negative press about both 
counseling and psycho-pharmacology, and battles within the psy-function 
itself between therapeutic and drug treatments, not to mention the Nurem-
berg Trial convictions of psychiatrists. Both right and left denounce the 
solipsistic absorption and consumerism of those derided by Bill Clinton as 
“the worried well.” Bush Minor is renowned for boasting, “I don’t spend a 
lot of time trying to figure me out. I’m just not into psychobabble” (quoted 
in Borger 2004). He is eerily reminiscent of Warren Beatty’s equally idiotic 
Yalie from Splendor in the Grass (1961), who when asked if he is happy 
replies, “It’s not a question I ask myself very often.”
 And no wonder. Mental health is an awkward domain for cultural poli-
tics. The psy-function is an easy mark for accusations that it generates and 
sustains false consciousness, bourgeois individualism, racism, and sexism, 
and that it implicates participants in the policing apparatuses of medicine, 
therapy, and thought control. Psychologizing people is said to distract 
attention from structural inequalities by pathologizing social issues. The 
taste for long-term therapy is derided as a consumerist luxury unavailable 
to those preoccupied with subsistence. Seen as a manifestation of middle-
class guilt at the ravages of capitalism, the psy-function benefited from the 
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“Red Scare” of 1919, when the US government was assured that psycho-
therapy could defuse the appeal of Marxism to the urban poor. Behavior-
alism, a model of person-as-machine for capitalism and state socialism 
alike, promised to manage individual conduct on the factory floor, to 
“change the individual while preserving the social order.” Latterly, feminist 
critics worry that antidepressants have kept women isolated and inchoate 
in domestic disappointment and oppression. In place of settling for chem-
ical quietude, the women’s movement argues that stories need to be told, 
rather than pills popped and lips pursed (Martín-Baró 1996: 37; Perring 
1997: 228; Manne 2003). The Rolling Stones, improbable fellow-travelers, 
wrote a song that encapsulates this (so to speak): “Mother’s Little Helper.”
 The right is also suspicious, because the psy-function suggests weakness, 
threatens productivity, and implies the use of public resources for personal 
“development.” Forbes magazine, the Wall Street Journal, and Investor’s 
Business Daily periodically rail at it (Eberstadt 1999; Murlowe 1997), and 
the right’s formerly favorite fallen Hegelian, Francis Fukuyama (2002), ful-
minates at the threat to hypermasculinity of a middling personality driven 
by feminism and permitted by Ritalin (engaged in the next chapter). The 
practical philosophy movement stands in opposition to pharmacology 
under the slogan “Más Platón, Menos Prozac” (More Plato, Less Prozac) 
(Marinoff 2000). And Scientology is an implacable foe of the psy-func-
tion. The church formed a Citizens Commission on Human Rights (2003) 
in 1969 as part of a worldwide campaign against what it sees as perni-
cious social control, racism, alcoholism, sexual assault, theft, and murder. 
Scientology’s key spokespeople, Lisa Marie Presley, Eduardo Palomo, Anne 
Archer, and Juliette Lewis, hand out “Human Rights Awards” and appear 
before congressional panels to protest “the psychotropic drugging of mil-
lions of American children.” Tom Cruise has been a particularly forceful 
hysteric in the struggle.
 But they are protesting against what seems like an unstoppable wave. 
The APA went from 111 members in 1900 to 83,096 a century later (http://
www.apa.org/archives/yearlymembership.html), briskly populating per-
sonnel departments, universities, the military, and the bourgeois media. As 
part of this rent-seeking expansion, the psy-function claims the status of a 
science and becomes guarantor of both happiness and productivity. Its his-
tories praise famous forefathers and their “findings,” rarely problematizing 
the production of data in any meaningful way (Danziger 1998). It assumes 
that “anything that is important in its history will have been absorbed into 
the ongoing research tradition.” This very sanguine model connects to the 
essentialist conceit “of an a-historical human nature” (Brock 1995) in which 
Miller_final.indb   41 8/20/2008   10:36:07 PM
	  	 ✴   c h a p t e r 	 
the self “may be donated, or housed within, a body that acts and partici-
pates in the material environment, but this aspect of it is irrelevant to—or, 
at best, a conduit to—the inner psychic sanctum, positive knowledge of 
which is psychology’s (especially cognitivism’s) ultimate goal” (McHoul 
and Rapley 2005b: 432).
 But a prominent dissenting medical practitioner suggests that psycho-
pharmacology tries to deal with culture “by avoiding it” but ends up as a 
“culture-thick, not science-thick, social and political endeavour” (Timimi 
2002: 35, 53).2 And the inevitably collective project of applying the psy-
function to society has latterly encouraged a culturally relative perspec-
tive—mostly outside the United States (European Union Consultative 
Platform on Mental Health 2006; Haste 2004: 421; Hansen et al. 2003: 
31; Maira and Soep 2004: 246). So rather than endorsing the psy-func-
tion’s assumptions about a naturally occurring process of growing up that 
requires psychologization, I draw on alternative and dissident models to 
explain how the child has been defined, nurtured, criticized, reformed, and 
governed in historical and spatial terms (Tyler 1993: 35; Damon 2004: 14; 
Cook 2002: 2; Malkki and Martin 2003). First, we must chart an alternative 
to the psy-function’s autohagiography.
the  Psy-Funct ion
health itself and the proper management of chronic illnesses are becoming 
individual moral responsibilities to be fulfilled through improved access to knowl-
edge, self-surveillance, prevention, risk assessment, the treatment of risk, and 
the consumption of appropriate self-help/biomedical goods and services.
 —adele e. Clarke et al. (2003: 162)
While some pharmaceutical bosses admit freely that their prime motive is profit, 
the success of the industry derives from the fostered perception that it exists 
primarily as a public good. . . . distinguished specialists and professors at 
prestigious institutes, in pharma-speak called “opinion leaders,” are groomed 
for engagement. They can earn £5,000 an hour or more than £20,000 a day for 
delivering a specific therapeutic message, which is then accepted by the profes-
sion as gospel.
 —margaret Cook (2004)
Foucault has been an inspiration to counterhistories of the psy-func-
tion. He sought to uncover how mental conditions came to be identified 
as problems in need of treatment through forms of demographic prob-
lematization that functioned as techniques, economies, social relations, 
and knowledges. They were the means whereby “some real existent in the 
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world” became “the target of social regulation at a given moment” (1994: 
123; 2001: 171). Foucault recognized that struggles for power take place 
over “the status of the individual”:
On the one hand, they assert the right to be different, and they underline 
everything that makes individuals truly individual. On the other hand, they 
attack everything which separates the individual, breaks his links with oth-
ers, splits up community life, forces the individual back on himself and ties 
him to his own identity in a constraining way. (1982: 781, 777–78)
In the words of the great liberation psychologist Ignacio Martín-Baró, mur-
dered by Yanqui-backed assassins: “there does not first exist a person, who 
then goes on to become socialized.” Rather, the “individual becomes an 
individual, a human person, by virtue of becoming socialized” (1996: 69). 
The raw stuff of human beings, then, is not individuals: people become indi-
viduals through the discourses and institutions of culture, in an oscillation 
between the law, economy, and politics, with the psy-function operating 
as a switching point between people’s proclivities and aptitudes (Foucault 
2006: 58, 190). Rites of passage from traditional societies have been dis-
placed, supplemented, or made purely symbolic in industrial and postin-
dustrial societies by scientific accounts of personhood that are makeover 
coefficients of social change:
Industrialization and urbanization created a growing number of people who 
could not be as readily defined by place of origin and relational ties, people 
who interacted with a far larger number of others than had hitherto been the 
norm, people who needed a “self ” to present to these many others. (Healy 
2002: 25)
On this account, to which I subscribe, status and ancestry joined measure-
ment and confession, as ritual and shame met the state and guilt. Facts and 
interpretations derived from archivism and experimentation in addition 
to titular authority. The chief, prelate, and household head were no longer 
omniscient. But even as a looser model of power proliferated, new hege-
mons emerged within depersonalized social institutions like hospitals and 
the psy-function (Foucault called them “professionals of discipline, nor-
mality and subjection”). Today, these experts utilize knowledges to mul-
tiply and intensify the exercise of power over bodies. So we may see adults 
incarcerated because they lack the ability to narrate their feelings and their 
struggles to the satisfaction of psychologists, thereby failing the duty of 
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disclosure and maturity that are the corollary (and test) of Enlightenment 
freedoms. It is the fate of “modern people,” in George Orwell’s words, to be 
“numbered, labeled, conscripted, ‘co-ordinated’” (Foucault 1979a: 193, 224, 
296; Foucault 1987: 23; Albee 1977: 152; Healy 2002: 29; Orwell 1982).
 Of course, people were mad, and were treated as such, before the psy-
function was institutionalized. Five-thousand-year-old skulls disclose 
signs of trepanning, suggesting holes bored to release devils, while a mul-
titude of fables and myths of religion and other superstitions and histories 
refer to possession and insanity. An abiding binary of good and bad, well 
and ill, has characterized meditations on sanity from the earliest texts to 
today. The two fundamental wings of the psy-function—cognition (sup-
posedly governed by nature) and behavior (presumptively governed by 
environment)—emerged from Plato’s and Kant’s distinctions between 
the bodily and behavioral sides of experience: the moral and the cogni-
tive, expressed as a moral space that separated brain from body even as 
it linked them. That binary has never been undermined, and it informs 
the banal personality/character couplet addressed in the Introduction 
of this book. Philosophers writing prior to the psy-function defined 
lunacy and melancholy as social categories linked to obedience and self-
control. Managing madness was about sustaining society. This concern 
helped to shift madness from a religious condition of demonic posses-
sion to a secular problem of irrational conduct (Fukuyama 2002; McHoul 
and Rapley 2001: 438–39; Rose 2007: 194; Porter 2002: 42–43, 10, 60; 
Heins 2002: 20–21). Plato understood madness as the outcome of “dis-
ease,” “irritability,” and “poor discipline,” which could lead to conflict and 
threaten authority (1972: 482). In Spinoza’s view, madness diminished 
“the body’s power of activity” (1955: 217)—a concern for productivity. 
Locke referred to the need for each person to have sufficient reasoning 
capacities to abide by the law—capacities beyond the youthful and the 
mad alike (1990: 145). When these men proposed policies founded on 
their suppositions, the results were sometimes odd. Vico, for instance, 
was convinced that the young “may profitably occupy themselves with 
languages and plane geometry,” but “metaphysical criticism or algebra” 
would leave them “incapable of any great work” (1970: 24).3 This stimu-
lated the desire among more rational critics for a scientific foundation to 
their efforts. Hume (1955: 24) and Kant (1991) longed for a Newtonian 
breakthrough akin to what happened in astronomy, an epistemological 
shift that would allow studies of the mind to transcend observation and 
comprehend underlying laws. Wittgenstein pointed to “something unsat-
isfactory” in the basic endeavor of the psy-function, because it lacked the 
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“sort of ‘metric’” found in physics (2007: 42). This desire for mathemati-
cization has remained deeply sunken in the thinking of the psy-function 
as a route to the status of a science ever since. Empirical observation and 
categorization were never enough—artificial neologization and calcula-
tion were required (Danziger 1998: 20).
 The key question for me is how people come to be subjects of the psy-
function within modernity, and hence subject to psy-makeovers. Politics 
has been at the core of this articulation. In the United States, political links 
to the psy-function began with the Declaration of Independence: Benjamin 
Rush, a signatory and an abolitionist who nevertheless pioneered the idea 
that Africans were black due to leprosy, published the country’s first psy-
textbook, in 1812. He was decreed the “father of American psychiatry” by 
the American Psychiatric Association in 1965. Rush’s successors in the pro-
fession were dedicated slavery supporters from the moment they founded 
a professional body in 1844 until the Civil War, arguing that “manumission 
caused insanity.” Meanwhile, the psy-function was normalizing itself across 
public life. The US Census of 1840 calculated the national level of what it 
called “idiocy/insanity,” which was split into seven different conditions by 
the 1880 version. These numbers were organized and collected not as a 
reflection of, or a service to, clinical work, but as a managerial tool of social 
order. The first US academic journal in the field, the delightfully named 
American Journal of Insanity, appeared in 1844, published by the superin-
tendent of a state hospital after he met with thirteen colleagues to establish 
the Association of Medical Superintendents for the Insane. It became the 
American Medico-Psychological Association in 1892, admitting non-car-
ceral specialists, and bought the American Journal of Insanity. In 1922, a 
further makeover was achieved, with the renamed American Psychiatric 
Association publishing the renamed American Journal of Psychiatry. Since 
then, the psy-function has undergone a shift—winding, incomplete, and fre-
quently circular—from religious judgments and confessional norms to sci-
entific techniques and chemical interventions, from carceral buildings and 
elongated couches to pill-dispensing pharmacies and returns to the social—
in short, beyond lock-ups and toward shopping aisles. The psy-function 
has latterly completed its transformation from a highly instrumental form 
of government that controlled the unruly, to a site of academic legitimacy, 
and finally to consumer marketing. Mental illness has undergone a complex 
oscillation between being a danger to society, a domain of knowledge, and a 
sales campaign (Ozarin and McMillan 2003; Shorter 1997: 15; Kutchins and 
Kirk 1997: 20, 201, 208; Rose 2007: 198; Foucault 2003b: 118–19; Ozarin 
and McMillan 2003; Kerr 2003). How was this achieved?
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 Throughout the 19th century, psychiatry intervened in the legal field of 
Western societies, establishing its right to define individuals as sane or oth-
erwise and claiming a role in justice and punishment. Penal law codified 
“dangerous individuals” as monomaniacal, degenerate, perverse, consti-
tutionally unbalanced, and immature (Foucault 2000). Psychiatry identi-
fied, and then dismissed, alternative forms of psy-knowledge that sought 
to establish professional training and conduct. Several US states briefly 
licensed “drugless healing,” such as the laying-on of hands, magnetism, and 
clairvoyance. But in the new century, medically qualified psychoanalysts 
pushed for the delegitimization of such claims, differentiating themselves 
from the stigmatized world of the asylum by promoting diagnosis and 
treatment over carceral control (Buchanan 2003: 228; David Park 2004: 
112).4 For their part, psychologists frenetically sought markets for their 
work with the same zeal that they pursued scientific recognition, offering 
to control school pupils and manage factory workers Tayloristically as a 
means of getting paid, even as they desired laboratories at the big end of 
campus (Danziger 1998: 101–3).
 The state was also involved economically. In the mid-19th century, the 
federal government was creating business conditions that eventually gen-
erated the very pharmaceutical corporations that would surpass therapists 
as controllers of the psy-function. Bulk buying of medicines during the 
Civil War encouraged both profits and professionalization, which received 
further stimulus fifty years later, in the Great War, through mass purchase 
of aspirin and patent-breaking treatments for syphilis. Then the United 
States simply stole discoveries from the advanced pharmaceutical indus-
tries of a defeated Germany after the war. And whereas medicines had long 
been sold directly to consumers, the state came to intervene in the name 
of public health, shifting between regarding individual drug users as citi-
zens and as consumers. In response to addiction, regulations mandated 
prescriptions for several drugs from 1914, reining in customer sovereignty 
and institutionalizing the power of large firms, which could mount scien-
tific and transparent forms of research and management, and the medical 
profession, which profited from increased visits by patients in search of 
medicines. The requirement for verifiable scientific testing pushed small 
companies and unaccredited practitioners alike out of business. The pre-
market testing of drugs became part of the grand oscillation in US public 
culture between drugs as angelic or demonic, depending on their valida-
tion by corporations and the state (Healy 2002: 18, 20, 22, 33–34; Ras-
mussen 2004: 163; DeGrandpre 2006: 25).
 World War I saw the creation of the position of Chief Army Psychia-
Miller_final.indb   46 8/20/2008   10:36:07 PM
	 	 t h e 	 p s y - F u n c t I o n : 	 M a k I n g 	 o v e r 	 M I n d s 	 ✴ 
trist overseas and the instantiation of numerous military disorders, as psy-
chology offered mental measurement and testing to the army. Engineering 
and personnel departments began deploying the psy-function in factories 
after the war as a means of maximizing output and minimizing worker dis-
content, via both scientific-management and human-relations methods. 
Industrial psychology redefined anger at work as personally and profes-
sionally unproductive, diagnosing rage against capitalism as displaced pri-
vate aggression. The popularity of Freudianism peaked between 1940 and 
1965 after it had demonstrated efficacy with military traumas, although 
many “cures” may be attributable to the end of the war rather than psycho-
analysis. We see these successes dramatically on display in John Huston’s 
epic documentary, Let There Be Light (1946), which came out when psy-
chology and psychiatry were combining to discredit reflexology, dianetics, 
and graphology, just as they had cashiered drugless healing fifty years ear-
lier. The clinician’s ear became a principal tool of analysis, and the patient’s 
mouth a principal source of information. But the 1930s had seen the advent 
of somatic therapy via drugs and electroconvulsive treatment, and “big 
science” was about to thrive under the stimulus of Cold War rivalry. The 
Veterans’ Administration (now the United States Department of Veterans 
Affairs) and the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) emerged as 
key sites for the growth of psychiatry and psychology. Congress avidly 
passed a Mental Health Study Act in 1955 to encourage major support 
for research. The National Institutes of Health (NIH) were quickly voted 
more money for drug development than they knew what to do with. And 
in 1951, the federal government mandated that all new medicines be sub-
ject to prescription, marking both a grab for professional standards and 
control and a new form of commodity production—collectively producing 
the project of a national makeover. Much of the funding also came through 
a desire to generate habits of mind and conduct in the postcolonial world 
that would elude the clutches of Marxism and Maoism. “Project Camelot” 
was covertly launched by the Pentagon in 1963 to finance the psy-function 
for such purposes. When this clandestine plan was exposed, new funding 
for the psy-world emerged from the State Department and the National 
Science Foundation. Today, the US military uses psy-function categories 
to deprive injured veterans of health-care and college benefits and retrieve 
their enlistment bonuses. It does so by defining their traumas—whether 
physical or psychological—as pre-existing conditions, delightfully utilized 
via the category of “Separation Because of Personality Disorder”—5,600 
cases under Bush Minor, and rising every year (Ozarin and McMillan 
2003; Hale 1995: 382; Stearns 1994: 121–25; Danziger 1998: 105; Buchanan 
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2003: 228–30; Musto 1995; Rose 2007: 194; Shattuc 1997: 114; Healy 1997: 
24, 66; Healy 2002: 35; Herman 1998; Kors 2007; Elias 2007).
 As part of this complex linkage between professionalization, govern-
mentalization, and commodification, the psy-function required codified 
therapeutic explanations (which became a form of consumer education). 
Into this space of nosological desire and reward came the American Psy-
chiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(DSM) in 1952, derived from the Statistical Manual for the Use of Hospitals 
for Mental Diseases, which had been in use since 1917 and adopted by the 
US Census the next year. The first DSM applied broad diagnostic labels, 
with the aim of encompassing the whole of society. Its successor, DSM-
II (1968), embodied a psychoanalytic approach to psychiatry. The status 
of psychoanalysis quickly began to decline, however, because of doubts 
about its scientific validity (Freudianism was unable to deliver the requisite 
“organic correlates of its diagnoses”), a renewed interest in genetic/biolog-
ical causes of mental illness (particularly with the proliferation of psycho-
therapeutic drugs), and the rise of alternative models. Perhaps the authors 
were in touch with their inner Wittgenstein (he deemed free association 
“queer” [2007: 42]). DSM-III (1980) embraced biopsychiatry (as well as 
discovering that homosexuality was not the disease proclaimed by its pre-
decessors, following an intense campaign by gay activists). It focused on 
symptomatology and description, not etiology and theory. The purported 
reason for eschewing causes was to avoid controversy amongst different 
camps of psychiatry. Actually, this new model was directly opposed to psy-
choanalysis and social psychiatry—and partially underwritten by pharma-
corps’ subvention of the American Psychiatric Association and researchers 
(Rose 2007: 194; Hacking 1995: 12; Cooksey and Brown 1998: 529–30; 
Kutchins and Kirk 1997: 13, 39, 65–99).
 As a result, serious disputes arose within the psy-function over swal-
lowing versus speaking, none more notorious than a 1971 debate between 
Heinz Lehmann (for pharmacology) and Herbert Marcuse (for psycho-
analysis). While Lehmann was addressing the audience, Frederick Qunes, 
who had helped organize the event, threw a cream cake in his face. Just 
as symbolically, the renowned Chestnut Lodge psychodynamic center 
was sued in the 1980s for malpractice because it denied drugs to a phy-
sician-patient. While the case did not set a legal precedent—terms were 
agreed upon among the parties—it furthered a developing discourse that 
juxtaposed clinically trialed drugs against impressionistic dialogues. Bio-
psychiatric diagnoses became dominant, and psychoanalysis fell into ter-
minal decline (outside textual analysis and the west sides of Manhattan 
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and Los Angeles). Since the cake fruitlessly flew and the chestnut privately 
settled, pharmaceutical corporations and their prescribing delegates have 
become hegemonic, utilizing the slogan “You can’t talk to disease” (Healy 
2002: 175; Rose 2003: 51; Shorter 1997: 309; Breggin 1994: 11–13, 17, 23, 
122). As they have found, you can vend invisible goods that will disarm 
it. Antidepressants offer highly specific interventions, albeit with systemic 
impacts. Although called “magic bullets,” implying precise targeting, their 
effect has been much wider, shifting “health to the center of Western poli-
tics and culture” (Healy 1997: 1).
 The first major psychoactive drug was chlorpromazine (first sold as 
the brand name Thorazine). Devised in France and bought by one of the 
nascent Yanqui drug firms as an antiemetic, it turned Smith Kline & French 
into a major company. Thorazine came onto the US market in 1954 and 
was immediately featured in numerous print advertisements. Combined 
with increased governmental employment of therapists, the arrival of the 
new drug reversed the long-standing removal of the mentally ill from 
public life to an institution: two years later, the number of mental-hospital 
patients had declined for the first time since the previous century. The fifty 
years since have seen mental-hospital beds drop from 560,000 to 53,000, 
even as the national population has increased by well over 100 million. 
Patients were not the only ones to come out. Whereas almost all psychia-
trists were hospital-based in 1940, by 1957 over 80% were not. The same 
period saw Miltown and Equanil mass-marketed as tranquilizers against 
suburban dross, to the point where the TV star Milton Berle renamed him-
self “Miltown”; in 1956, one in twenty US residents was taking what were 
popularly called “happy pills.” The key corporations manufacturing these 
exit passes from asyla and anomie—Sandoz, Rhône-Poulenc, Geigy, Ciba, 
and Roche—convened many collusive meetings between 1953 and 1958. 
Invited to meet the Pope in 1957, participants founded the anachronis-
tically named Collegium Internationale Neuropsychopharmacologium 
(nothing like some mid-20th-century Latin to confer prestige). Congress 
avidly passed a Mental Health Study Act in 1955 to encourage major sup-
port for research. Meanwhile, corporate sponsors were paying clinical 
researchers to exchange information. Merck also played a part, distrib-
uting 50,000 copies of Frank Ayd’s 1961 volume Recognizing the Depressed 
Patient to doctors around the world. My copy has a page that permits the 
owner to sign his or her name (“Ex Libris”). It adds: “Presented by MERCK 
SHARP & DOHME”). The United Nations released an associated movie in 
twelve languages. This product placement successfully promoted depres-
sion as ordinary and as diagnosable in general (nonpsychiatric) medical 
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practice. It worked: the number of depressed people in the United States 
grew 2,000-fold between the 1950s and the 1990s—an extraordinary 
development for a condition that is allegedly hereditary! From the early 
1960s, advertisements in medical journals trumpeted families reuniting, 
men returning to work, and women embracing the home—a makeover 
that could be produced chemically. One famous promotion for Thorazine 
depicted a pill on a leather couch; it had displaced the client as well as the 
therapist.
 With the advent of Medicare and Medicaid as part of the “Great Society” 
reforms of the 1960s, public hospitals lost even more patients. State gov-
ernments utilized new forms of funding to shift them into nontraditional 
institutions, such as private nursing homes, halfway houses, and outpa-
tient services, which were ideologized as populist by the emergent com-
munity-care movement, even though they were neoliberal triumphs that 
led to dreadful suffering, because deinstitutionalization occurred without 
the requisite expansion in community-based services and financing. This 
policy disaster, enshrined by the Supreme Court in Olmstead v. L.C. (1999), 
was operationalized by Bush Minor in Executive Order 13217 of 2001. The 
effect was to reincarcerate the mentally ill, this time in prisons rather than 
dedicated facilities, as more and more federal housing was dedicated to the 
elderly. Within six years of these decisions, the Federal Bureau of Justice 
Statistics disclosed that the number of mentally ill people within US jails 
had quadrupled, with over 50% of inmates reporting depression, a propor-
tion five times that of the overall population. The provision of services is 
minimal and the situation horrendous in many circumstances (Herman 
1996: 257–59; Shorter 1997: 253–54, 316; Martin 2006: 157–58; Ozarin and 
McMillan 2003; Rubin 2004: 370–72; DeGrandpre 2006: 52; Martinez 2005; 
Healy 1997: 47, 75–76; President’s New Freedom Commission on Mental 
Health 2003: 31–32; Human Rights Watch 2006 and 2003).
 These changes are both indexed and generated by the DSM’s stature 
within courts, schools, and prisons, and by health-insurance companies’ 
insistence on its use by claimants and their physicians. The Manual’s 
impressive expansion can be measured in any number of ways, not least 
that it has announced 200 new mental illnesses in the past thirty years 
(Spiegel 2005). From its origins as a reference book, the DSM has become 
“a strange mix of social values, political compromise, scientific evidence, 
and material for insurance claim forms” (Kutchins and Kirk 1997: x). 
Of course, there have been critics. The Manual’s richly obsessive, seem-
ingly unending, unbending lists bring to mind the narrator of Jerome K. 
Jerome’s 1889 novel, Three Men in a Boat, who reads a medical manual and 
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diagnoses himself with symptoms of every illness described save house-
maid’s knee (1938: 8–9). For Scientology, the DSM represents the apogee 
of a century in which “psychiatrists have treated man as an animal” (Citi-
zens Commission on Human Rights 2003), and the President’s Council 
on Bioethics (2002b) regards it as a document of finance and power as 
much as medicine, a “top-down approach to diagnosis” that specifies signs 
over society—bodily practices, not education, family, or labor. The psy-
function promotes self-regulating norms, rather than offering a verifiable 
and absolute correspondence of physiological or behavioral signs with 
diseased or deviant referents. For example, in one cultural space, that of 
defining Obsessive-Compulsive Personality Disorder, washing one’s hands 
frequently is a sign of illness; in another, such as working in an infectious-
diseases ward, it is a sign of duty. But the DSM presents itself as acultural 
and dealing in physical universals, collocating bodily practices in order to 
define them as evidence of psychopathology, and fixing diagnostic truths 
via reification, reductionism, and synecdoche (part of one’s “behavior” 
stands for the totality of one’s personality). This drive toward a usable tax-
onomy may have overdetermined any underpinning in scientific knowl-
edge. In addition, claims to a disinterested pursuit of truth were brought 
into question by the 2006 disclosure that 56% of the DSM’s authors cheer-
fully receive remuneration from the companies whose drugs they describe 
as crucial for actually existing disorders. And when the DSM is avowedly 
in use to diagnose patients, evidence suggests that its criteria are frequently 
interpreted by doctors in terms of their own presuppositions about race 
and gender (McHoul and Rapley 2001: 434; Hansen et al. 2003: 12; Spiegel 
2005; Santostefano 1999: 322–23; Aldhous 2006; Loring and Powell 1988).
 But in 1990, Bush the Elder declared a “Decade of the Brain” (perhaps 
preparing the nation for being led by his son). The nomenclature repre-
sented the triumph of “New Psychiatry” as per the DSM. Psychosurgery 
and drug treatments were in the ascendant. Congress and the NIH devoted 
large amounts of money to research of cognition and recollection via 
molecular biology, genetics, and brain-imaging technology. Identifying 
the brain as the etiological site of educational, social, personal, and even 
political problems, psychiatrists have gone on to medicalize misery to the 
point where ideas of early childhood trauma appear outmoded, moves 
are being made to erase psychotherapy from psychiatric education, and 
popular culture has turned against it: Time published a 1993 cover story 
asking, “What If Freud Was Wrong?” A gathering body of case law cov-
ering murder defenses is constructed around diminished responsibility, as 
illustrated by brain scans and genetic maps. All in all, the brain is getting 
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larger and more powerful: the American Society for Neuroscience attracts 
upwards of thirty thousand academics to its annual conference, and the 
American Psychiatric Association formed its very own political action 
committee in 2000. In the decade to 2007, the number of mainstream-press 
references to neuroscience grew by 33%, providing new oracular accounts 
of everything from ideological proclivities to merchandising preferences. 
These “diagnoses” are based on snapshots of a moment in time in terms 
of brain activity, as opposed to the power of history to display continuities 
and discontinuities, individual preferences, and cultural practices (Maslin 
2000; “Supercharging” 2004; Rose 2007: 232–33; Rose 2006: 3; Ozarin and 
McMillan 2003; Cass 2007).
 In shifting its tasks from naked control to generative, productive power, 
the psy-function has engaged in a systematic and purposive discrediting of 
aberrant mental phenomena as somehow beyond “discursive acts, mean-
ingful performances by skilled human actors” (Harré 2004: 4). It models 
government at a distance that aims to improve “discipline in domestic life” 
(Rafavolich 2001: 373). This is part of a departure from law and toward 
medicine as a means of handling middle-class problems with alcohol, sex-
uality, and other stormy topics where superstition/religion can only do so 
much (Clarke et al. 2003: 164). The trend is accompanied by an increasingly 
consumer-oriented address of both public culture and professionalism. In 
keeping with many self-legislating professional associations, the APA once 
opposed advertising therapeutic services, for ethical reasons. But in the 
early 1970s, the Federal Trade Commission objected to this stance on the 
ground that it was denying consumers the perfect knowledge required to 
choose between providers. The APA changed gears, welcoming what was 
suddenly redefined as an economic stimulus. Today, it even describes itself 
as a “consumer advocacy organization” (Hansen et al. 2003: 41, 45, 25). 
Possessive individualism had long been the touchstone of ego psychology; 
now it was an ideological price point, too. (By 2007, the association boasted 
100,000 members “bringing you” National Public Radio via sponsorship.)
the  young
Psychiatry would dearly love to have a rational material basis to its theories 
and practices, but has yet to manage this. instead, psychiatrists have tried to 
replace spiritual, moral, political and folk understandings of distress and mad-
ness with the technological framework of psychopathology and neuroscience.
 —Sami Timimi (2002: 51)
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Young people occupy a privileged location in the psy-function, in the con-
text of risk society and moral panic. Positioned between birth and adult-
hood, holding keys to both the promise of the future and its potential 
corruption, youth are both “at risk” and “a source of risk.” Moral panics 
about them have abounded and continue to abound, from British protests 
against the Industrial Revolution via child-abduction stories, through US 
worries about lost generations after the Great War, movements contra fas-
cist “disappearances” of children in Argentina, and postindustrial Yanqui 
concerns over Satanism (Durham 2004: 589, 591). The young must be pro-
tected from harm inflicted by self, family, society, and education. At the 
same time, young people embody a threat to order and stability as defined 
and provided by those same entities, for they are shaky makeovers still 
underway. From characterizations of hedonistic consumption to associ-
ations with subcultures and resistance—in the form of popular culture, 
antiwar activism, extralegal recreational drug use, antiglobalization move-
ments, and alternatives to traditional life styles—panics about youth and 
safety are also panics about moral and social order, about defining and 
policing unacceptable conduct (Thompson 1998: 1). Young people “are 
always available to serve for the time being as the immediate signifier of 
the general need for governability,” the ultimate sanctioned makeover 
(Hartley 1998: 14).
 This governability is achieved through an array of techniques. Today’s 
“positive psychology” movement is popular within academia, the volunteer 
sector, and public policy. It seeks to ensure “positive youth development” by 
focusing on spirituality, god-bothering, volunteerism, and sport, abjuring 
legal and illegal recreational drugs in order to “build a better kid” who is 
self-reliant, which translates as obedient to state, religious, and commercial 
norms rather than subcultural ones (Peterson 2004a: 7, 9; Damon 2004: 
21; also see Peterson 2004b and Nansook Park 2004a and 2004b). These 
triumphs are encapsulated in the claim that “personal responsibility and 
high standards have been universally adopted by professionals and policy 
makers of all ideological persuasions” in the last decade. The psy-func-
tion encourages children to monitor themselves against values preferred 
by the psy-function, and it urges parents to see themselves as “helicopters,” 
hovering over the impending disasters known as their offspring. The psy-
function has massive exposure across tertiary education. Virtually every 
student in US colleges can take classes in it, and more than half a mil-
lion people across the population work inside it (Damon 2004: 21; Stearns 
2006: 42; Sloan et al. 2006).
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 Youth-oriented nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and state pro-
grams roll on and on in the antiwelfare era of neoliberalism: the Char-
acter Counts! Coalition, the Aspen Declaration on Character Education, 
the Character Education Partnership, the Character Education Network 
(Nansook Park 2004b: 41); and so it goes. They embrace “The Golden 
Rule” and resolutely work for “good manners” (Westheimer and Kahne 
2004a: 242). Such people simply cannot stop their restless quest for power, 
a quest undertaken via a methodological individualism exemplified in the 
notion that civil society is a collocation of atomized subjects seeking per-
sonalities (Youniss et al. 1997: 620). At the level of education, there is an 
ever-increasing, and increasingly perverse, ratchet effect, whereby state 
aid diminishes as the link between economic success and schooling grows 
more intense. Risk is now distributed across society in a way that mili-
tates against class mobility, even as young people in the United States are 
audited along a success-failure horizon (Jeffrey and McDowell 2004: 132, 
135; Maira and Soep 2004: 247). Who, apart from those of us in cultural 
studies, will stand up for personal irresponsibility and low standards?
 The psy-function and public policy tend to essentialize childhood as 
timeless, creating and sustaining moral panics that assume children have 
been denied the innocence that comes from a state of grace. Echoing 
the philosopher William Whewell’s challenge of a century and a half ago 
that “anyone can make true assertions about a dog, but who can define a 
dog?” (1840: 8.1.4), a wisely bemused APA president in his 1978 plenary 
address noted of young people that “no other species has been catalogued 
by responsible scholars in so many widely discrepant forms, forms that 
a perceptive extraterrestrial could never see as reflecting the same beast” 
(Kessen 1979: 815). Youth remains “a term without its own center” (Gross-
berg 1994: 26). So what is it? Can we even define it before we circle and 
control it?
 Preindustrial European societies seem to have had very permeable cat-
egories of age. They lacked social or biological concepts of adolescence or 
a natural subjectivity that was weak yet pure. Edenic fantasies about inno-
cence and opportunities for collective change were absent from Ancient 
Greek pedagogy and philosophy through Descartes, while Plato argued 
that the young should be respected rather than criticized, in order to 
encourage modesty as they grew up. Such ideas were predicated on chil-
dren as transitional forms whose essence and value awaited their maturity. 
Hegel regarded them as creatures with “sensory emotions” who needed to 
attain “empirical consciousness” of themselves and the world in order to 
transcend their “immediate and lawless character” through a transition to 
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ethical self-sufficiency (Descartes 1977: 192–93; Canguilhem 1994: 358; 
Hegel 1988: 129, 198). Natural law emphasized the right of the young to 
parental development, protection, and aid, in return for obedience and 
respect. In medieval Europe, children were organically embedded in col-
lective culture, including work. But this did not mean that what are laugh-
ably termed “family values” in today’s United States were prominent. In 
feudal times, the young were fetishized through the role of their families in 
the economy. Most parents abandoned their children (Rousseau dispensed 
with five), and as recently as the 19th century, youth routinely worked from 
the age of 7 and left home between 10 and 15 to become servants. Until the 
16th century, European girls could marry of their own volition at age 12, 
and boys at 14. Far from being a distinct cohort, children were thought 
of as “miniature adults,” lacking autonomy or distinctiveness (Pufendorf 
2000: 124–28; Hobbes 2002: 107–14; Locke 1990: 142–43; Acocella, 2003; 
Heins 2002: 20; Mazzarella 2003: 28; Kline 1993: 46; World Economic 
Forum 2004: 68).
 Ideologies of privacy, domesticity, individuality, and family that devel-
oped in Europe and then the United States between the 15th and 18th 
centuries slowly spread to include the young, whose sexual purity and 
vulnerability were announced and dithered over as part of 19th-century 
evangelization, urbanization, and industrialization. With the emergence of 
capitalism and Protestantism and the decline of self-sufficiency, new social 
priorities were adopted: dividing labor, restricting workers’ wages, and 
centralizing organizational power. Urban migration dramatically increased 
as factories displaced domestic industries. Young people left the country-
side to join city life, attracting new forms of knowledge and governance as 
they went. Managing them through religion was crucial to securing their 
everyday obedience. Between 1870 and 1910, the “family-wage economy” 
appeared, as both production and producers departed the home. Factories 
spread across the United States, along with labor organization and public 
schooling, which channeled workers’ unrest into active citizenship rather 
than economic upheaval, instilling a paradoxical blend of knowledge and 
obedience. Wealthy children were increasingly defined in relation to family 
power structures. They were represented apart from public life in art and 
writing and at the core of a new utopianism about childhood fantasy, as 
expressed by such writers as Victor Hugo, Charles Dickens, and Charles 
Baudelaire (Heins 2002: 8; Stephens 1995: 5; Griffin 1993: 12–13; Sommer-
ville 1982: 97, 112; Liljeström 1983: 128; Canguilhem 1994: 359).
 Late-19th-century urbanization in the United States was accompanied 
by newly freed labor—black workers—and the subsequent adoption of 
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an ideology of adolescence via a religious fervor that privileged Puritan 
norms. An emergent middle class endorsed restraint and deferred grati-
fication, norms that could be inculcated in children by minimizing affec-
tion and maximizing surveillance, thereby prohibiting undue pleasure. 
The psy-function offered a systematic doctrine of child rearing along these 
lines. At the same time, the states enacted legislation to protect children 
from alcohol and work and guarantee them milk and school. Religious, 
academic, and reform intellectuals allied around the idea of adolescence 
as a critical phase in subject formation, a moment when spiritual maturity 
and behavioral obedience could be ensured or forever lost. The ideology 
of church and factory countered and channeled sexual urges. At the same 
time, a new literature of parental advice emerged, distilling religious and 
medical superstitions and knowledges into guidance manuals and steering 
clear of Soviet theory, which argued that children were basically social 
creatures who later underwent individuation (Griffin 1993: 13–15; Ehren-
reich 1990: 85; Getis 1998: 21; Heins 2002: 20; Staiger 2005: 28).
 Education for boys provided a means of class differentiation away 
from physical skill and toward managerial calculation. Adolescence was 
a convenient alibi for the middle class to lobby for public subsidy of its 
offspring’s educational capital, based on a psychologization that suppos-
edly rendered the latter emotionally vulnerable absent years of schooling. 
In short, the discovery of “immaturity” cross-subsidized upward mobility. 
Kant rang the school bell and said it was time to come in from play-lunch. 
By the 1890s, US public education had developed a “good citizenship” 
system that mimicked responsibilities to come. Schools were cities, class-
rooms were wards, pupils were voters, and student councils were govern-
ments. This mirror of the social world became an endless process of inno-
vation, for despite ongoing mimetic pedagogic success, new threats and 
opportunities were identified. So the developing capacity to write good 
English was only a temporary elevation, as risks emerged to imperil the 
shaping of future citizens (Ruddick 2003: 336; Ruddick 1996: 16; Thelen 
2000: 553).
 Problematic conduct among children at this time was attributed to 
defects of authority and self-discipline, evident in unruly bodily motions 
and inattentiveness, which Social Darwinism attributed to class differ-
ences (Sandberg and Barton 1996: 1, 5–6). Moral and medical discourses 
blurred on their way past one another, with each affected by the transac-
tion. “Behavior” came to displace “morality.” But the latter heavily coded 
the former, if in a scientistic manner that treated norms as necessary for 
social cohesion and individual advancement on a secular rather than a 
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God-given basis. Knowledge, business, and the state were borrowing reli-
gion’s methods, even as they challenged its authority.
 The expansion of public education, both demographically and chrono-
logically, put people of the same age together for increasing amounts of 
time. Peers displaced parents as key points of identification. The freedom 
and obligation to learn and work independently turned into the freedom 
and obligation to consume and enjoy independently. Across the 19th cen-
tury, English children progressively gained protection from being treated 
as chattel by factory owners, attaining the same guarantees against cruelty 
as animals, in addition to certain property rights. As part of a new Edenic 
mythology, children were encouraged to adopt the personae of animals 
while playing. The spread of kindergartens (children’s gardens) emphasized 
the notion of children existing in a state of nature, before the Fall—a weird 
reverse anthropomorphism. These reforms recognized, inter alia, young 
people’s cultural distinctiveness and emergent economic power, which were 
coevally registered through a new popular culture: toys and other domestic 
objects, plus sections of the new department stores designed specifically 
for them, offering both sales and child care. Children soon became indices 
of the changes wrought by industrialization, thanks to the musings and 
innovations of critics, reformers, politicians, priests, and manufacturers 
who formed a “child-saving” movement to end child labor. In addition to 
controlling and channeling youthful urges, these agents sought to inculcate 
liberal self-reliance at the heart of childhood, even as mass recreational 
consumption was emerging as a seeming counter to Puritan restraint. This 
also encouraged a recoding of clothing and gender: following a US debate 
over the right colors to associate with boys versus girls, baby boys were 
dressed in blue and baby girls in pink by the first quarter of the 20th cen-
tury. Children were given individual toys and required to sleep alone in 
order to develop strong senses of self, while training in consumption was 
theorized and promoted to alleviate unpleasant emotions. Removal from 
factory life brought with it a new sanctification of childhood, a sentimen-
tality that was quickly codified. Hence the historical emergence of what 
the President’s Council on Bioethics blithely renders today as a timeless 
drive: “deep and familiar human desires . . . for better children” (Mazzarella 
2003: 229; Kline 1993: 46–49, 51–52; Cook, 2007; Kimmel 1997; Stearns 
1994: 208, 210, 212; Levine 2007: 248; Mickenberg 2006: 1218; President’s 
Council on Bioethics 2003: xix).
 The psy-function was crucial to these processes. Based on studies in 
France, Jacques Donzelot found that child psychiatry was not originally 
concerned with psychological particularities amongst children per se. The 
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early physicians who directed mental asyla, and the alienists and neu-
rologists who restricted their expertise to a small group composed of the 
severely insane, were interested in childhood insanity in the light of future 
adult health. For example, vagabonds became the focus of psychiatric atten-
tion in the last decade of the 19th century. Problematic children were seen 
as potential future vagabonds—“bad” citizens—who must be subjected to 
a policy of “preselect and . . . pretreat” (Donzelot 1979: 131). The school 
became a site for observing signs of disorders in children, with the family 
the originary site of mental illness, and the law aligned with the psy-func-
tion in favoring “a court of perversity and danger” over “a criminal court” 
(Foucault 2003b: 40).
 In the United States at this time, juvenile law shifted from punishment 
and repression to education and prevention, alongside new public-health 
measures such as better domestic hygiene, pasteurized milk, and puri-
fied water. The psy-function played a major role as the state transformed 
itself from a disciplinarian to a foster parent, and there was a reaction 
against the evangelical taste for instilling fear in the young. Children were 
medicalized through not only ideas but also practices, through the labor 
of janitors, pharmacists, nurses, teachers, architects, gym instructors, 
hygienists, philanthropists, and social workers as well as the usual psy-
function suspects. Juvenile courts were founded in 1899 on the premise 
that an adult-oriented system was doling out sentences that were not 
therapeutic for the young. These reforms featured leadership and ideas 
from middle-class, educated women, as per Jane Addams, who articu-
lated psy-intervention with campaigns against child labor. By the late 
19th century, the “nervous child” had been identified and typified, with 
treatment available from patent medicines and vivisection. Freud arrived 
in the United States in 1909, the same year as the Juvenile Psychopathic 
Institute was founded in Chicago, while the American Psychoanalytic 
Association was formed in 1910. Within a decade, Freudianism and child 
guidance had found much in common as they marched into the class-
room together to treat the normal alongside the aberrant. At the same 
time, the federal government set up a Children’s Bureau to coordinate 
programs aimed at young people and make psy-insight a cornerstone of 
justice, because not all the animals in the garden were easily civilized. The 
“dangerous individual” ran around looking up little girls’ skirts, stealing 
public signs, and disrupting class. He was a future problem citizen, and 
his existence posed several puzzles: were there intrinsically dangerous 
people, could they be recognized, how should one react to their presence, 
and was gender a key variable? The search to solve these puzzles shifted 
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from a focus on heredity as a cause of deviance to an emphasis on families 
of origin, repression, and sexuality.
 Institutions took fallen children off the street and into legal, peda-
gogic, and therapeutic contexts where they could be diagnosed, punished, 
treated, directed, and taught, blending new rights (protecting them from 
state violence) with new responsibilities (indoctrinating them into self-
governance). Through this union of child law, child psychiatry, and child 
bureaucracy, progressives hoped to uncover the causes of juvenile crimes 
and ultimately eradicate delinquency, frequently siding with children and 
blaming parents. Medical science gained in popularity as infant mortality 
dropped spectacularly between 1880 and 1920. Children were no longer 
expected to die but to become problems in other ways, and fields allied to 
doctoring that emerged to manage them attained some of medicine’s glow. 
The turn of the century was an auspicious time to garner public support, 
as the media were filled with moral-panic reports of rising crime. Pressure 
to enact special legislation and establish treatment facilities for youth came 
from an array of civil-society activists in schools and clubs. The Juvenile 
Psychopathic Institute suggested that delinquents were “normal” children, 
not feebleminded or psychopathic. Its findings were praised by welfare and 
prison reformers and inspired a national child-guidance movement, which 
created more court-affiliated clinics. In 1910, a US National Committee for 
Mental Hygiene was founded to counter mental illness and delinquency, 
with grants from the Rockefeller Foundation and the Commonwealth 
Fund. In 1922, the committee provided seed money to establish child-
guidance clinics. By 1936, there were 235 such clinics across the nation, 
embraced by politicians as a means of avoiding a costly welfare system 
(Ruddick 1996: 18–19; Levine 2007: 248; Foucault 2003b: 110; Skocpol 
2003: 191; McCallum 1993: 142–43; Petrina 2006: 505, 508; Hale 1995: 7, 
85, 87; Garfinkle 2006: 71; Stearns 2006: 82, 96, 99; Herman 2001: 304–6; 
Jones 1999: 4, 15, 37–38, 43, 56–57, 58–60; Getis 1998: 21).
 The child-guidance clinics’ first patients were delinquents, mostly from 
immigrant, poverty-stricken families. But the shift from irredeemability 
toward educability—the perfect makeover—saw US child psychiatry 
more and more concerned with “ordinary” children and their parents and 
how to promote correct child raising. Over the next few decades, child 
psychiatry’s clientele grew to encompass middle-class children, brought 
in by mothers concerned about their children’s educational performance 
and sexual behavior. By the early decades of the 20th century, psychiatry 
was interested in “normal” children of all ages and classes, not just the 
criminally insane. Families, suburbs, and schools were targeted as sites 
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of intervention and were rapidly medicalized. Medicalization as a con-
cept came into use among school hygienists to account for the way medi-
cine defined and responded to an ever-widening array of social issues. 
US developmental psychology effectively began at the turn of the 20th 
century with major studies into adolescence that focused on developing/
preserving autonomy, in keeping with the methodological individualism 
characteristic of Yanqui social-science rhetoric. Such inquiries frequently 
neglected the underlying moral panic animating them—how to instill 
national- and world-leadership qualities into a local and imperial class 
in the face of popular temptations toward social democracy, isolationism, 
or lassitude. By the 1920s and ’30s, child guidance had begun to take an 
interest in the “problem child,” who was “normal” in comparison with 
19th-century psychiatric subjects but deviant with respect to authority, 
such as the family or school. The psy-function had transcended an initial 
association with immigrant and proletarian youth to encompass all those 
who might be “developed.” Problem children could come from any social 
class. Their future capacity to monitor their conduct and be good citizens 
was at stake (Jones 1999: 9; Herman 2001: 299; Lunbeck 1994: 22–24; 
Foucault 2003b: 150, 250; Petrina 2006: 504, 522; Maira and Soep 2004: 
248–49; Mickenberg 2006: 1218).
 In the hundred years to 1950, the school displaced the factory as a 
key site for disciplining children, and popular culture became identified 
as risky. Parents in the evolving nuclear family were held responsible for 
their children’s welfare and were punishable by the state for failing to be 
so. Child psychologists emerged to theorize and treat children in terms 
of “natural” forms and stages of development into adulthood, even as the 
child was constituted as a future citizen whose loyalty and security were 
imperiled by Sovietism. After World War II, child psychiatrists associated 
more with the medical community than with social workers and reformers. 
In the 1950s, the “privatized nuclear household with its male breadwinner, 
female homemaker, and dependent children” shifted from an “insurgent 
ideal” of the 19th-century white middle class to a tentatively achieved, but 
ideologically naturalized, norm—80% of children grew up with their mar-
ried, biological parents. But they were being circled by the psy-function 
just the same. The American Academy of Child Psychiatry was founded 
in 1952, restricting affiliation to medically trained members of the Amer-
ican Psychiatric Association. In 1959, child psychiatry became a formal 
medical subspecialty. Meanwhile, in 1958, the National Defense Education 
Act invented the school guidance counselor, funding 60,000 jobs. Almost 
overnight, children were subject to external testing and self-monitoring. 
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Norms of scholastic and occupational achievement derived from the psy-
professions were deployed to invigilate adherence to and deviation from 
managerial norms. The obsessive desire to explicate, enumerate, legislate, 
and codify childhood is nowhere better expressed than the thousands 
of mental-hygiene films made between 1945 and 1970 that maniacally 
detailed how to date, destroy, develop, drive, drug, eat, fail, feminize, sub-
urbanize, and succeed (Jones 1999: 7, 217–18; Herman 1996: 257–59; Rose 
2007: 119; Smith 1999).
 An additional factor was crucial to the psy-function and young people 
over this period and beyond: the media played a critical role in the cre-
ation, circulation, and subject matter of moral panics about a childhood/
future citizenry at risk. Of course, baleful attitudes toward popular culture 
have a distinguished lineage. Theatre, for example, has long been plagued 
with the sense of an ungodly public sphere of secular make-believe that 
can dupe its audience. Plutarch, for example, recounts the following story 
about Solon. Having enjoyed what later became known as a tragedy, he 
asked the play’s author, Thespis, “whether he was not ashamed to tell such 
lies in front of so many people”:
When Thespis replied that there was no harm in speaking or acting in this 
way in make-believe, Solon struck the ground angrily with his staff and 
exclaimed, “Yes, but if we allow ourselves to praise and honour make-believe 
like this, the next thing will be to find it creeping into our serious business.” 
(Plutarch 1976: 73)
In the 12th century, John of Salisbury warned of the negative impact of 
juggling, mimicry, and acting on “unoccupied minds . . . pampered by the 
solace of some pleasure . . . to their greater harm” (quoted in Zyvatkauskas 
2007). On the other side of the ledger, active interpretation was assumed 
to be a crucial component of media consumption. Socrates was the first 
of many to argue that what we would now call media effects could occur 
only by touching on already-extant proclivities in people. Away from the 
public sphere, the emergence of private, silent reading in the 9th century 
was criticized as an invitation to idleness, but it was also welcomed as an 
invitation to intertextual meaning-making by readers. In the 18th century, 
Denis Diderot asked, “Who shall be the master? The writer or the reader?” 
And up to the early 19th century, it was mostly taken as read that audi-
ences were active interpreters, given their unruly and overtly engaged con-
duct at cultural events (Kline 1993: 52–53, 55; Manguel 1996: n. p., 51, 63, 
71, 86).
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 With the Industrial Revolution, the psy-function became both an 
enabler of commercial targeting and a guardian of correct conduct in the 
textual sphere. The telegraph was connected with the dissociabilities and 
insensitivities of industrial life, its permissive connection to the production 
and circulation of truth brought into question. Telegraph cable’s capacity 
to produce truth before breakfast was accused of exhausting newspaper 
readers’ emotional energies at the wrong time of day. Neurological experts 
attributed their increased business to it, alongside the expansion of steam, 
periodical literature, science, and educated women. The telegraph’s pres-
ence in saloons expanded working-class betting on sporting events. At the 
same time, its messages of goodwill became highly marketable and stan-
dardized, the prospect of individual marks—seemingly enhanced through 
popular education—devastated by the very industrialization that had pro-
duced it. The extension through societies of the capacity to read had as 
its corollary the possibility of a public forming beyond a group of people 
physically gathered together. With mass literacy came industrial turmoil. 
When unionists in the Cuban cigar industry organized mass readings 
of news and current affairs to workers on the line, management and the 
state responded brutally. White slave-owners terrorized African Ameri-
cans who taught themselves and their colleagues to read along with their 
white collaborators: Nat Turner’s Rebellion of 1831 was attributed by many 
to his literacy. The advent of outdoor reading and of the train as a site 
of public culture generated anxieties about open knowledge and debate. 
Nineteenth-century US society saw spirited debates over whether new 
popular genres such as newspapers, crime stories, and novels would breed 
anarchic readers lacking respect for the traditionally literate classes. The 
media posed a threat to established elites by enabling working people to 
become independently minded and informed, distracting them from the 
one true path of servitude (Manguel 1996: 110–11, 141, 280, 284; Stearns 
2006: 65; Miller 1998).
 A gendered side to the new openness through mass literacy became 
the heart of numerous campaigns against public sex and its representa-
tion, most notably the 1873 Comstock Law, which policed sex beginning 
in the late 19th century. The law was named for the noted Post Office mor-
alist Anthony Comstock, who organized and ran the NGO the New York 
Society for the Suppression of Vice. Comstock was exercised by “EVIL 
READING” and avowed that before the Fall, reading was unknown. In the 
early 20th century, opera, Shakespeare, and romance fiction were censored 
for their immodest impact on the young. Media regulation since that time 
has been colored by both governments and courts policing sexual material 
Miller_final.indb   62 8/20/2008   10:36:10 PM
	 	 t h e 	 p s y - F u n c t I o n : 	 M a k I n g 	 o v e r 	 M I n d s 	 ✴ 
based on its alleged impact on young people, all the way from the uptake of 
Britain’s 1868 Regina v. Hicklin decision and its anxieties about vulnerable 
youth through to the US Supreme Court’s 1978 Federal Communications 
Commission v. Pacifica (Heins 2002: 9, 29–32, 23).
 By the early 20th century, academic experts had decreed media audiences 
to be passive consumers, thanks to the missions of literary criticism (dis-
tinguishing the cultivated from others) and psychology (distinguishing the 
competent from others) (Butsch 2000: 3). The origins of social psychology 
can be traced to anxieties about “the crowd” in a suddenly urbanized and 
educated Western Europe that raised the prospect that a long-feared “och-
locracy” of “the worthless mob” (Pufendorf 2000: 144) would be able to 
share popular texts. In the wake of the French Revolution, Edmund Burke 
was animated by the need to limit popular exuberance via “restraint upon 
. . . passions” (1994: 122). Elite theorists emerged from both right and left, 
notably Vilfredo Pareto (1976), Gaetano Mosca (1939), Gustave Le Bon 
(1899), and Robert Michels (1915), arguing that newly literate publics were 
vulnerable to manipulation by demagogues. The founder of the “American 
Dream” saw “the mob mentality of the city crowd” as “one of the menaces 
to modern civilization,” and he disparaged “the prostitution of the moving-
picture industry” (Adams 1941: 404, 413). These critics were frightened of 
socialism; they were frightened of democracy; and they were frightened of 
popular reason (Wallas 1967: 137). With civil society growing restive, the 
wealth of radical associations was explained away in social-psychological 
terms rather than political-economic ones, as the psy-function warmed 
itself by campus fires: Harvard took charge of the theory, Chicago the task 
of meeting and greeting the great unwashed, and Columbia the statistical 
manipulation (Staiger 2005: 21–22).
 Throughout this history, the young were the special focus of the moral 
panics. As working-class immigrants and their children learned to read 
in the United States, the middle class sought to manage the population. 
Tests of beauty and truth found popular culture wanting and promul-
gated the notion of the suddenly enfranchised being bamboozled by the 
unscrupulously fluent. Such tendencies moved into high gear with the 
Payne Fund studies of the 1930s, which juxtaposed the impact of films 
on “‘superior’ adults—young college professors, graduate students and 
their wives” with children, notably in juvenile centers, easily corralled 
due to what were thought of as “‘regular régimes of living.’” These studies 
inaugurated mass social-science panic about young people at the cinema 
through the collection of “AUTHORITATIVE AND IMPERSONAL DATA 
WHICH WOULD MAKE POSSIBLE A MORE COMPLETE EVALUATION 
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OF MOTION PICTURES AND THEIR SOCIAL POTENTIALITIES” to answer 
the question, “What effect do motion pictures have upon children of dif-
ferent ages?,” especially on the many young people who were “retarded” 
(Charters 1933: 8, iv–v, 12–13, 31; see May and Shuttleworth 1933; Dale 
1933; Blumer 1933; Blumer and Hauser 1933; Forman 1933; Mitchell 
1929). These pioneering scholars boldly set out to see whether “the onset 
of puberty is or is not affected by motion pictures,” especially given what 
were called “The Big Three” narrative themes: love, crime, and sex. They 
gauged reactions through “autobiographical case studies” that asked ques-
tions such as whether “All Most Many Some Few No Chinese are cunning 
and underhand.” They also investigated “demonstrations of satisfying love 
techniques” for fear that “sexual passions are aroused and amateur pros-
titution . . . aggravated.” This was done, inter alia, by assessing a viewer’s 
“skin response.” “Laboratory techniques” used such sensational machinery 
as the psychogalvanometer and beds wired with hypnographs and poly-
graphs (Charters 1933: 4, 10, 15, 25, 32, 49, 54, 60; Wartella 1996: 173; 
Staiger 2005: 25).
 This example has led to seven more decades of obsessive attempts to 
correlate youthful consumption of popular culture with antisocial conduct, 
emphasizing the number and conduct of audiences to audiovisual enter-
tainment: where individuals in the audiences came from, how many there 
were, and what they did as a consequence of being present. Moral panics 
and the psy-function combine in media critique to create what Harold 
Garfinkel calls a “cultural dope,” a mythic figure who “produces the stable 
features of the society by acting in compliance with pre-established and 
legitimate alternatives of action that the common culture provides.” The 
“common sense rationalities . . . of here and now situations” used by ordi-
nary people are obscured and derided by such categorizations (1992: 68). 
The pattern is that whenever new communications technologies emerge, 
children are immediately identified as both pioneers and victims, simulta-
neously endowed by manufacturers and critics with immense power and 
immense vulnerability—early adopters/early naifs. They are held to be the 
first to know and the last to understand the media—the grand paradox of 
youth, latterly on display in the “digital sublime” of technological deter-
minism, as always with the superadded valence of a future citizenship in 
peril (Mosco 2004: 80).
 Congressional hearings into juvenile delinquency in the 1950s heard 
again and again from social scientists, police, parents, and others that pop-
ular culture was dividing families by diverting offspring from their elders’ 
values. The hearings promoted psychiatric denunciations of comic books 
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as causes of nightmares, juvenile delinquency, and even murder. To elude 
regulation, publishers developed codes of conduct that embodied “respect 
for parents” and “honorable behavior” in their precepts of self-governance 
(Steinberg and Kincheloe 1997: 1–2; Mazzarella 2003: 230; Malkki and 
Martin 2003: 217–18; Gilbert 1986: 3; David Park 2004: 114; Heins 2002: 
52–54).
 The Payne Fund studies were animated by the realization that “motion 
pictures are not understood by the present generation of adults” but “appeal 
to children” (Charters 1933: v). And each communications technology and 
genre has brought with it a raft of marketing techniques focused on young 
people, even as concerns about supposedly unprecedented and unholy 
new risks to youth recur: cheap novels during the early 1900s; silent, 
then sound, film during the 1920s; radio in the 1930s; comic books of the 
1940s and ’50s; pop music and television from the 1950s and ’60s; satanic 
rock as per the 1970s and ’80s; video cassette recorders in the 1980s; and 
rap music, video games, and the Internet since the 1990s. Recent studies 
totalize eight- to eighteen-year-olds as “Generation M,” for “media.” The 
satirical paper The Onion cleverly mocked the interdependent phenomena 
of moral panic and commodification via a faux 2005 study of the impact 
on US youth of seeing Janet Jackson’s breast in a Super Bowl broadcast the 
year before (Kline 1993: 57; Mazzarella 2003: 228; Roberts et al. 2005; “U.S. 
Children” 2005).
 As Bob Dylan puts it, recalling the ’60s in Greenwich Village, “Sociolo-
gists were saying that TV had deadly intentions and was destroying the 
minds and imaginations of the young—that their attention span was being 
dragged down.” The other dominant site of knowledge was the “psychology 
professor, a good performer, but originality not his long suit” (2004: 55, 
67). They still cast a shadow across that village, and across many others. 
Consider Dorothy G. Singer and Jerome L. Singer’s febrile 21st-century 
call for centering media effects within the study of child development: “can 
we ignore the impact on children of their exposure through television and 
films or, more recently, to computer games and arcade video games that 
involve vast amounts of violent actions?” (2001: xv).
 Effects studies suffer all the disadvantages of ideal-typical psychological 
reasoning. They rely on methodological individualism, failing to account 
for cultural norms and politics, let alone the arcs of history that estab-
lish patterns of text and response inside politics, war, ideology, and dis-
course. Each massively costly laboratory test of media effects, based on, 
as the refrain goes, “a large university in the mid-West,” is countered by a 
similar experiment, with conflicting results. As politicians, grant-givers, 
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and jeremiad-wielding pundits call for more and more research to prove 
that the media make you stupid, violent, and apathetic—or the opposite—
academics line up at the trough to indulge their contempt for popular cul-
ture and ordinary life, and their rent-seeking urge for public money. The 
model never interrogates its own conditions of existence—namely, that 
governments, religious groups, and the media themselves use it to account 
for social problems, and that broadcasting’s capacity for private viewing 
troubles those authorities who desire surveillance of popular culture.
 Of course, things have changed for young people, thanks to the com-
mercial media—though not in the way the psy-function’s epistemology 
allows it to address. John Hartley refers to a process of “juvenation,” which 
simultaneously positions the young as sources and targets of the media. 
An early example was 1930s radio clubs. They encouraged programming 
directly attuned to children’s interests in order to develop loyalty to brands 
as well as stories, providing listeners with clandestine codes that made 
them feel privileged to possess secret knowledges (Hartley 1998: 15; Mick-
enberg 2006: 1223; Cook 2007). Youth became simultaneously a “mass 
movement and [a] mass market” in the postwar period. Popular Science 
magazine coined the word “teenager” in 1941, and Seventeen magazine 
appeared on newsstands three years later (“teen” clothing sizes had been 
named in the previous decade, but things moved into full swing after the 
war, with cosmetics aimed at training girls for teenage life by 1946). The 
“subteen” was identified as a consumer in the mid-1950s. Both left and 
right were susceptible to panic about this (Lewis 1992: 3; Hindess 1993: 
320–21; Cook and Kaiser 2004: 207), alarmed by the “commercial child” 
(Liljeström 1983: 144–46).5 By the 1950s, identification through mar-
keting and protection through policing were the norm, with the white-
faced family and white-picket-fenced home seemingly under threat from 
this newly enfranchised shopper and worker, who communed with other 
readers rather than parents. Earlier forms of literature for young people, 
which were didactic and largely restricted to economic and militaristic 
advice, had been supplanted by pleasure and “life directions” (Riesman 
et al. 1953: 122, 175–76). With jobs emerging from marketers trained in 
psychology and advertising departments, the psy-function was infiltrating 
the very genres it drew strength from denouncing.
 Before this period, toys were advertised to the trade, with 80% of sales 
made each December. But “children began their training as consumers” 
at the age of four or five during that decade. When Disney introduced the 
Mickey Mouse Club on TV in 1955, product placement and commercials 
centered them as consumers on a year-round basis for the first time (via 
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what became known in the ’80s as the “Shortcake Strategy,” named by Tom 
Engelhardt after the popular “Strawberry Shortcake” doll). This innova-
tion picked up on Disney’s promise from its earliest cartoons of benefi-
cial consumption, not unprincipled exploitation. Within a decade, market 
researchers began spying on children via dedicated academic instruments 
of surveillance to elicit their desires. By 1999, children were estimated to 
account for $300 billion a year in expenditures by parents across the United 
States, while direct targeting worked with the slogan “Kids Getting Older 
Younger” (young people themselves were spending upwards of $20 billion). 
In 2004, US industry spent twice as much on targeting sales to children as a 
decade earlier. Viacom, Time Warner, and Disney identify children as key 
sources of TV profit, because advertising, programming, and merchan-
dising have such an effortless, organic connection. In 2003, Nickelodeon 
sold $3 billion of consumer products, up one-fifth from the previous year. 
That made it the fastest-growing part of Viacom. PBS launched Sprout for 
two- to five-year-olds in 2005, and BabyFirstTV, aimed at six-month-old 
viewers, began in 2006. Companies like Posh Tots offer a bewildering array 
of personalized bedroom furnishings and ambience for the billion-dollar 
child via http://poshtots.com. No wonder that when the “stars” come to 
life in Toy Story (1995) and Toy Story 2 (1999), they converse about their 
“parent” companies and brand identities. While pop parts of the psy-func-
tion aid consumer targeting, they also feed anxieties about lost innocence 
via a raft of Olympian literature denouncing child commerce, finding 
fellow traveling media-panickers in bodies such as Action for Children’s 
Television, founded in the 1960s (Riesman et al. 1953: 120; Mickenberg 
2006: 1221; Kapur 2005: 33, 31, 29, 2; Stephens 1995: 14; Watson 2004: 14; 
“Kids & Cash” 2004; “Children’s Television” 2004; Cook 2007; DeFao 2006; 
Cook and Kaiser 2004: 215).
 Meanwhile, for reasons entirely unrelated to comic-book consump-
tion, VCR absorption, or chromosomal misconduct, the supposedly idyllic 
world of the bourgeois US family was simply not working by the 1980s. Just 
12% of children lived with their biological parents at the end of eight years 
of Reagan as president, and 7% lived with employed fathers and “home-
duties” mothers. The 2000 Census disclosed that married couples with 
children were just 25% of the population. To the horror of creepy Chris-
tianity, this history reveals the family to be “a contingent form of associa-
tion with unstable boundaries and varying structures” (Shapiro 2001: 2). 
Ideologies, institutions, and policies predicated and structured on “tradi-
tion” fell under the threat of major social change, often indexed by the 
media. On the one hand, children had to cope with the extended working 
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hours and diminished spending power of harried, often single, parents. On 
the other, they were interpellated by corporate advertising and entertain-
ment as competent, knowledgeable consumers who should not be cowed 
into submission by authoritarian parental or educational will. Meanwhile, 
problems such as child abuse, which correlate quite clearly with poverty, 
were scrupulously defined by the state and the psy-function as unrelated 
to the economy. The response was to psychologize rather than politicize: 
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention estimate that at least 40% 
of parents seeking aid for their disturbed children emerge from doctors’ 
offices with prescriptions in hand (Healy 2007). By 2003, more money was 
being spent on stimulants and antidepressants for children than antibi-
otics or asthma medication. And Minor’s New Freedom Commission on 
Mental Health recommended surveillance of all preschoolers for mental 
disorders and called for a consumerist ethos to mental health that focused 
on clients as customers (Steinberg and Kincheloe 1997: 2–3, 16–17; Reeves 
and Campbell 1994: 186–89; Coltrane 2001: 390; Hacking 1995: 64–65; 
Albright 2006: 170; Lenzer and Paul 2006; President’s New Freedom Com-
mission on Mental Health 2003).
 For their part, right-wing front organizations such as the Parents Tele-
vision Council undertake obsessive content analyses of media texts. The 
council’s Entertainment Tracking System (2005) seeks to “ensure that chil-
dren are not constantly assaulted by sex, violence and profanity on televi-
sion and in other media . . . along with stories and dialogue that create 
disdain for authority figures, patriotism, and religion.” Hence the bizarre 
sight of state, church, and commerce governmentalizing, demonizing, and 
commodifying youth culture (Hartley 1998: 14).
 Jacques Gansler, Clinton’s Assistant Secretary of Defense for Acquisi-
tion and Technology, declared that teen hackers posed a “real threat envi-
ronment” to national security (quoted in Bendrath 2003: 53). However 
ridiculous this assessment may be, it neatly indexes the state’s contempt 
for its young and the symbolic power of popular culture—the makeover 
out of control. Young people incarnate adult terror in the face of the pop-
ular. They provide a tabula rasa onto which can be placed every manner 
of anxiety about new knowledges, technologies, and tastes (Hartley 1998: 
15). So we find Clinton announcing in 1997 that the nation had “about six 
years to turn this juvenile crime thing around or our country is going to 
be living in chaos,” even as youth crime had dropped by almost 10% in a 
year. And a decade later, the press was lapping up a spurious claim by the 
American Automobile Association that castigated young drivers for acci-
dents. Meanwhile, psychiatry blamed the failure to manage “this recalci-
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trant and difficult-to-access population” (juvenile delinquents) on faith 
in criminology, when the resources of the world should go to viewing 
“criminality as a form of psychopathology.” William Bratton, the much-
heralded former Chief of Police in New York City, celebrated his first 
term in charge of the Los Angeles Police Department by denouncing “a 
youthful population that is largely disassociated from the mainstream of 
America,” even as the average age of violent criminals in his city was well 
on the increase and arrests of local youth had plummeted. No wonder 
the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) warns that childhood is 
“under threat” at the same time as it is deemed threatening (Males 2006a; 
Glassner 1999: xiv; Males 2006b; Steiner and Karnik 2006; The Children’s 
Society 2006: 5–6).
 Moral panics about the young and the popular have displaced attention 
from the horrific impact on children of deregulation and the cessation 
of vital social services that characterized the catastrophic presidencies of 
Reagan and the Bushes. The data on youth welfare demonstrate the cen-
trality of big government to the family solidity that these hegemons rhe-
torically pined for but programmatically undermined through massively 
eroded expenditures on health, nutrition, foster care, and a raft of other 
services for young people, notably the State Children’s Health Insurance 
Program. In the 1960s, young people lost free-speech protection when the 
Supreme Court differentiated them, permitting state governments to leg-
islate in ways that would be unconstitutional if applied to adults (Ginsberg 
v. New York 390 US 629). In 1968, the court established that young people 
could be arrested if they “didn’t look right” to officials (Davis et al. 2002). 
(The FBI and the Customs Service use this decision to justify body-lan-
guage profiling as a means of identifying potential terrorists, with agents 
trained to notice “exceptional nervousness” via visible carotid arteries, 
chapped lips, “fleeting smiles,” “darting eyes[,] and hand tremors.”) Such 
protocols establish that “the individual already resembles his crime before 
he has committed it” (Foucault 2003b: 19). And while the court shields 
adults from being treated with psychotropic drugs against their will, this 
protection does not exist for the young in most US jurisdictions. The 
young have also been subject to genetic testing, on the ground that it can 
predict classroom disobedience (Albright 2006: 171; Rose 2007: 119). For 
700 years, the British legal doctrine of doli incapax decreed that people 
under the age of 10 could not distinguish wrong from right. It has been 
rescinded. Conservative justices are contemptuous of privacy rights for 
children, and the United States repeatedly establishes new records amongst 
developed countries for the execution of people under age 18, with the 
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longstanding support of the Supreme Court, half of which, until a 2005 
decision, favored killing those aged under 15. Only two nations deny chil-
dren rights in criminal cases, other than to counsel and due process. One 
is Somalia. You are encouraged to guess the identity of the other. A handy 
hint is that the Kansas Juvenile Code incorporates parental rights as part 
of creepy Christianity’s horror in the face of children’s citizenship. This is 
in keeping with Evangelicals’ support for violence against children, which 
has characterized their methods of family domination for more than three 
centuries. Let’s not even discuss the implications of future parents repro-
gramming their future progeny genetically (Males 1996: 7, 35; Watson 
2004: 5, 18n5; The Children’s Society 2006: 6; Minow 2002: 262; Stearns 
2006: 68–69; Habermas 2003: 76).
 The outcome of decades of policies exacting a toll upon the young is 
that US citizens over age 40 are the wealthiest group in world history, with 
the lowest tax payments in the First World. Child poverty is at unprec-
edented levels—18.6% for Yanquis and 28.2% for immigrants. In each case, 
the proportion is massively greater than for any other age group (Pew His-
panic Center 2008). This is three times the figure for Northern Europe; 
and half of all US children experience poverty at some point, with black 
children suffering at twice the rate of whites, in addition to the burden of 
having twice the rate of teen unemployment. Whereas very few teenaged 
children in the United States worked for money in the first half of the 20th 
century, almost half had to do so by its end, while one in eight children 
has no health coverage today. Using an index of material wealth, health 
and safety, education, relationships, and conduct that draws, inter alia, on 
the World Health Organization and the OECD, UNICEF judged the well-
being of young people in the United States in 2007 to be second-worst 
among wealthy nations, at number twenty—bested only by its neoliberal 
partner in experimentation, the UK, and far behind its nearest point of 
comparison, Hungary. Suicide is the eleventh largest cause of death in the 
United States, but third amongst the young. As suicide levels fell across the 
population between 1950 and 1995, the rate for fifteen- to nineteen-year-
olds quadrupled, notably among males. Key social measures of unhappi-
ness correlate with youth today in a way they did not up to the mid-1970s, 
beyond even the concerns of the elderly. The psy-function argues that 
adolescents are ten times more likely to suffer depression today than they 
were one hundred years ago. To cope with feelings of helplessness, 135,000 
teenagers packed a gun with their sandwiches and school books in 1990, 
while by 2004, eight children/teenagers died by gunshot each day. Perhaps 
this incidence actually has something to do with marketing. When the 
Miller_final.indb   70 8/20/2008   10:36:11 PM
	 	 t h e 	 p s y - F u n c t I o n : 	 M a k I n g 	 o v e r 	 M I n d s 	 ✴ 
white-male market in firearms became saturated, and attempts to sell to 
women fell short of the desired numbers, manufacturers turned to young 
people in the 1990s. At the same time, powerful antipsychotic drugs were 
being used on them as never before, increasing five times between 1993 
and 2002, with white boys a particular target/beneficiary, depending on 
your perspective; and the DSM was invoked in the courts and schools to 
classify, exculpate, and indict them (Romer and Jamieson 2003; Putnam 
2000: 261–63; Gillham and Reivich 2004: 152; Lewis 1992: 41; Children’s 
Defense Fund 2004; UNICEF 2007; Glassner 1999: xxi, 55; Ruddick 2003: 
337, 348; DeNavas-Walt et al. 2006: 13; Hacker 2006: 32; Foundation for 
Child Development 2004; Black Youth Project 2007: 4; Liebel 2004: 151; 
Ivins 2005; Carey 2006a; Kutchins and Kirk 1997: 11–12).
 For all this disenfranchisement and peril, the little beasts must be pre-
vailed upon for yet more sacrifices: Reagan education bureaucrat, pop 
philosopher, and secret serial gambler William Bennett called for young 
people to respect the law and the individual, and Bush Minor introduced a 
“Lessons of Liberty” schools program to ideologize them into militarism. 
In 2004, 83% of US high schools ran community-service programs, up 
from 27% two decades earlier. For all the world a throwback to Soviet-era 
Yanqui drills that involved scurrying under school desks to elude radia-
tion, Minor’s administration announced a “Ready for Kids” initiative in 
2004, hailing children in emergency responses to terrorism (Westheimer 
and Kahne 2004a; “Kid’s” 2004). In 2002, Minor promulgated policies to 
“improve students’ knowledge of American history, increase their civic 
involvement, and deepen their love for our great country.” He went on to 
require that children learn that “America is a force for good in the world, 
bringing hope and freedom to other people.” Senator Lamar Alexander, 
previously federal head of education and a university bureaucrat, spon-
sored the American History and Civics Education Act “so our children can 
grow up learning what it means to be an American” (Bush and Alexander 
quoted in Westheimer 2004: 231). Meanwhile, progressive political activism 
by young people led to sanctions. In West Virginia, a high-school pupil was 
suspended for inviting her colleagues to join an antiwar club in 2002, as 
were a ninth-grader in Maryland for marching against the invasion of Iraq 
in 2003 and a high-schooler in Colorado for posting peace flyers (West-
heimer 2004: 232): wrong knowledge of “American history”; wrong type of 
“civic involvement.”
 Despite the propaganda masquerading as education in this country, 
whereas three-quarters of school-leavers thought the United States was the 
best country in the world in 1977, only half were sufficiently narcissistic 
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and deluded to believe this in 2000. They are less likely than their self-satis-
fied elders to proclaim US culture superior to all others or to oppose immi-
gration. Globally, preferences for European over US influence on interna-
tional relations see young people appalled by Yanqui imperialism. In the 
2004 presidential contest, the young were the only age group that favored 
Democrats, and they were solidly Democratic in the 2006 midterms. Plus 
they are by far the least religious sector among the US population (Center 
for Information & Research on Civic Learning & Engagement 2004; Pew 
Research Center for the People & the Press 2004a; Globescan/Program on 
International Policy Attitudes 2005; Baylor Institute for the Study of Reli-
gion 2006).
 These mild-mannered signs of a critical, skeptical attitude are interpreted 
by their elders and betters with shock and awe, in keeping with the latter’s 
belief in severe moral decline among the young. A 1997 Public Agenda 
Report disclosed that two-thirds of US adults regarded young people as out 
of control and irresponsible, and parents sought to shield children from 
news that reflects world and domestic social conflict. And whereas half 
the adult population in 1952 was convinced that young people knew the 
difference between good and evil, only 19% believed so fifty years later. US 
political science decreed the political views of young people unimportant 
because they often changed en route to adulthood. The discipline basically 
ceased addressing youth interests from the 1980s (Giroux 2000: 15; Galston 
2002: 280–81; Lemish 2007: 13; Black Youth Project 2007: 7). Youth’s grand 
paradox had fully emerged, its fate to be simultaneously “the most silenced 
population in society” and “the noisiest” (Grossberg 1994: 25), caught 
between the psy-function’s “production and marketing of the idea that the 
inevitable alienation, dispossession and injustice inherent in consumer 
capitalism is an individual and personal . . . problem” (Hansen et al. 2003: 
15) and the national loathing of children, summed up in Time’s denuncia-
tion of “half-pint hellions who drive parents and teachers to distraction” 
(quoted in Schmitz et al. 2003: 399).
 The next chapter focuses on what happens when the governance and 
commodity functions of the psy-function meet and offer the young a pill 
to make themselves over, leading to a contradictory rush of panic and risk 
as different fractions of the psy-function, capital, the family, and the state 
struggle over how to reinvent people.
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this	chapter	picks up the dual themes of managing and selling make-
overs that were introduced in the analysis of the psy-function and youth. 
It  focuses on the nexus of education and pharmacology, specifically con-
troversies about Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) and 
Ritalin, an amphetamine-related pill that has been prescribed over three 
decades for children diagnosed with the disorder.1 ADHD and Ritalin offer 
a means of identifying, naming, curtailing, and channeling unproductive, 
uncontrolled, disruptive exuberance, such that “troubled” young people 
lead disciplined lives, making them over without allocating vast human 
resources to monitor and direct them.
2
how did we—or at least those of us who live in the United States—come to 
code children’s inattentiveness, difficulties with organizing tasks, fidgetiness, 
squirming, excessive talkativity and noisiness, impatience and the like as       
attention deficit hyperactivity disorder?
 —nikolas rose (2003: 46)
Carol Sutherland knew something was seriously wrong when her husband tried 
to baptize the parakeet.
 —dale brazao and Patricia Orwen (2001b)
don’t be surprised if it turns into a big new feminist cause all over the world: 
the plight of women who say they have trouble focusing their attention—and 
can’t get anybody else’s attention for long enough to deal with their problem.
 —The Economist (“really desperate housewives” 2006)
r i t a l i N
Making	over	youth
Many thanks to Marie Leger, with whom I wrote a paper that formed the basis for much of this chapter.
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 In 1999, almost 2.98 million pharmaceutical prescriptions were written 
for US adolescents—over eleven thousand new scripts each weekday—and 
in 2000, 37% of US residents aged 15 to 24 were diagnosed as mentally ill 
(Waters 2000; Berman et al. 2000). So just as young people are identified 
as problems in ever more sophisticated ways, so they are more and more 
likely to be treated via consumption, in the shape of a pill. Thanks to such 
medical interventions, classroom conduct and scholastic results are made 
over by an invisible and inexpensive device; Ritalin is, as per the wider 
designer-drug phenomenon, central to US upward-mobility fantasies of 
transcendence through purchase. It is a sign of how commodified forms 
of generational transcendence characterize the United States and its niche 
fetish—identity for sale.
 I do not argue that ADHD is arbitrarily “made up,” even though it was a 
politically correct construction by pharmaceutical corporations to replace 
the less palatable “minimal brain damage” (Gottlieb 2000). Nor do I negate 
the necessity of social formations decreeing certain forms of conduct (and 
suffering) unacceptable. I acknowledge the efficacy and legitimacy of dem-
ocratically derived and policed norms of life. But to regard definitions (for 
example, of what is mad or sane) as timeless, spaceless, absolute accounts 
of interiority that explain and match exteriority is to miss the temporal and 
spatial contingency and discursive and institutional politics of the occa-
sions when suffering becomes illness (Halasz et al. 2002: 1). So rather than 
endorsing or debunking ADHD, or promoting or condemning Ritalin, I 
suggest that the moral panic associated with them is a routine, generic 
event that emanates from today’s risk society via a political economy 
and political technology of personhood that invest contradictorily in the 
national makeover.
attent ion  def ic i t  hyperact iv i ty  d isorder
Within the last few years scientific studies have shown . . . that adhd probably 
is not primarily a disorder of paying attention but one of self-regulation; how the 
self comes to manage itself within the larger realm of social behavior.
 —russell a. barkley (1995: viii)
initially intended for classroom use, the motivaider ($90.00 retail cost) is a 
pocket-sized, battery-operated device that can be set to provide a gentle vibra-
tion at determined intervals for the adhd child and/or parent. The ADD Ware-
house on-line catalog states, “The motivaider sees to it that a child receives 
enough of the right reminders to make a specific improvement in behavior.”
 —adam rafavolich (2001: 380)
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The first quotation above comes not from some loopy Foucauldian, social 
constructionist, or risk sociologist, but a pro-Ritalin clinician. Yet despite 
his insight, Barkley and others still desire scientific correlations between 
conduct they are keen to control and a somatic problem. ADHD provides 
the psy-function with reasons to make Ritalin “the cornerstone of therapy” 
(Steinberg 1999: 223). And treatment is acceptable only as part of medical-
ization. There must be a physiological underpinning to these disorders, lest 
they be dismissed as malingering by patients; as quick and easy explana-
tions for parents, teachers, and doctors; or as self-interest on the part of 
the psy-function and the pharmaceutical and educational establishments 
(Conrad 1975). The American Medical Association asserts that each year, 
$77 billion of national income is lost due to educational underattainment 
caused by ADHD (2004), and the American Academy of Pediatrics (2005) 
has no doubt that the disorder exists. In 1990, an NIMH study included 
colorful pictures of brain scans, suggesting that a number of adults with 
a history of ADHD in childhood had decreased brain metabolism. These 
images circulated widely in the media, and the research was used to assert 
a biological basis for the disorder: brain lesions that affected dopamine 
(Breggin 1998; Steven Rose 2006: 261). In the words of prominent aca-
demic Harold Koplewicz, “It is not that your mother got divorces, or that 
your father didn’t wipe you the right way. . . . It really is DNA roulette” 
(quoted in Waters 2000). In 2003, a study funded by the NIH suggesting 
that people with ADHD had small brains led to debate over whether brain 
size was a function of the disorder or of its treatment; the author declined 
to make underlying data freely available. Not surprisingly, many mothers 
welcomed medical diagnoses and drugs for dealing with their children in 
order to elude the patriarchal blame of psychoanalytic explanations and the 
intrusive child-guidance movement—a classic case of competing forms of 
rent-seeking within the psy-function, with neurology and pharmacology 
triumphing over the talking cure. True believers were delighted when the 
diagnosis globalized in the 21st century, as the globalization was taken to 
prove that ADHD was not the creature of pharmacological hubris, medical 
gullibility, or national specificity—though it was subaltern white-settler 
colonies that fell most fully into line (AKA Canada and Australia) (Singh 
2002; Lenzer 2006; Oak 2004; Carey 2006b; Herman 2001: 307; Anwar 
2007; Scheffler et al. 2007).
 ADHD adherents express alarm at “a discipline known as the sociology 
of medicine,” claiming that its “politicization of neuropsychopharma-
cology undercuts everything for which evidence-based medicine stands” 
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via “a recurring wave of anti-medication hysteria” (Accardo and Blondis 
2001). The “International Consensus Statement on ADHD” rails at “media 
reports” relying on “wholly unscientific . . . social critics” whose concerns 
are “tantamount to declaring the earth flat, the laws of gravity debatable, 
and the periodic table in chemistry a fraud” (2002: 89–90; also see Carey 
and Diller 2001 and Ginther 1996). But should these self-anointed suc-
cessors to Galileo, Newton, and Mendeleyev be so confident? The “Inter-
national Consensus Statement on ADHD” drew sturdy repudiation from 
authors of equivalent eminence—but without equivalent ties to pharma-
funding (Timimi et al. 2004).
 The medical literature on ADHD displays a strong preference for 
what is described, almost in base-superstructure terms, as “underlying 
physiology.” Yet even subscribers lament the weak correlation of “brain 
damage with attentional dysfunction” (Lock and Bender 2000: 30–31), 
and many admit that “definitions of learning disabilities are astoundingly 
plastic,” depending on “one’s choice of boundaries” (Hinshaw 2000: xv). 
This dilemma is euphemized as “the heterogeneity of ADHD,” a function 
of combining “a cluster of several behavioral deficits, each with a specific 
physiologic substrate” (Sieg 2000: 111). There seems to be a rather puzzled 
search in physicians’ offices, laboratories, classrooms, and recreational 
facilities for a singular truth about ADHD that either coheres logically, or 
corresponds to empirical observation. The Journal of Attention Disorders 
has dedicated a decade to it (Messinger 1978: 67; Sandberg and Garralda 
1996: 281–82; Tait 2005).
 Five attempts have been mounted to provide a biological basis to the 
disorder:
•  The first takes the efficacy of treatment as proof of the existence 
of disease: since Ritalin works like a neurotransmitter, reducing 
disruptive conduct and increasing concentration, there must have 
been a problem with neurotransmission in the first place. This 
reasoning neglects the fact that Ritalin used by “healthy” children 
also leads to greater obedience and focus.
•  The second removes the blame from neurotransmitters and places 
it on pregnancy and birth. Prenatal and perinatal traumas are held 
responsible for early behavioral difficulties. Research validates 
such claims only up to the age of three years, so they are rarely 
used to justify Ritalin prescription.
•  The third turns to retarded maturation, “soft signs” of neurolog-
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ical function; but again, they are encountered in normal children 
as well.
•  The fourth looks in the direction of physical abnormalities, but 
there are weak correlations between these difficulties and hyper-
activity.
•  Last, the inevitable appeal to genetics has produced no absolute 
proof; concordance of ADHD among monozygotic twins is only 
51%, compared to 100% concordance of eye color, which suggests 
only a partial genetic link, although an ADHD Molecular Genetics 
Network continues the hunt. 
 (Rubinstein et al. 2000: 42–43; Livingstone 1997; Kent 2004; 
Howlett et al. 2005: 95)
These five forms of thought offer less than compelling evidence that ADHD 
exists independently of its diagnosis and treatment. The credulous New 
York Times Magazine is reduced to arguing that at the end of the day, “doc-
tors know it when they see it” (Belkin 2004). When and where have they 
seen it? The American Academy of Pediatrics’ treatment guidelines for chil-
dren aged 6 to 12 emphasize that symptoms may not be apparent during 
an appointment, so doctors should ask parents, caregivers, and teachers 
about conduct at home and at school. The symptoms must be present for 
six months in at least two of the child’s social settings (for example, home 
and school), and other conditions should be ruled out (or diagnosed as 
coexisting disorders); it can get crowded in those brains. Endless studies 
that find children are hyperactive at home but not at school, or at summer 
camp (where 40% of the population was on chronic prescription drugs 
in 2006) but not in clinicians’ rooms, do serious disservice to biological 
claims. The NIH Consensus Conference has not established any basis for 
ADHD in brain functioning. So when parents, encouraged by television 
commercials that warn of youth violence and/or educational failure absent 
psy-intervention (Welch et al. 2007; Glassner 1999: 78), present profes-
sionals with such queries as “Do you test for ADD [Attention Deficit Dis-
order]?,” they are reifying a cluster of symptoms and signs into a biological-
neurological condition (Diller 1998: 3). Perhaps there is no “objectively 
discoverable pathogen” and “ADHD is a purely hypothetical construct” that 
lacks an incontrovertible clinical test, relying instead on symptomatology 
(Schubert et al. 2005: 151, 155). In the words of the British Journal of Psy-
chiatry, it may be “best understood as . . . cultural” (Timimi and Taylor 
2004).
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 But that is not the hegemonic account: both therapy and drugs are rec-
ommended forms of treatment once extensive surveillance has done its 
work. This is no surprise, given that clinical discussion of unruly conduct 
amongst children has a long history: mania and melancholy were identi-
fied as distractions two millennia years go. The NIMH (which, like the 
American Psychiatric Association, is unable to spell the word “principal” 
or correctly parse “well-qualified” in its publication on ADHD, a docu-
ment full of imprecations and incantations to do with “impulsivity” that 
nevertheless appear not to have constrained its rush to publish) dates dis-
covery of the disorder from 1845, when Heinrich Hoffman (1999) wrote 
“The Story of Fidgety Philip” for children. George Still, who had been 
“collecting observations . . . of defective moral control as a morbid condi-
tion . . . in association with idiocy or imbecility” for some time, described 
ADHD-like symptoms in 1902. He attributed them to an inherited neu-
rological disorder that produced “defects of inhibitory volition” leading to 
an “abnormal defect of moral control” via theft, sex, violence, mendacity, 
hyperactivity, and an “abnormal incapacity for sustained attention” (Hall 
2000; “New” 2001; Accardo and Blondis 2000b: 4–5; Porter 2002: 48; 
Breggin 1998: 179; National Institute of Mental Health 2006: 2; Ozarin and 
McMillan 2003; Still 1902 and quoted in Lakoff 2000: 149–50).
 It took the 1917–18 encephalitis epidemic to stimulate this discourse 
more thoroughly. Clinicians were presented with numerous young patients 
who behaved oddly, which suggested a link between lively but unfocused 
conduct and brain damage or disease. Hyperactivity was first declared 
in the late 1950s by European researchers. The 1960s witnessed a grand 
Atlantic bifurcation over the disorder(s). European clinicians began, and 
have largely continued, to define the problem narrowly, in terms of “exces-
sive motor activity,” probably caused by damage to the brain. In the United 
States, by contrast, hyperactivity has been viewed as part of the problem, 
with brain damage part of the cause. Things shifted in 2003, when a review 
of research that alleged correlations between ADHD and brain damage 
revealed that these studies had not disclosed that their subjects had been 
using a variety of drugs prior to the brain images, which may have pro-
duced the injuries depicted (Sandberg and Barton 1996: 2–3, 8; O’Meara 
2003).
 As per these key differences of opinion over defining the disorder, its 
diagnosis has remained controversial and may even appear ludicrous to 
the non-initiate. The very word “disorder” is preferred DSM nomenclature, 
“code for a vision of the world that ought to be orderly” (Hacking 1995: 
17). Successive DSMs differ radically in their definitions of ADHD: DSM-
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II offers hyperactivity, impulsiveness, and inattention as three cores, sup-
posedly diminishing in adolescence; DSM-III divides these cores into their 
own groups, with minimal disorders within each one to qualify (it rapidly 
doubled US diagnoses); and DSM-IV clusters the cores into one multi-
faceted problem while criticizing previous rules of inclusion and exclu-
sion. This version requires a minimum of six forms of inattention/hyper-
activity in order for children to be diagnosed as sufferers, and it offers 
some rather sinister-sounding variations, such as “Conduct Disorder” 
and “Oppositional Defiant Disorder.” The latter comes complete with the 
splendid acronym “ODD.” It is applied to children who “argue with adults 
or refuse to obey,” in the approving words of the NIMH, and is often diag-
nosed among gay adolescents. Hmm. And the Brown Scale urges parents 
to watch over their charges lest they “act smart,” a sure sign of the condi-
tion. The text revision of DSM-IV-TR devotes eight pages to ADHD, com-
pared to eight lines three decades earlier, with the disorder now divided 
between problems with “executive functions” versus “selective attention.” 
The one thing not in doubt is ADHD and its treatment. No surprise here, 
when a cool 62% of the 2006 DSM panel concerned with the disorder have 
ties to pharmacorps (McBurnett et al. 2000: 229–31; Perring 1997: 230–31; 
National Institute of Mental Health 2006: 17; Albright 2006: 186; Conrad 
and Potter 2000: 564; Glassner 1999: 79; “The Role” 2006; Hari 2007; Ald-
hous 2006).2
 The casual reader of the DSM’s list of ADHD signifiers may be inclined 
to identify with such “symptoms” as: easily distracted, clumsy, impatient, 
explosive, always on the go, fidgety, talking loudly, moving a lot during 
sleep, immature, and a loner. I plead interpellated, and I am not alone. The 
power of the Protestant work ethic to require productivity and erase failure 
is clearly evident in the NIMH’s concern that ADHD sufferers “impulsively 
choose to do things that have an immediate but small payoff rather than 
engage in activities that may take more effort yet provide much greater but 
delayed rewards” (Hacking 1995: 145; National Institute of Mental Health 
2006: 4). New York Times columnist Maureen Dowd (2003) went on-line to 
self-administer “Dr. Grohol’s PsychCentral Adult A.D.D. Quiz” and imme-
diately found herself hailed by the available signage and symptomatology. 
Edward M. Hallowell and John J. Ratey’s Random House–published, auto-
diagnostic questionnaire of one hundred tests for ADHD asks whether 
potential adult sufferers “laugh a lot” or “love to travel” (quoted in Eber-
stadt 1999) (surely reminiscent in its “craziness” of Vico’s other-worldly 
distinctions between plane geometry versus algebra’s impact on children’s 
fitness for work). The questionnaire gained legitimacy because Hallowell 
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and Ratey are psychiatrists who have decreed themselves to be ADHD 
sufferers, although neither is a researcher in the field and self-diagnosis is 
highly dubious. The Adult ADHD Self-Report Scale encourages partici-
pants to note any tendencies to “fidget or squirm” when undertaking dull 
tasks or confronted by background noise; to misplace objects; or to finish 
others’ sentences. Right. For those especially keen to be the fourth man 
or first woman in Jerome K. Jerome’s boat, TV commercials encourage 
viewers to consult http://www.adhd.com/adults/adults.jsp, and Vogue 
magazine directs readers to the World Health Organization’s 2003 instru-
ment for screening adult ADHD, to help sufferers avoid speeding tickets, 
multiple sexual partners, alcohol, recreational drugs, and philandering 
scoundrels. There is also advice for those who might be able to achieve 
the diagnosis of “executive dysfunction,” a related problem identifiable 
through compulsive emailing. To help recruit patients/consumers, drug 
companies use a variety of techniques: Strattera (Eli Lilly) offers the Self-
Report Scale on its site; Lilly has purchased http://adhd.com/index.jsp; 
and Shire (maker of Vyvanse) dispatches an ADHD Progress Kit from 
http://www.vyvanse.com. Time magazine suggests that prominent suf-
ferers include Bill Clinton, Benjamin Franklin, Albert Einstein, and Win-
ston Churchill (Lee 2003: 316, 318; Conrad and Potter 2000: 566–67; “Are 
You Living?” 2006).
 No wonder the disorder was the most-diagnosed psychiatric problem 
for US children by the mid-1970s (Conrad and Potter 2000: 563). The rush 
to identify it becomes rather sinister (and anthropometric) when physi-
ological forms of diagnosis extend to associating a “double posterior hair 
whorl,” an “anterior cow lick,” or “electric hair” with a proclivity toward 
ADHD (Accardo and Blondis 2000a: 153). Such articulations connect to a 
long history of attributing deviance to anatomy. Take, for example, Cesare 
Lombroso’s examinations of prostitutes in late-19th-century Italy for signs 
of physical “degeneracy,” or the sex-variance study carried out in New 
York City between 1935 and 1941, in which Robert Dickinson compared 
the genitals of women traced on a glass plate covering their vulvas to dif-
ferentiate lesbians from nonlesbians. Such research became a model for 
understanding delinquent conduct as hereditary, sometimes alongside and 
sometimes in competition with schools of thought that focused on feeble-
mindedness (Terry 1998; Horn 1995; Griffin 1993: 17; Getis 1998: 24; Gray 
2003: 37).
 Foucault usefully identifies three key qualities of the psy-function 
that can guide us through this conceptual thicket: “the power to deter-
mine, directly or indirectly, a decision of justice that ultimately concerns 
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a person’s freedom or detention”; “discourses with a scientific status”; and 
“discourses of truth that provoke laughter” (2003b: 6). This remarkable 
amalgam of state power, academic legitimacy, and popular whimsy sees 
an almost unprecedented blend of control, authority, and pleasure. When 
Dowd or Vogue link concerns with conduct and status to humor, the sense 
of ADHD as something that can be normalized becomes all the stronger. 
The very epistemological weaknesses of the psy-function allow it to serve 
as a “switch point” between government, commerce, and jocularity (Fou-
cault 2003b: 33).
 Once more, children are both at risk, and are themselves risks, with 
popular culture a folk devil. Parents are urged by the psy-function to con-
trol children’s interaction with television and computer games, lest they 
become dupes at the console. TV is blamed for making them unable “to 
sit still,” leading to ADHD. Researchers probing the minds of people aged 
between one and three decree that watching television produces ADHD 
at seven, because it encourages impulsiveness. The American Academy of 
Pediatrics recommends no “screen time” for this group, and just an hour or 
two a day of “quality television and video” for older preteens, as ADHD is 
articulated to the fast pace of Rugrats, The Wiggles, and Sesame Street, with 
Disney’s Baby Einstein products a supposed corrective (Malacrida 2002: 
369; Malacrida 2003; Malkki and Martin 2003: 219; Rafavolich 2001: 388; 
Gillam 2004; Christakis et al. 2004; Jane Healy 2004; Melissa Healy 2004). 
ADHD and its prescription drug of choice are crucial in juvenation. The 
psy-function has rarely had such success circling the young.
 The “true” prevalence of ADHD across gender, geographic, class, and 
racial lines has generated many conflicting opinions, yet certain groups of 
people are more frequently circled than others. Boys are four times more 
likely than girls to receive a diagnosis of ADHD and be prescribed stimu-
lant medication (Woodworth 2000). Based on US Census data and other 
studies, it has been proposed that in 1994, 5.8% of boys and 1.5% of girls 
aged between 5 and 17 had ADHD. DSM-IV suggests that 6.8% to 7.5% 
of children are sufferers. In the UK, the gender ratio is three to one. Epi-
demiological studies vary in reported prevalence between 0.5% and 26% 
of all children, and the NIMH estimates from 3% to 5% of, or 2 million, 
US residents. Gender differences have been explained as an outcome of 
the less violent ways of girls, which lead to fewer referrals than the atten-
tion-getting conduct of bratty boys and to the assumption that boys are 
more unruly, so they are more closely evaluated. Only in the area of sex do 
girls draw an equivalent gaze of the medical police: twenty-five years ago, 
the National Association of Private Psychiatric Hospitals recommended 
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“immediate acute-care hospitalization” for girls who embark on “sexual 
promiscuity” (quoted in Glassner 1999: 79). Recent feminist scholarship 
and activism, such as Australia’s ADDventurous Women electronic com-
munity, regard the association of males with ADHD as largely mythic, pro-
posing that the clinical imbalance derives from underdiagnosis amongst 
girls and older women, such that there is said to be a “hidden epidemic.” 
But the tendency equally originates in the 1970 Isle of Wight studies and 
some behavioral checklists, which divide disorders between those of con-
duct, among boys, and emotion, among girls. This bifurcation, as per the 
Platonic/Kantian binary mentioned in the previous chapter, informs the 
DSM and the International Classification of Diseases. It constructs chil-
dren as “miniature adults” open to adult syndromes, even as their specific 
disorders may achieve mature onset or recognition (Quinn and Nadeau 
2000: 216–17; “Really Desperate” 2006; Timimi and Taylor 2004; Steele et 
al. 2006: 1893; National Institute of Mental Health 2006: 1; Rogers 2001; 
Staller and Faraone 2006; Timimi 2002: 34–35).
 ADHD is mostly found amongst upper-middle-class white people 
living in the suburban Northeast, South, and West of the United States. 
African-American families use Ritalin at one-half to one-quarter the rate 
of their white socioeconomic equals, while the drug’s uptake is virtually 
zero amongst Asian Americans. Black Yanqui communities are flooded 
with antipsychiatric materials alleging every manner of conspiracy—for 
example, that ADHD and Ritalin form a “genocidal plot.” This may account 
for the low prevalence/credulity/uptake among African Americans, along 
with a tendency to incarcerate African Americans or diagnose them as 
in need of remediation as part of racist moral panics. There is conflicting 
evidence about the impact of class and family background on ADHD diag-
noses. Some studies propose a link between disadvantaged families; some 
do not. There has been little sustained research into this disparity. Outside 
the United States, as well as within, ADHD is less prevalent in rural areas, 
while in Canada there is a relationship between poverty and diagnosis. 
Certain findings suggest that cultural differences have zero impact on the 
problem once the diagnosis is in play, though this claim has caused con-
troversy among medical and educational anthropologists. By 2004, it was 
suggested that 8 million US adults had the disorder, putting it second only 
to depression in prevalence (Diller 2000; Sandberg and Garralda 1996: 
283–84; Williams 2003; Barry 2002; Bender 2006; Diller 1998: 35–36; Hep-
stintall and Taylor 1996: 330; Luk 1996: 358; Cantwell 1999: 4; Brownell et 
al. 2006; Brewis et al. 2000; Brewis 2002; Caldararo 2002; Jacobson 2002; 
Belkin 2004). Diagnosis continues. And once a diagnosis is secured, it 
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generally leads to one outcome—prescription drugs, classically Ritalin, an 
education/fun/social-control makeover rolled into one.
rita l in
how has it come to pass that in fin-de-siècle america, where every child from 
preschool onward can recite the “anti-drug” catechism by heart, millions of mid-
dle- and upper-middle class children are being legally drugged with a substance 
so similar to cocaine that, as one journalist accurately summarized the science, 
“it takes a chemist to tell the difference”?
 —mary eberstadt (1999)
7-year old douglas Castellano’s unbridled energy and creativity are no longer a 
problem thanks to ritalin. . . . “after years of failed attempts to stop douglas’ 
uncontrollable bouts of self-expression, we have finally found success with 
ritalin,” dr. irwin Schraeger said.
 —The Onion (“ritalin Cures next Picasso” 1999)
Ritalin is related to amphetamines, a class of chemicals first synthesized in 
the 1880s that replicates neurotransmitters to arouse the nervous system. 
Since the 1920s, their capacity to stimulate activity has been widely appre-
ciated as a source of both recreational pleasure and occupational effec-
tiveness, with the first recorded prescription against hyperactivity in 1937 
and later use by fighter pilots and JFK. Children diagnosed as educational 
underachievers participated in clinical trials from 1930, with Benzedrine 
tested as a counter to nerves and wildness and a stimulus to academic 
success. As of 1970, fifteen different pharmaceutical corporations manu-
factured over thirty kinds, amounting to 12 billion pills annually. Under 
the chemical name of methylphenidate, Ritalin is within this group. Meth-
ylphenidate was created in 1944 as part of a search for a nonaddictive 
stimulant. Ten years later, it was endorsed by the FDA to treat narcolepsy, 
depression, and lethargy. Reborn as Ritalin in the early 1960s by the phar-
maceutical company Ciba-Geigy (later called Novartis following a merger 
with Sandoz) as a memory aid for seniors and treatment for chronic fatigue 
syndrome after tests on the wife of a researcher named Rita (who said it 
improved her tennis), the drug was soon redisposed yet again, for use on 
children (Petrina 2006: 521; Jenkins 1999: 30–31; Perring 1997: 231; Presi-
dent’s Council on Bioethics 2002b; Steinberg 1999: 225; Breggin 1998: 180; 
Diller 1998: 21–22, 25; DeGrandpre 2006: 4; Blech 2006: 65).
 Ritalin has been enormously popular since its introduction. By the mid-
1960s, it was the drug of choice for treating performance and behavioral 
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issues in US children—perhaps an early sign that psychoanalysis was on 
the wane. In 1970, 150,000 children were using it, increasing to 900,000 
in 1990. Across the 1990s, the number of US children and adults diag-
nosed with ADD/ADHD rose, with most patients taking Ritalin and some 
using Dexedrine. Between 1990 and 2005, methylphenidate production 
increased seventeenfold, and amphetamine production thirtyfold. Sales 
went from $109 million in 1992 to $336 million four years later. Eleven 
million prescriptions are now written in the United States each year. These 
figures are astonishing for controlled substances (Sandberg and Barton 
1996: 11–12; Marshall 2000; Healy 2006; Russell 1997).
 Studies suggest that Ritalin increases adherence to polite, restrained 
social norms and encourages strong academic performance, calm conduct 
in class, pacific public behavior, intersubjective pleasure, and participation 
in organized sports (Trapani 2000: 201; Powers 2000: 486; Cantwell 1999: 
16). Such effects register the ideal makeover, encouraging government at 
a distance via consumption that transforms the self. We might translate 
these correlations between Ritalin and conduct by a few degrees, such that 
they are viewed as preparation for a conservative role in the labor pool, 
via the suppression of disgruntled responses to oppressive institutions and 
norms and via the diversion of energy into recreational pastimes rather 
than politics. A healthier, fitter, more polite population reduces the cost of 
public health and guarantees a functioning and pliable workforce. It even 
helps tourism by delivering a ready supply of happy, smiling people ready 
to welcome strangers and their money.
 Just as ADHD has its skeptics, so does its treatment. Peter Breggin, one 
of the most visible contemporary critics of pharmacological psychiatry, 
stigmatizes Ritalin as an “Iatrogenic Drug Epidemic” that generates mind-
less obedience, suppresses emotions and ideas, and diminishes self-esteem 
(1994: 303–5, 309). Other medical professionals/populist authors who dis-
sent from the mainstream cast doubt on the drug’s long-term safety, its role 
in facilitating or obstructing long-term cures for ADHD, and its capacity to 
treat-without-understanding—changing behavior by masking biological, 
familial, or institutional problems (Diller 1998: 13). Richard DeGrandpre 
(1999) does not question the existence of the disorder. He takes reports of 
its increasing incidence literally but claims that ADHD is prompted by a 
speedy society in which rapid-fire culture, rather than abnormal biology, 
produces addictions to newness and change. DeGrandpre uses the amount 
of money poured into pop-culture moments—such as Titanic (1997)—to 
advance this hypothesis. His recommendation is not medication—pro-
viding stimulants to sensory addicts just compounds the problem, he 
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says—but slowing society down to a “natural speed and rhythm” to chal-
lenge “the dominant paradigm of work work work . . . [and] overcome 
cynicism through hope and action” (DeGrandpre 1999; also see Rafavolich 
2001: 387–88). Psychiatrist Paul Steinberg (2006) believes ADHD to be just 
one of many disorders that are artifacts of a knowledge economy. There 
are clear ties in such analyses to prayer-and-care communitarian anxi-
eties about the impact of neoliberalism on atomized social relations, and 
the Margaret Mead school of anthropology, which argued that the United 
States imposed quite specific stresses on young people (Maira and Soep 
2004: 249). For his part, Ratey argues that contemporary office life creates 
problems for executives because they lack secretaries to maintain their cal-
endars and expense accounts (cited in Belkin 2004). Put another way, he is 
referring, in distinctly gendered terms, to the impact of self-governing and 
multiskilling on the middle class.
 Some critics suggest that the psychologization and therapization of 
teaching have produced the rush to Ritalin, because schools, now viewed 
as mental-health institutions, often threaten parents with removal of their 
children from classes absent medication. The right attributes this trend to 
egalitarian educational philosophy, alleging that it makes teachers respon-
sible for students’ performance against a presumed tabula rasa of equal 
innate ability. Such conservatives contend that this tendency, along with 
pharmacology’s displacement of old-style physical sanctions as a means 
of disciplining children, has encouraged educators to put their charges on 
Ritalin. Alternatively, it has been suggested that the introduction of “high-
stakes” testing into many states—with funds allocated to school districts 
on the basis of improved student test scores—has compelled counselors, 
teachers, and principals to recommend Ritalin to parents to heighten stu-
dents’ performance. Indeed, property values, jobs, and salaries can depend 
upon grades. Meanwhile, critics accuse the federal government of exac-
erbating the trend by creating incentives to define pupils as disabled, via 
special-education programs that support low-income parents and schools 
once children are diagnosed with ADHD. This becomes a concern of pro-
gressives, too, as they note the medicalization of education and the advent 
of “Teachers as Sickness Brokers for ADHD” via a formal role allotted 
by DSM-IV, something duly exploited by pharmacorps’ assiduous use of 
Web sites to promote products in ways that masquerade as disinterested 
informational clearinghouses. It can be excruciatingly difficult for parents 
from non-psy backgrounds to master and counter the discourse of such 
environments. The Ohio State Board of Pharmacy worries that these pro-
grams heighten stimulant prescriptions, while both CBS’s Eye on America 
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and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) disparage Ritalin as 
“the fourth R in schools” (Diller 2000; Livingstone 1997; Sax 2000; Mur-
lowe 1997; Phillips 2006; Tait 2001; McHoul and Rapley 2005b: 442–44; 
McHoul and Rapley 2005a; House of Representatives, Subcommittee 2000: 
11; Woodworth 2000). Would that such critics had it within them to tie 
these concerns to the way contemporary capitalism devalues equity and 
social justice in comparison with efficiency and effectiveness—to see that 
Ritalin is the risk-society additive par excellence, as evidenced in the moral 
panics which ensue when its proliferation attains levels that trouble ideas 
of nature and godliness.
 Bush Minor’s Council on Bioethics has conducted far-reaching discus-
sions on drugs as cures to illness versus aids to performance (2002a, 
2003). One key point is the ethical distinction between “therapeutic” and 
“enhancement” uses of Ritalin. Broadly put, many people and institutions, 
most importantly Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs), accept the 
former but reject the latter. They endorse medical intervention to enable 
people to achieve a potential that has been diminished by some disability, 
but abjure attempts to excel beyond the norm through biochemical inter-
vention—so mad people may control themselves with lithium, but athletes 
should not use stimulants to improve their performance; treating pupils’ 
“severe hyperactivity” is acceptable, but improving “the concentration 
of Ivy League test-takers” is out of order. Medicine should enable factor 
endowments to flourish in the face of obstacles, but equalizing the distri-
bution of endowments reduces self-esteem, with subsequent achievements 
devalued as “cosmetic enhancements.” This is “fitting in” versus “fitting in 
too well” (President’s Council on Bioethics 2002a; Kass 2003; Elliott 2003b: 
xv). It is equally a meeting point of neoliberalism, Social Darwinism, and 
religiosity.
 The distinction between therapy and enhancement becomes difficult 
to sustain, with ADHD’s classroom impairment and Ritalin’s classroom 
improvement mutually defining one another, in ways described by staff 
of the Council on Bioethics as “subjective” and “fuzzy.” And the entire 
diagnostic and biochemical setting is colored by contradiction and capital. 
Such topics became a matter of legal redress when some US medical stu-
dents who failed their National Board of Medical Examiners tests claimed 
their failure was due to ADHD and sued the board, asking for additional 
exam time—unsuccessfully, because the Courts found that their comple-
tion of medical school indicated they could perform above-average intel-
lectually. Many litigants have used the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(ADA) against dismissal for poor work performance caused by ADHD, but 
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they have lost virtually every court case. The National Collegiate Athletic 
Association, on the other hand, allows athletes with proof of ADHD to 
take stimulants. In other words, the distinction is cultural: when medical-
ized, these drugs are legitimate; when claimed as pathways to transcen-
dence (or eugenics), they are not. Meanwhile, colleges across the United 
States ponder the statistics estimating that anywhere between 65,000 and 
650,000 students have ADHD; the Federal Rehabilitation Act that prima 
facie requires them to offer special services to sufferers, so they often seek 
exemption from it; and the evidence that more and more co-eds are using 
prescription drugs as study aids (President’s Council on Bioethics 2002b; 
Elliott 2003b: xvi–xvii; Belkin 2004; Farrell 2003; Nichols 2004).
 In 1999, the Colorado Board of Education resolved to discourage 
teachers from recommending Ritalin. In 2000, a five-year, $6 million fed-
eral government study of its effects began. That same year, the drug’s man-
ufacturer, Novartis, the 20,000-strong parents’ rights group Children and 
Adults with Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (CHADD), and the 
American Psychiatric Association faced class-action lawsuits in Florida, 
New Jersey, California, and Texas, charging that they conspired to drive 
up demand for Ritalin and did not publicize warnings about its risks to the 
nervous and cardiovascular systems. The lawsuits were all subsequently 
dismissed or withdrawn (Leibowitz 2000; Diller 2000; Layton and Wash-
burn 2000; Wilce 2000; Rogers 2001; “Doctors, Lawyers” 2001; Hausman 
2002). 
 Part of this panic derived from a challenge to the psy-function. Pediatri-
cians and family practitioners write most prescriptions for Ritalin in the 
United States, thus removing it from the exclusive clutches of psychiatrists, 
the traditional gatekeepers of mind-altering drugs, who argue that the 
ability of pediatricians and psychiatrists to prescribe the drug leads to over-
prescription. Of adolescents treated for depression in Oregon in 1998, 60% 
were prescribed drugs not by psychiatrists but by pediatricians; in North 
Carolina in 1999, the figure was 72%. It comes as no surprise that old con-
flicts over credentialism are raging anew, with psychologists seeking the 
right to prescribe medication, and psychiatrists seeking to discredit them. 
While the AMA and the American Psychiatric Association ban members 
from participating in US torture, the APA does not, on the advice of its 
Task Force on Psychological Ethics and National Security. For much of the 
1990s, the military had granted psychologists the right to prescribe medi-
cation, and they hope to have this right renewed by participating in inter-
rogations. The American Psychiatric Association lobbies with all its might 
against this dispensation. These conflicts are occurring in a context where 
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HMOs have undermined previously hegemonic power brokers through a 
discourse of bureaucratic-managerial commodification. Insurance-com-
pany support for family therapy has rapidly declined since the mid-1990s 
advent of wholesale managed care versus fee-for-service. HMOs want to 
erase symptoms and reduce long-term, face-to-face, and in-patient treat-
ment. They will fund only four to six therapeutic visits before the use of 
pharmacology, paying psychiatrists much more for follow-up visits to 
evaluate the impact of drugs than to meet a child’s family. Lance Clawson, 
a Fellow at the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, 
suggested on C-SPAN in 2003 that the refusal of HMOs to fund sufficient 
meetings with physicians encouraged the early prescription of Ritalin. The 
drug has had its own makeover as a cost-cutting policy technology, a sub-
stitution effect for what had become an annual hospital cost to insurance 
firms of $30 billion for children (Schachar et al. 1996: 435–36; “Doctors, 
Lawyers” 2001; Gaus 2007: 28; Kory 2007; Shorter 1997: 295; Waters 2000; 
Hyman 2000; Woodworth 2000; Daly 2006).
 Meanwhile, alternative ADHD therapies are also being governmental-
ized and commodified via support groups, counseling, biofeedback, and 
vitamin supplements (“nutraceuticals”). In many cases, this “alternative” 
(but equally corporate) discourse blames mothers for causing their chil-
dren’s mental problems, notably through breast-feeding (Scheid 2000; 
Waters 2000; President’s Council on Bioethics 2002b; Glassner 1999: 78, 
80; “Nutraceuticals” 2003; Malacrida 2002: 373, 379). Here we see deregu-
latory health-care policies and alternative health movements generating 
new forms of consumerism and self-government that both criticize and 
mirror prescription drugs.
 Apart from questions of prevalence, and in whose hands prescription lies, 
some important issues surround the ethics and the physiological impact of 
Ritalin. True believers argue that moral panics over the drug are driven by 
illegitimate anxieties about the number and rate of diagnoses. They point 
to its high therapeutic safety index, a figure derived from dividing a toxic 
dose by a therapeutic one. But Ritalin may produce anorexia; “intermittent 
drug holidays” are recommended to ensure normal growth; and there are 
concerns over its role in the etiology of tics and Tourette Syndrome. Long-
term use (beyond fourteen months) has not been studied, as the pharma-
ceutical industry is primarily interested in the short-term effects of medi-
cations. In the period between 1990 and 2004, of the 2,353 drugs that the 
FDA approved and required pharmacorps to study via postsales research, 
just 6% were scheduled for further study (Powers 2000: 477, 483, 489–90; 
Hyman 2000; Chen 2007).
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 Conflict-of-interest concerns have also caused controversy for the 
disorder and its drug. In reaction to organic, bottom-up patient groups 
that have been successful in goading and criticizing medical capital, big 
pharma has established and sponsored pseudo-civil-society arms of their 
publicity campaigns (Rose 2007: 142). CHADD is one of many front orga-
nizations masquerading as organic consumer groups that lobby on behalf 
of their key substructural base—in this case the pharmaceutical sector—by 
claiming to deliver “science-based, evidence-based information” (Children 
and Adults with Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder 2005). In the 
words of the British Medical Journal, the reality is that entities “ostensibly 
engaged in raising public awareness about underdiagnosed and under-
treated problems” are really part of corporate marketing and surveillance 
campaigns, creating comprehensive media platforms of experts, victims, 
and advocates. The United Nations International Narcotics Board has 
issued a warning about CHADD’s responsibility for the rate of Ritalin con-
sumption (Moynihan et al. 2002: 886; also see Conrad and Potter 2000: 
560; Singh 2002: 593).
 In the 1990s, pharmacorps gave CHADD 9% of its annual revenue. 
Despite adverse publicity and a stern reprimand from the DEA, the orga-
nization continued to secure funding from the industry: for the period 
2002–3, 17% of its operating funds; in 2005, 22%; and in 2006, 28%, from 
such friends as Pfizer, Shire, New River, UCB Pharma, Cephalon, McNeil, 
Novartis, and Lilly. In 2005, CHADD activists and staffers appeared on 
almost nine hundred radio shows to spread the word. CHADD’s arresting 
magazine Attention! has a print run of 141,000—with 65,000 copies bought 
by Shire and UCB Pharma for product placement in doctors’ waiting 
rooms. The glossy ADDitude magazine comes out six times a year. Fea-
turing inspiring stories of social, educational, and financial success, ADDi-
tude is underwritten by advertising drug regimes and financial programs 
that guarantee a profitable life for sufferers, and it offers information on 
academic scholarships thoughtfully provided by drug companies. For cus-
tomers who want their diagnostic acronyms personalized or credentialed, 
CHADD offers its own Visa card, and one can study on-line at the ADD 
Coach Academy, where $3,695 for nine months of instruction qualifies 
graduates to charge $400 an hour for listening to adult sufferers on the tele-
phone. Astonishingly, CHADD was attacked by Republican Congressman 
Dan Burton on the grounds that this constituted a conflict of interest—
staggering hypocrisy from a US political party, but in keeping with its den-
izens’ terror in the face of ungodly mental intervention. More typical was 
the double-declutching of Representative James Greenwood, who shifted 
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directly from chairing a House subcommittee charged with monitoring 
pharmaceuticals to running the Biotechnology Industry Organization, a 
lobby group for firms he had supposedly just been interrogating, such as 
Pfizer, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Eli Lilly and Company, and GlaxoSmithKline 
(Russell 1997; House of Representatives, Subcommittee 2000: 43; Children 
and Adults with Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder 2005; Children 
and Adults with Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder 2006; Hearn 
2004; Hansen et al. 2003: 51; Phillips 2006; Belkin 2004; Montero 2002; 
Gettelman 2004). For patients interested in a more organic site of shared 
experience, http://www.adhdnews.com provides many hair-raising as well 
as reassuring stories of medical competence and incompetence and what it 
is like taking this stuff.
 Pediatrician Michael Ruff has found the use of stimulant medications 
“a blessing” in his practice but is appalled by the hidden financial/pharma 
self-interest that underwrites much ADHD research. Here is his account of 
going through the morning mail:
Almost everything I received had something to do with ADHD. There was 
a magazine entitled “The ADHD Podium” (sponsored by Shire and Adder-
all), which contained an article on how to use the DSM IV criteria to diag-
nose and treat children with ADHD. Next was a brochure and video-tape 
from the University of Florida and Lilly (Straterra) on how to diagnose ADD 
in adults. Additionally, there were several faxes and letters offering to teach 
me more about the genetics, neurochemistry, and pharmacotherapeutics of 
ADD via dinner meetings and telephone conferences.
 Finally, there were 3 magazines of different genres for my waiting room; 
all of which contained cover ads for Straterra, boldly proclaiming “Welcome 
to Ordinary” (via medication). (2005: 557)
In addition to this overdetermined political economy, Ritalin is also liable 
to induce moral apoplexy. It works similarly to cocaine, though more 
slowly because it is a pill. A link has been established between its medical 
applications and recreational drug use, starting in 1960s Sweden. The drug 
was subsequently removed from distribution there. The DEA designates it 
as a Schedule II substance, a categorization that stigmatizes drugs as liable 
to lead to abuse.3 In 1995, when CHADD, the American Academy of Pedi-
atrics, and others petitioned the DEA to lower regulatory controls, on the 
grounds that Ritalin had minimal recreational potential, the DEA refused, 
aware of the drug’s capacity to suppress appetite, induce wakefulness, 
and make people happy (Vastag 2001; Poulin 2001; Diller 1998: 348n86; 
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DeGrandpre 2006: 11; Woodworth 2000; National Institute on Drug Abuse 
2006).
 Street names for Ritalin include some clever coinages: Vitamin R, Skippy, 
the smart drug, R-ball, JIF, and MPH. Dealers in the United Kingdom call 
it “kiddie coke.” In 1994, a national high-school survey found that 1% of all 
seniors had taken it the year before without a prescription, and five years 
later the figure was 3%. In 1990, there were 271 emergency-room reports of 
Ritalin overdoses, and 1,727 in 1998. By 2005, the figure was 3,212. From 
January 1990 to May 1995, methylphenidate ranked in the top-ten con-
trolled drugs stolen from Registrants, and about seven hundred thousand 
dosage units were reported to the DEA’s drug-theft database in 1996 and 
1997. One in ten US teens reported recreational use of Ritalin and its kind 
in 2005. School nurses, “teachers of the year,” and principals are among 
those found “liberating” Ritalin from school coffers (Lynette Scavo in Des-
perate Housewives uses her son’s supply). Use of Ritalin was banned from 
the professional golf tour in 2008 (“Generation Rx” 2005; “Behave” 2004; 
Kolek 2006; Jarboe 2006; Leinwand 2007; Teter et al. 2006; Bonk 2007). 
DEA and UN evidence presents grim findings on prescription/use (see 
figures 1–3).
 All of this has, of course, attracted major media attention as part of an 
emergent moral panic, contradictorily tied to neoliberal media marketing 
struggles over youth that parallel Ritalin’s chronology: for by the late 1960s 
and early ’70s, popular magazines were locked in a contest with color tele-
Figure 1. Aggregate	production	quota	(in	kilograms),	DEA	data	
(Source:	Woodworth	[2000]).	
amphetamine        methylphenidate
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Figure 3.	 Amphetamine	and	methylphenidate	prescriptions,	IMS	Health,	National	
Prescription	Audit	Plus	(Source:	Woodworth	[2000])
Figure 2.	 United	Nations	data,	methylphenidate	consumption	
(defined	daily	dose	in	millions)	(Source:	Woodworth	[2000])
 
amphetamine        methylphenidate       total rx
other            U.S.
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vision for audiences. They reacted by addressing young people both as 
readers (through stories on popular culture) and as problems (through 
generational stereotyping). This practice continued as the cultural indus-
tries promoted the existence of catchy-sounding generational cohorts to 
advertisers (“the Greatest Generation,” “Baby Boomers,” “Generation X,” 
“Generation Y,” and “Generation Rx”) with supposedly universal tenden-
cies and failings. When the Partnership for a Drug-Free America (free of 
recreational drugs, not corporate ones) released a report on teens in 2005, 
the bourgeois media leaped at the neologism “Generation Rx” as part of an 
emergent moral panic over prescription abuse—without noting this was 
just the second occasion such substances had been included in the national 
survey (Kitch 2003b: 188; Shreve 1997; “Generation Rx” 2005; Szalavitz 
2005).
 Recognizing the media’s power, Ciba-Geigy spreads the gospel of brain 
disorders as the key to depression and other abnormalities wherever 
possible—for example, by financing Public Television’s series The Brain 
(Breggin 1994: 122) during Bush the Elder’s celebration of the brain, when 
ADHD became known as the “diagnosis of the decade.” Media attention 
has since been “unprecedented” in terms of “national magazine covers, 
science features in daily newspapers, broadcast television highlights, talk 
radio topics, and local-news spots” (Hinshaw 2000: xiii). Positive popular 
literature about the phenomenon also appeared around this time, via a 
flurry of populist parental and adult-sufferer guidebooks, many written 
by clinicians and academics. Notable examples include Barbara Ingersoll’s 
Your Hyperactive Child (1988); Hallowell and Ratey’s Driven to Distraction: 
Recognizing and Coping with Attention Deficit Disorder from Childhood to 
Adulthood (1994); Barkley’s Taking Charge of ADHD (1995): Colleen Alex-
ander-Roberts’s ADHD and Teens (1995); Grad L. Flick’s Power Parenting 
for Children with ADD/ADHD (1996); Edward H. Jacobs’ Fathering the 
ADHD Child (1998); and Paul Weingartner’s ADHD Handbook for Fami-
lies (1999). There was a veritable explosion of stories, mostly credulous, 
in popular periodicals during the 1990s, from Better Homes and Gardens 
to Seventeen. As well as favoring biological and genetic explanations for 
ADHD and providing tips on diagnosis and treatment, such texts function 
as behavioral guides, offering recommendations on managing children 
so they learn to govern themselves through token economies and other 
rewards and punishments (Eberstadt 1999; Rafavolich 2001: 375; Schmitz 
et al. 2003).
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 At the same time, popular culture has picked up on anxieties from the 
antipsychiatry movement, represented by the tragic heroics of Jack Nich-
olson’s character in One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest (1976), to embark on 
such pop-psy-function denunciations of Ritalin as The Myth of the Hyperac-
tive Child, and Other Means of Child Control by Peter Schrag; Diane Divoky 
and Gerald Coles’ The Learning Mystique (1987); and Scientology founder 
and science-fiction writer L. Ron Hubbard’s repeated attacks (Diller 1998: 
31). In the wake of Prozac’s popularization and associated debates about 
antidepressants, the genre drew new strength in the 1990s via Breggin’s 
Toxic Psychiatry (first published in 1991) and Ritalin Nation (1998); Law-
rence Diller’s Running on Ritalin (1998); Thomas Armstrong’s The Myth of 
the ADD Child (1995); and DeGrandpre’s Ritalin Nation (1999). The debate 
has trickled into popular literature as well through Robin Cook’s 1994 
novel Acceptable Risk (Stookey 1996: 163, 172–73, 175, 18n1).
 Not surprisingly, from the 1970s, horror stories about Ritalin began 
appearing in the bourgeois US press as part of its drive to identify appealing 
topics unrelated to old definitions of news. In the late 1980s, articles crit-
ical of ADHD and Ritalin were published in the New York Times, the Wall 
Street Journal, the Washington Post, and the Los Angeles Times; and a seg-
ment was aired on ABC’s Nightline (Singh 2002: 579; Breggin 1998: 180, 
183). Good Housekeeping magazine queried “the rush to Ritalin,” dubbing 
it “kiddie cocaine” and suggesting that “at the slightest sign of trouble—a 
child keeps running back and forth to the water fountain, has an unruly 
week pushing other kids on the playground, or plays drums on his desk 
with pencils—parents are circled by the school’s teachers, psychologists, 
and even principals, all pushing Ritalin” (Russell 1997). Activist Jim High-
tower referred to “Babies on Drugs” (2001). Other critics called it the 
“chemical cosh” or “a cane-for-the-brain” (Midgley 2003; Hari 2007). The 
“‘War on Drugs’ slogan” was accused of transmogrifying into “not medi-
cating your child is unethical” (Schubert et al. 2005: 152). And Newsweek 
went from an unfortunately worded endorsement of Ritalin as “one of the 
raving successes in psychiatry” to warning that it “may be causing some 
hidden havoc . . . in an impatient culture” (quoted in Schmitz et al. 2003: 
394).
 The first Congressional report on behavior-modification drugs and 
children was inspired by Ritalin as far back as 1970, while hearings were 
prompted in 2000 by a story in the Washington Post entitled “Omaha 
Pupils Given ‘Behavior’ Drugs,” which raised the specter of mind control 
and merged with popular concerns about diet to suggest a more “natural” 
treatment. Over the next three years, Ritalin made guest appearances on 
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Dateline NBC; CNN’s Larry King Live (featuring Bush Minor’s dyslexic 
brother and ADHD-diagnosed nephew explaining why Ritalin must be 
abjured); 48 Hours and Eye on America from CBS; and Cleveland’s WKYC-
TV. These programs screened investigative reports and idiot punditry on 
Ivy League Ritalin abuse and drug dealing, emergency-room visits, and 
school complicity. PBS and A&E ran documentaries, with “journalist” Bill 
Kurtis intoning that Ritalin was challenging “the very essence of childhood 
itself ” (Singh 2002: 579; Leo 2002: 58; House of Representatives, Subcom-
mittee 2000: 14; Kurtis quoted in McDonald 2001). The New York Post 
headlined CHADD as a “Ritalin Pusher” and the New York Times noted the 
panic (Diller 1998: 30–31; Sandberg and Barton 1996: 3, 18–19; Montero 
2002; Zernike and Petersen 2001). The House of Representatives Subcom-
mittee on Early Childhood, Youth and Families, Committee on Education 
and the Workforce (2000: 7) queried whether the problems of accurate 
diagnosis meant that “youthful rambunctiousness” or “serious stressors 
like divorce or neglect” saw Ritalin erroneously prescribed. Congressman 
Bill Goodling said, “Ritalin may be the biggest drug problem we have in 
the country, and it drives me up the wall to see little children get hooked so 
early” (House of Representatives, Subcommittee 2000: 9).
 The biggest flurry of media attention devoted to children and Ritalin 
was set off in 2000 by a study stating that in the previous decade, the pre-
scription of stimulants as treatment of ADHD in US children aged 5 to 14 
had increased dramatically, with use by those aged 2 to 4 growing three-
fold between 1991 and 1995. These findings were confirmed by subse-
quent research (Zito et al. 2000; Goode 2003). The NIMH reacted strongly, 
rejecting prescription to large numbers of preschoolers (which the DEA 
had never approved) and funding a large research project to evaluate that 
group. Skeptics argued that their findings would eventually legitimate the 
practice. Major media attention was also paid to state intervention against 
parents who took their children off Ritalin. In one New York case, a local 
school district informed the Child Protective Services Unit, which accused 
some parents of child abuse—a charge that was not sustained in court and 
led to eleven states insisting teachers not mention Ritalin or ADHD to 
families. Then the House’s Government Reform Committee heard tes-
timony from Lisa Marie Presley on behalf of Scientology that children 
were being “drugged” and ADHD was an invention that obscured the real 
problems of allergies, lead exposure, hearing, and eyesight. It was, in the 
words of the church’s Citizens Commission on Human Rights, “psychia-
try’s cash cow diagnosis” and had helped to kill Kurt Cobain. In 2003, the 
House Committee on Education and Labor introduced a Child Medica-
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tion Safety Act to protect parents from schools requiring them to have 
their children medicated. It was sponsored by several leading Republicans, 
including then-Speaker Dennis Hastert. All this was much to the chagrin 
of true believers in Ritalin (“Scandal!” 2000; Leo 2002: 53; Leibowitz 2000; 
President’s Council on Bioethics 2002b; Citizens Commission on Human 
Rights 2003; Titus 2004; Barkley et al. 2003).
 USA Today proposed a national debate on the growing gender gap in 
educational attainment, under the headline “Girls Get Extra Help While 
Boys Get Ritalin” (2003), blaming the decline in male scholastic perfor-
mance on the preponderance of female teachers, the absence of “advo-
cates,” and the easy availability of Ritalin as opposed to holistic, peda-
gogical answers to their difficulties. This was part of a clever reversal of 
arguments for gender equity, a standard move by the right to reassert patri-
archy by deconstructive sleight of hand and a return to long-standing anxi-
eties about the impact of female role models on young men. At the same 
time, the science in support of therapeutic rather than pharmacological 
interventions was gathering strength—with the APA and the American 
Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry favoring behavior modifica-
tion as first steps in 2006 and clinicians blaming “permissive or uncertain 
child-rearing” for ADHD (Kimmel 1997; Carey 2006b).
 Meanwhile, Neil Bush, the officially intellectually disabled Bush brother, 
appeared on ABC’s modestly named Good Morning America in 2002, 
blaming dull textbooks and a lack of engagement in school for ADHD, 
while thoughtfully taking the opportunity to promote his investment in 
pedagogic courseware—but this conflict of interest was not noted by the 
network or by fellow Republicans. By 2006, Neil’s big brother’s No Child 
Left Behind Act had provided a means of profit for his Ignite Learning 
firm. Partly owned by their parents, the company’s product is purchased 
through uncompetitive bidding by school districts utilizing federal, Saudi, 
and Moonie funds, despite widely variant evaluations of its value. Their 
mother, Barbara, made purchase of it a condition of her “charity” to school 
districts after Hurricane Katrina (Roche 2006). Perhaps this was familial 
synergy, not sharp practice. Sometimes it’s hard to tell them apart.
Conclus ion
Upon reflection, i think a combination of prayer and ritalin could eliminate her 
excess energy.
 —head priest at Catholic school to a mother
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how dare you! you may call her hyperactive, but if the good lord gave her       
excess energy then by God no one is taking it from her.
 —mother (Superstar 1999)
The increasing number of children diagnosed with ADHD is deemed objec-
tionable because the public is worried about harm done to the young in a 
hyperspeedy age of hypercompetitive parents, and because the diagnosis 
pathologizes children who were previously viewed as normal or mischie-
vous. Critiques of Ritalin evoke nostalgia for a less technological era when 
“boys were boys” and that was all there was to say about the topic. Today’s 
fuzzy boundaries differentiating the feisty child from the ill one are viewed 
as problematic; they help explain fervent searches for signs of ADHD dis-
played on the body, in the hope such signs may clearly distinguish children 
who need treatment from those who do not. Hair, toes, and brains are cat-
egorized and evaluated in the expectation that they will lead to a concrete, 
unitary diagnosis acceptable to scholars, clinicians, parents, teachers, and 
the public. But the absence of incontrovertibly objectifiable signs linked to 
an underlying cause remains matched by symptoms that are always liable 
to redefinition. The twin objectives of the applied sciences—to understand 
causes and to master interventions—are only partially met. Any notion of 
“pure” medicine is compromised by forces of management, education, gov-
ernment, and capital (Hacking 1995: 12). Drugs answer the question of the 
disorder’s “realness” by sidestepping it. Who can identify authenticity or 
distinguish illness from factor endowments when pills make people com-
port themselves differently from before they were ingested? In the process, 
pharmacology partially lifts psychiatry out of its ascientific mire (Reznek 
1998: 214, 220) and advances makeovers through government at a dis-
tance. A pill is a commodity and governmental form par excellence—truly 
“consumed,” genuinely material and measurable, utterly standard, and infi-
nitely repeatable. It adheres to bureaucratic norms of reliability, efficiency, 
and substitutability, thus enabling the actuarialization and financialization 
of the sick mind—perfect Yanqui-makeover material.
 For therapists, the pharmacological threat to talking cures has encour-
aged collective action to preserve analysis (Lerner 2000). For pharmaceu-
tical corporations, it has encouraged competition. Shire, the extraordinary 
new company that is a developer and marketer of drugs rather than their 
researcher and manufacturer, expanded at unprecedented pace in the new 
century via Adderall. Long a weight-loss pill and now an alternative to 
Ritalin, it offers three kinds of amphetamine instead of one, and it lasts 
longer. Shire bought the rights to Adderall in 1997 and “repositioned” it 
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from anti-obesity to anti-ADHD. The company also purchased data on 
the 180,000 US doctors who had prescribed drugs for the disorder; then 
it mapped national sales strategies around the areas with the highest num-
bers of prescribers. Adderall rapidly attained 36% of the US market, with 
$758 million in US sales by 2000. Compared in its effects and toxicity to 
the demonized Ecstasy, the drug is banned in Europe and was abruptly 
outlawed in Canada in 2005 after links were drawn to twenty deaths and 
its use led to the acquittal of a man who killed his daughter because the 
drug made him psychotic. In the United States, it is approved for three-
year-olds. Meanwhile, Shire developed a patch, Daytrana, to disseminate a 
generic form of Ritalin that would supposedly avoid abuse. It was approved 
by the FDA in 2006, even as the administration issued a strong warning 
about Ritalin’s potentially fatal impact on the heart and its hallucinatory 
side effects. Other “new” treatments (almost generics, they are known as 
“me-too drugs”) include Concerta, based on methylphenidrate; Atomex-
tine, which is marketed as Strattera (a nonstimulant); Dexedrine; Cylert 
(which is toxic to the liver); Ritadex, Novartis’s kinder, gentler Ritalin; and 
Modafinil, sold as Alertec and Provigil as a nonaddictive alternative and 
used illegally by US athletes and legally by high-altitude bombers. The 
fact that Strattera targets noradrenaline, not dopamine, compromises the 
claim that ADHD is all about brain lesions affecting dopamine, but this 
fact is rarely, if ever, commented on (Clark 2000a; Clark 2000b; Zernike 
and Petersen 2001; Cox et al. 2003; Phalen 2000; Oliver 2000; “Shire” 2003; 
“Drug Withdrawal” 2005; Steven Rose 2006: 260–61; Hearn 2005; Pres-
ident’s Council on Bioethics 2002b; Spartos 2001; Gardiner Harris 2005; 
Gardiner Harris 2006; National Institute of Mental Health 2006: 22; Kraus-
kopf 2001; Heavey 2006; Wallis 2006; “Supercharging” 2004; Eccleston 
2006).
 When sales of Ritalin slumped in 2002 in the face of longer-acting rivals, 
Novartis sought to strike back via extended-release Ritalin LA, which sup-
posedly lasted the length of a school day. The one drawback was that the 
comparative advantage that the corporation claimed over competitors had 
no research to support it. WPP’s subsidiary Intramed commissioned fac-
ulty to author a paper filling that gap. Intramed wrote it and the professors 
signed it, based on the guarantee that the piece would be “quick, down 
and dirty.” A ghostwriter with a doctorate in anatomy and a dozen years of 
experience in penning such deceits was hired to produce the required out-
come. It was approved by Novartis and published in a journal (Moffatt and 
Elliott 2007; Petersen 2002). The next task of these unscrupulous cash-reg-
ister intellectuals would be to deal with a 2007 government order requiring 
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ADHD drug producers to tell patients about adverse cardiovascular and 
psychiatric responses to their medicines (“FDA Directs” 2007).
 The New York Times Magazine had a large, glossy series of “articles” 
and advertisements in 2002, paid for and produced by pharmacorps, enti-
tled From Cause to Cure: Mental Health and Nervous System Conditions. 
It offered a “case study” of an adult ADHD sufferer who, once diagnosed 
and treated, increased his salary by $10,000. Thus shall we know them. 
There is no shame: after September 11, 2001, promotions for Zoloft asso-
ciated the drug with firefighters, flags, and the corporation’s relief fund, 
noting its sorrow, “We wish we could make a medicine that could take 
away the heartache.” Lilly lined up to market Strattera to what it hoped 
were 8 million adults across the United States, and Concerta appeared in 
commercials on A&E and the Discovery Channel. Meanwhile, the FDA 
warned Shire that its advertising claims were unsubstantiated. But while 
most people believed that the administration approved all such texts prior 
to their going to air, its capacity to do so had been undermined by Minor. 
Physicians are beginning to depart the picture, just as psychoanalysts had 
done, eclipsed by the drugs they broker. Next, it will be the turn of the FDA 
to disappear as an independent watchdog—its Center for Drug Evalua-
tion and Research is now virtually half-funded by corporations, in order 
to hasten approval of new medications (Jaramillo 2006: 277; Pfizer quoted 
in Rubin 2004: 377; Rosenthal et al. 2003; Zarembo 2005; Zernike and 
Petersen 2001; Diller 2001). All this direct-to-consumer advertising had 
clear effects on treatment, as patients and their caregivers read misleading 
claims for the curative powers of medications through slogans such as “an 
idea that a kid with ADHD can believe in,” “the science behind ADHD and 
self-esteem,” and “life stopped being about ADHD and started to be about 
staying in the game” (quoted in Goldstein 2006). Children are important 
targets for Novartis, which has produced a picture book about Hippihopp, 
an octopus who is “everywhere and nowhere,” suffering the trials and trib-
ulations of adult scolds until a turtle medico diagnoses him with ADHD 
and proffers the cure: “a small white tablet” (Blech 2006: 64).
 By 2004, ADHD medication sales added up to over $2.7 billion, with 
more than 33 million prescriptions. Sales rose to $3 billion in 2006. 
Novartis might assert that Ritalin holds only 20% of the US market in 
methylphenidate, but prescriptions for those aged between 20 and 44 rose 
by 139% in the five years to 2005 (Jarboe 2006; “Really Desperate” 2006; 
Barry 2002). And the drug’s name represents more than sales; it stands for 
recalibrating a new generation—the triumph of psy-drug treatments. For 
example, the Riddlin’ Kids (2002), a postpunk Texas band with a homonym 
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to avoid legal action and a debut album entitled Hurry Up and Wait, were 
promoted as “fired-up energy balls” with a “hyped-up stage antic.” They 
featured in Orange County (2002) and the video game ATV Offroad Fury 2. 
The Ritalin Reading Series on New York City’s Lower East Side restricted 
writers to four-minute performances, while the founder of JetBlue Airways 
boasted that staying off medication enabled “his” ADD to differentiate him 
from ordinary workers, and Novartis referred to the disorder as “a life-long 
loyal companion.” The Cyberathlete Professional League decided to test 
participants in e-sports for use of Ritalin. True believers estimated that as 
many as 25% of US children suffered from “communication disorders.” 
Perhaps this made Bush Minor more legitimately representative of the 
nation than was often thought. And as more and more pharma drugs were 
blamed for violence, GlaxoSmithKline, Pfizer, and Lilly provided prosecu-
tors with information and even special manuals for use against defense 
teams whose clients claimed they were driven to kill by a pill—a somewhat 
more sinister outcome than baptizing a parakeet (Tavernise 2004; Belkin 
2004; Accardo and Blondis 2001; Blech 2006: 64; “CPL to Test” 2006; Waters 
2004). Product placement had migrated from doctors’ offices to prosecu-
tors’ briefs.
 In late 2007, the Multimodal Treatment Study of Children found that 
Ritalin and Concerta were effective in the short term; but over three years, 
they had no discernible impact on conduct and could diminish physical 
growth. The NIMH advised that those diagnosed with ADHD simply 
“grew out of it” and caught up with their age group academically. At that 
moment, 4.4 million school pupils across the country were deemed to be 
sufferers, with half of them prescribed stimulants. But have no fear—prov-
idential new territory had been unveiled. Bipolar disorder, long assumed 
not to exist amongst children, was announced as a sleeper, with a fortyfold 
increase in diagnoses over the previous decade—though the NIMH was 
skeptical (Stratton 2007; Gellene 2007; Healy 2007). 
 New best-selling drugs used on hundreds of thousands of children in 
the United States to counter “behavior problems” have often not been 
approved or adequately tested for these populations. These “atypicals” are 
frequently prescribed by doctors who receive direct financial inducements 
from pharmaceutical companies. Minnesota, the one state that requires 
disclosure of such arrangements, reports that such graft increased sixfold 
in the five years to 2005, a period during which Medicaid prescriptions of 
atypicals to children increased by a factor of nine, with a dramatic correla-
tion between psychiatrists receiving money from companies and urging 
patients to spend it on related brands (Harris et al. 2007). Along the way, 
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a grand project of bringing the mentally ill out into the light of day was 
accomplished, and a new way of seeing the world modeled upon, and in 
turn modeling, madeover citizens. The moral panics over ADHD and Rit-
alin veer in “diametrically opposed directions”—one finds overtreatment, 
the other discerns undertreatment; one disavows ADHD as an invention, 
the other demonizes its critics as unscientific (Lewis 2006: 85). Perhaps 
the panics about Ritalin will die off once it is recognized as one more cos-
mopolitan investment in human capital, in a risk society that wagers its 
future on the very people about whom it is most worried. As pharmaceu-
tical companies market their wares more and more effectively to parents, 
doctors, and teachers—and forces mount in opposition—all participants 
must make peace with the tension between promises of new applications 
and fears of doping the future. The moral panic may become as hidden as 
the disease and the drug that birthed it.
 Young people are a canvas for painting contradictory images of social 
life. As the noted pharmacological researcher Julie Zito asks, “How do you 
even know who the kid is anymore?” when multiple prescriptions expose 
children to “a potpourri of target symptoms and side effects” (quoted in 
Carey 2006a). Onto their bodies are projected the foibles of adulthood and 
the mythologies of the makeover, from all sides. The latest jag for pharma 
is paying doctors to talk up the likelihood of bipolar disorder amongst 
children—a bold untapped market/diagnosis. At the same time, the Child 
Medication Safety Act of 2003 is meant to “protect children and their par-
ents from being coerced into administering a controlled substance” (Harris 
et al. 2007; Act quoted in Petrina 2006: 531n42). Can there ever be a sphere 
for discussing these topics from beyond diagnosis and prescription, out-
side the DSM’s reach (Harwood 2006: 144)?
 So swallow and blink—then talk. As you do so, recall the words of David 
Healy, a former Secretary of the Royal College of Psychiatry: the pills on 
your tongue “lie midway between magic bullets and snake oil” (1997: 4). 
And note that the culture-jamming group Adbusters sells sugar placebos as 
antidepressants, given their favorable results in clinical trials (Greenberg 
2005)! Concerns about mental health, educational success, drug use, and 
corporate commodification have joined left and right in a bipartisan panic 
culture, all orchestrated around a little pill and its impact on turning little 
people into big citizens. Unless the nature of corporate-state relations is 
fundamentally questioned as part of the debate about the disorder and its 
treatment, this panic will prove unproductive.
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Moving	beyond  the psy-function and young people, this chapter argues 
that US secular commodity transcendence is undergoing renewal through 
a major change in the political economy of masculinity, allied to the dereg-
ulation of television. Together, these forces have created the conditions for 
a new address of men as commodity goods, sexual objects, sexual subjects, 
workers, and viewers, thanks to neoliberal policies that facilitate media 
businesses targeting specific cultures. Viewers are urged to govern them-
selves through orderly preparation, style, and pleasure—the transforma-
tion of potential drudgery into a special event, and the incorporation of 
difference into a makeover treat rather than a social threat.
 Of course, men have been prone to primp for a very long time. Recent 
archaeology has unearthed sophisticated male grooming twenty-five hun-
3
a metrosexual is a man who wants to be looked at . . . a collector of fantasies 
about the male, sold to him by advertising.
 —mark Simpson (quoted in andrew Williams 2005)
The lines are blurring between men who work with their hands and men who 
have their hands worked on.
 —Jim rendon (2004)
all the complicated material conditions [dandies] subject themselves to, from 
the most flawless dress at any time of day or night to the most risky sporting 
feats, are no more than a series of gymnastic exercises suitable to strengthen 
the will and school the soul.
 —Charles baudelaire (1972)
M e t r o s e x u a l i t y
Making	over	Men
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dred years ago. German Romanticism of the 1800s conceived of men as 
sensuous, emotional creatures, as per Friedrich Schlegel’s “tender man-
hood.” The Enlightenment era of rationality had its double in Empfindsam-
keit, or spiritual sensitivity amongst intellectuals of both sexes. It called 
for the expression of feelings and for attention to the passional. Men were 
encouraged to record their emotions in diaries and discuss the results with 
others. The sybarite/bon vivant is a familiar figure in fashion history, and 
the New York Public Library’s famous “Rakish History of Men’s Wear” 
show detailed the way that clothing made the man across time and space 
(“Metrosexual Man” 2006; Trepp 1994: 13n25; Jauffred 2006; Irizarry 2007). 
Baudelaire (1972) dates dandyism as far back as Alicibiades, with further 
links to Lucius Sergius Catilina and Julius Caesar, and locates it as far afield 
as the wilds of the New World. The early-19th-century dandy was preoccu-
pied with style and pleasure juxtaposed against depth and responsibility. A 
figure for whom creativity was all and work anathema, he favored art over 
nature (Elsaesser 1999: 4–5). The severe Calvinist prelate Thomas Carlyle 
called the dandy “a Clothes-wearing Man, a Man whose trade, office and 
existence consists in the wearing of Clothes,” sacrificing “the Immortal to 
the Perishable” in the name of “Self-worship.” In Sartor Resartus, Carlyle 
typified the 1830s “DANDIACAL HOUSEHOLD” as:
A Dressing-room splendidly furnished; violet-colored curtains, chairs and 
ottomans of the same hue. Two full-length Mirrors are placed, one on each 
side of a table, which supports the luxuries of the Toilet. Several Bottles 
of Perfumes, arranged in a peculiar fashion, stand upon a smaller table of 
mother-of-pearl; opposite to these are placed the appurtenances of Lavation 
richly wrought in frosted silver. A Wardrobe of Buhl is on the left; the doors 
of which, being partly open, discover a profusion of Clothes; Shoes of a sin-
gularly small size monopolize the lower shelves. (1999; also see 1837)
 Baudelaire classified dandies as men with “no profession other than 
elegance” who lived under “a rigorous code of laws” despite standing out-
side formal legal institutions. However “ardent and independent their 
individual characters” may have been, their search for “a personal form of 
originality” took place “within the external limits of social conventions.” 
The dandies’ “cult of the ego” took pleasure in the surprise others showed 
when they appeared. Nevertheless, Baudelaire saw them disappearing with 
the rise of democracy, because patrician attitudes and aristocratic wealth 
would be rhetorically and materially compromised (1972). His prediction 
was instantiated in subsequent histories that refer to the “Great Mascu-
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line Renunciation,” which supposedly saw men shy away from consump-
tion as women’s business. But traces of Bohemian culture are found in the 
consumption booms of the 1890s, 1920s, and 1960s. The fashion industry 
broadened its means of production and communication to encompass men 
with the proliferation of the department store and retail catalogs at the end 
of the 19th century. Then the interwar period’s revised marketing systems 
ushered in a new acceptability of men as clothes horses via the notion of 
their rationality in purchasing, as opposed to the emotion-driven wasteful-
ness of women consumers, and via the association of goods and services 
with soldiers and sportsmen. This trend countered the link of effeminacy 
to homosexuality, which had intensified following Oscar Wilde’s 1895 trial 
for gross indecency (Sedden 2002: 48; Shannon 2004; Honeyman and 
Godley 2003: 105).
 Even so, despite François de Chateaubriand finding rural dandies in 
North America, the United States has a male tradition that has frequently 
defined itself in a hypermasculinist and specifically Francophobic way. 
Early Puritanism stood alongside the frontier as a defining characteristic 
of the New World, via the careful calibration of conduct through devo-
tion to a higher being who transcended base human desires—a blend of 
rugged individuality and collective piety. As per the personality/character 
dialectic noted in the Introduction, men who wrestled with their hun-
gers and drives could attain a life-world of the spiritual through proper 
behavior, which would compensate for secular privations. They might even 
feel liberated by establishing and maintaining an alternative universe to 
the secular. Puritanism’s ethical technology took on a deeply pre- and pro-
scriptive form that ramified and intensified secular law with a duty to obey 
God’s (heavily interpreted) word. It also became a monetary technology, 
an index and guide to thrift and self-actualization via utilitarian calcula-
tion. Late-18th-century Yanqui theater parodied British men, unfavorably 
contrasting their supposedly effete, foppish display with putatively coura-
geous, rugged nativism. The Old World was associated with a feminizing 
influence that had to be resisted/infiltrated in order to restore and institu-
tionalize hypermasculinism. Misogyny, xenophobia, machismo, and cul-
tural nation building were bound together. At a time when 80% of men 
worked in agriculture, John Adams wrote to Thomas Jefferson in 1819 
that he feared that economic growth would generate “effeminacy, intoxi-
cation, extravagance, vice and folly,” while Washington Irving favored 
keeping young men as ignorant of the world beyond as possible, lest they 
“grow luxurious and effeminate in Europe.” There was great anxiety about 
avoiding not just luxury, but the look of luxury; one had to appear frugal 
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(Baudelaire 1972; Susman 1984: 41–45; Motley 2006: 90–91; Adams and 
Irving quoted in Kimmel 1997: 19). Adams and Irving clearly never took a 
cultural-studies course, where we admire such things.
 This decidedly material mode of salvation stressed the male propen-
sity—nay, imperative—to work, save, and invest rather than consume, in 
accord with the uptake of John Locke’s ideas on private property and the 
role of the state. It supported the formation of capital and the disciplining 
of the workforce, even as it rhapsodized about self-sufficiency. In the 
hands of heralds and apologists for 19th-century capitalism, Puritanism 
endorsed labor and savings as keys to building an earthly heaven, ordering 
individuals through the material rule of law and the interpersonal rule of 
belief. In 1832, Senator Henry Clay coined what became a famous neolo-
gism: “self-made men.” These heroic figures attained trust in the business 
world by contrasting their lack of personal style with demonstrative Euro-
pean aristocrats. Woe betide would-be leaders who did not adopt this look. 
Despite being described on today’s White House Web site as “trim and 
erect,” Martin Van Buren was criticized in his 1836 and 1840 presidential 
campaigns for wearing ruffled shirts and failing to embody frontier mas-
culinity. Davy Crockett accused him of being “laced up in corsets,” which 
perhaps explains the Bush Minor White House’s admiration for his tumes-
cence. This was also the period when Great-Awakening preachers mocked 
men without facial hair or who wore glasses, while the Civil War became a 
moment for the reassertion of the North as a place of manly industry con-
trasted with the South’s mannered racism. The term “sissy” entered Yanqui 
English at this time to describe men who cowered in the face of peril (Clay 
and Crockett quoted in Kimmel 1997: 26, 38; http://www.whitehouse.gov/
history/presidents/mb8.html; Kimmel 1997: 60, 73; Stearns 2006: 98).
 But between 1870 and 1910, a middle class formed comprising folk who 
were not agricultural, proletarian, or capitalist. In the two decades to 1890, 
the number of professionals in the US labor force went from below 350,000 
to almost 880,000, and subordinate white-collar workers grew from 80,000 
to 470,000. Urbanization and Eastern European and Asian immigration 
accelerated, rural whiteness receded, more and more women entered the 
labor force, and queer culture emerged. Intellectuals with managerial and 
scientific knowledge appeared on the scene. Science favored truths that 
could be tested, rather than magically revealed. The corollary to the intense 
rationalism of science was an aesthetic notion of human quintessences that 
would emerge in art: desires were not to be denied or displaced. Puritanism 
was held responsible for the personal and social alienation experienced by 
intellectuals. Writers began to wonder about other forms of self-expression 
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than those mandated in the narrow corridors of the Puritan mind. H. L. 
Mencken famously defined Puritanism as “the haunting fear that someone, 
somewhere, may be happy” (1956: 233). Freudian discourse made desire 
an inevitable and valuable corrective to the anal retentiveness of prevailing 
ideology. Aesthetic discourse privileged expressive totality and sensuous 
response over tightly buttoned shirts. Temperance and censorship were 
seen to favor certain categories of person over others. The duel between 
these tendencies has continued, along with the xenophobic nativism that 
attaches to men who have a sense of style.
 Meanwhile, the emergent psy-function began to worry about the impact 
of modernization on men by the mid-1850s. The 19th century also saw the 
proliferation of advice manuals to boys on preparation for business suc-
cess. By the end of the First World War, when so many Yanquis faltered 
under fire through shell shock, mental illness had begun its process of nor-
malization (Schiller 1996: 17; Susman 1984: 41–48; Kimmel 1997: 82, 85, 
87, 98, 132–33; Heller 2006: 3). And the centrality of hypermaleness to the 
economy had been fatally compromised via a shift away from the founda-
tional mythology of masculinity in agrarian life and then factory life. Even 
as the economy was undergoing dramatic agricultural and manufacturing 
growth in the 19th and 20th centuries, the services area, too, expanded. 
Services were not theorized as such at the time, but we can discern their 
significance for some time prior to the Depression. The countinghouse 
was transformed into the modern office, as new technologies, educational 
investments, and systems of labor emerged, helping the United States to 
overtake Britain as the key center of world productivity via a shift from 
customized, low-volume production to standardized, high-volume manu-
facture. These transformations began in communications and transport, 
before widening to finance and culture (Broadberry and Ghosal 2002). 
As George Orwell put it, with reference to belated but similar changes in 
Britain, the corollary was “a general softening of manners” as industrial 
technology relied less and less on the “old-style ‘proletarian’—collarless, 
unshaven and with muscles warped by heavy labour”—and helped to pro-
duce a “common culture” of “tastes, habits, manners and outlook” that 
veered toward the middle class (1982). This sector of the economy was 
feminized, at both an occupational and a stylistic level, with appearance 
often an important part of work (Sarah Berry 2000: xiii). The devastation 
wrought by the Great Depression expressed itself as violent irruptions on 
domestic landscapes. Herbert I. Schiller recalls his family’s “frequent quar-
rels, most of which had an economic origin.” His “father’s continuing job-
lessness was viewed by my mother as weakness and inadequacy” (2000: 
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12). The return of soldiers from the subsequent World War appeared to 
reinstate male power along with male employment. Then the rise of femi-
nism and civil rights increased pressure on violently achieved and pre-
served male antiquities. Through all these changes, a severe Puritanism 
often revived its cranky self, with culturally libertarian conduct obsessively 
chronicled and decried. But the political economy has largely militated 
against this worldview.
 All this amounted to what Barbara Ehrenreich views as a “masculinity 
crisis that gripped middle-class men in the late fifties,” with traditional jobs 
changing and advertisers focusing more and more on female consumers as 
key decision makers. By 1960, about 40% of jobs outside farming were in 
manufacturing. That figure was 14% in 2002, when the service industries 
accounted for 80% of employment beyond agriculture. By the mid-1980s, 
36% of corporate purchases were of high-technology products. Factory 
machinery had been dropping steadily as a factor since the war. The United 
States today has 86 million private-sector jobs in services. Well over half of 
US employment growth between 1988 and 2000 was in the service sector. 
The corollary of such changes is increased credentialism and internation-
alism—since the only things people want to buy from the United States are 
military-related manufactures and cultural, legal, financial, medical, and 
psy-function texts, technologies, and techniques. The outcome, alongside 
the deregulatory outcomes explained in the Introduction, has been atro-
cious for the material underpinnings to working-class masculinity: between 
1973 and 2005 the economy grew by 150%, and productivity by 80%, while 
the hourly wage of the male worker, adjusted for price shifts, went from 
$15.76 to $15.62. Over the same period, the proportion of women’s income 
to heterosexual household incomes has increased dramatically. In 1970, 
men brought in all the earnings in 50% of Yanqui homes; by 2000 it was 
20%. Men have become less central to the material survival and comfort of 
those they live with, and women have developed the independence neces-
sary to love them or leave them. Divorce rates correlate with female earn-
ings to reflect that shift in autonomy (Ehrenreich 1990: 33; Hacker 2006: 
80, 88, 105; Office of the US Trade Representative 2001: 1, 10, 15; Schiller 
2000: 101; Schiller 2007: 12; Goodman and Steadman 2002; Bernstein 
2006: 73).
 As if to blend these contradictory lineages, the new masculinists of the 
1970s and beyond appeared to go forward and build culture anew via an 
appeal to supposedly ancient verities. The “development and integration 
of body, mind, and emotions” would result from consulting such pop-psy-
function literature as Accessing the King in the Male Psyche and The Warrior 
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Athlete. Newsweek announced “the first postmodern social movement” in 
1991: poet and tree-hugger Robert Bly’s followers looking within for the 
lost monarch. This tendency was rooted in Carl Jung’s uptake of Greek and 
Roman mythology as a universal, transhistorical truth about masculine 
and feminine bases to personality, a “collective unconscious” that animates 
everyone. Other accounts derived from middle-class reactions against 
feminist challenges to male authority and privilege. Sometimes these reac-
tions have been misogynistic and antifeminist; at other moments, they have 
expressed envy at women’s “feelings” discourse, their unity, and their claims 
to expressive totality. One wing became “Father’s Rights,” the other “Men 
Against Sexism.” Both sides stressed the difficulties of being a man, the 
pain of leadership, the confusion of roles “under” feminism, the vacuum of 
authority and direction, and the need to “share.” Carol Gilligan notes that 
where the “feminist movement has held men responsible for their violence 
and privilege,” the “mythopoetic men’s movement has embraced men as 
wounded” (Moore and Gillette 1992: 25–27; Millman 1979: viii; Ross 1980: 
118; Newsweek quoted in Boscagli 1992–93: 71; Gilligan 1997).
 There were much more interesting contributions from 1960s and 1970s 
television and glam rock. The Man from U.N.C.L.E. added a touch of the 
feminized male to the banality of dyadic male action-adventure TV drama, 
for example. Whereas its predecessors certainly targeted male viewers keen 
on action and women keen on bodily display, this series cast men of ordi-
nary physique and soft features as its heroes after the show’s producer met 
a woman who pointed out that “there were other types of people in the 
world” than vast hunks (Miller 2003). And in music, androgynous/queer 
personae of that decade and the next three—Mick Jagger, Jimi Hendrix, 
David Bowie, Marc Bolan, Elton John, Brian Eno, Peter Gabriel, Lou Reed, 
Mick Ronson, Todd Rundgren, Alice Cooper, Slade, Sweet, Freddy Mer-
cury, Boy George, Michael Jackson, Robert Smith, Morrissey, Prince, Ricky 
Martin, and others—led to an androgyny that welcomed queerness, a 
“cavalier feminizing” that envied girls’ monopoly on “pretty, floaty nonag-
gressive free spirit[s]” (Doonan 2007). While the blaxploitation film genre 
of the period may have emphasized violence, it also stressed conspicuous 
consumption via the superfly figure, who placed great value on stylish, 
effervescent personal appearance.
 As part of a gathering critique across the human sciences and social 
movements over the last thirty years, we have also seen a burst of scholarly 
writing and thinking about men from feminist and queer theory (Kimmel 
1992; Connell 1992: 735). The critical arm of this research draws much of 
its inspiration from the idea that we live in an era of “hegemonic mascu-
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linity” (HM). The concept’s lineage is in Antonio Gramsci’s theorization of 
hegemony, as picked up and redisposed by RW/Bob/Raewyn Connell. For 
Gramsci, an Italian Marxist writing from jail in the mid-1930s, hegemony 
is a contest of meanings in which a ruling class gains consent to the social 
order by making its power appear normal and natural. Ordinary people 
give “‘spontaneous’ consent” to the “general direction imposed on social 
life by the dominant fundamental group” as a consequence of education 
and entertainment. Society contains old cultural meanings and practices, 
no longer dominant but still influential, and emergent ones, either propa-
gated by an upcoming class or incorporated by the ruling elite. These dis-
courses are carried by intellectuals, who work at “superstructural ‘levels’” 
to forge the “hegemony which the dominant group exercises throughout 
society” (Gramsci 1971: 12).
 Connell, an Australian Marxist writing from Australian and US re-
search universities in the ’80s, ’90s, and today, applies this notion of con-
sent-through-incorporation to gender relations, especially masculinity. 
Combining theories of imperialism with feminism, he/she1 articulates the 
history of North Atlantic commercial republics expanding into the rest 
of the world with contemporary anthropological study. The result makes 
Western European and North American white male sexuality isomorphic 
with power: men seek global dominion and desire, orchestrated to oppress 
women. HM encompasses obvious sexism—rape, domestic violence, and 
obstacles to female occupational advancement—and more subtle domina-
tion, such as excluding women from social environments and sports teams, 
and lopsided media interest in men. Connell calls for critical investigations 
of masculinity across the state, work, the family, sex, and organizational 
life (1987, 1995, 1998, 2001).
 Of course, HM (straight, strong, domineering) oppresses the many men 
excluded from it, while even “subscribers” often find its norms unattain-
able. HM’s articulation against women and queers makes it unpopular with 
vast numbers of people. While men who feel socially weak (the working 
class, minorities, and many immigrants) may find the hegemonic model 
appealing, the real sources of their powerlessness lie in the monetary and 
racial economy, not struggles against women and gays (Messner 1997: 7–8, 
12; Rowe 1997: 124). Connell acknowledges that male identity is complex 
and polyvalent, with no singular set of qualities consistently marked as 
masculine; masculinity and men’s bodies (symbolically conceived as uni-
tary) are contested sites, fraught with contradictions (1998). But the work 
sometimes reads like neat, ideal types overlying messy evidence. Counter-
examples to a narrative of Western domination abound in the Third World, 
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and significant aspects of everyday male conduct are about the desire to 
share and build, not control and shutter. Francesca M. Cancian argues that 
what counts as loving conduct has been erroneously feminized in the United 
States by identifying it with expressing feelings rather than, for example, 
helping or fucking. She favors equal value being placed on all sides to love 
(1986: 692). For his part, Wil Coleman (1990) calls for a focus on mascu-
linity in use—not as a term freighted-in from ideal types, as per Connell, 
but when maleness appears as such in the vocabulary of everyday life.
 Those contradictions became manifest and manifold beyond the expec-
tations of HM in the most recent Yanqui makeover. In the 1990s, tradi-
tional ways of dividing First World consumers—by age, race, gender, and 
class—were supplemented by cultural categories, with market researchers 
proclaiming a decade of the “new man.” Life-style and psychographic 
research sliced and diced consumers into “moralists,” “trendies,” “the 
indifferent,” “working-class puritans,” “sociable spenders,” and “pleasure 
seekers.” Men were further subdivided into “pontificators,” “self-admirers,” 
“self-exploiters,” “token triers,” “chameleons,” “avant-gardicians,” “sleep-
walkers,” and “passive endurers” (Fox 1989). Something was changing in 
the landscape of Yanqui masculinity, as part of a general turn in employ-
ment from manufacturing to culture.
 Consider Clinton. The Economist looks back on him as “the first andro-
gynous president,” and he was identified early as a “classic metrosexual” 
(with ADHD, as we saw earlier) (Lexington 2004; “Real Men” 2003). When 
lapsed-leftist Christopher Hitchens mocked Clinton with Paula Jones’s 
implication that “it would have taken two of his phalluses to make one 
normal one” (1999: 50), he referenced quite precisely the discourse long-
used to find fault with women’s bodies. OK, Bill’s is “five inches long when 
erect, as big around as a quarter, and bent” (Paley 1999: 222). That I could 
so boast. This information is clearly an objectification of his body. It indi-
cates that the commodity fetish has moved on to men. A similar process 
problematizing masculinity took place during the 1992 elections, when 
Bush the Elder accused Clinton of being influenced by “the tassel-loaf-
ered lawyer crowd.” Reform Party candidate Ross Perot forbade his staff 
from wearing the offending shoe, and the Elder’s press secretary, Toni 
Clarke, compared Clinton to Woody Allen (Kimmel 1997: 297). A big girl, 
Clinton is described by friends former and current, psychoanalysts, and 
poly-sci mavens as desperate to please, “seductive,” and eager to hear dif-
fering points of view (Wayne 1999: 559–61). He is both the new man of 
advertising—flawed, sexy, priapic, sensitive—and the publicly humiliated 
adulterous woman of misogyny. This replays issues close to Augustine, 
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the Ancient Greeks and Romans, and Burke. Clinton looked back on his 
impeachment as something akin to a Du Boisian/Aristotelian moment, 
referring to the split he experienced between public and private selves, 
between duty and desire, as “parallel lives” that return “with a vengeance” 
via a duel of “outer life” versus “old demons” (Clinton 2004: 775, 811, 923). 
This was a combat between “personality” and “character.”
 During Clinton’s presidency, the variegated male body was up for grabs 
as both sexual icon and commodity consumer, in ways that borrowed 
from but also exceeded earlier commodification of the male form. The 
most obvious sign was the emergence of the “metrosexual,” a term coined 
in the mid-1990s by queer critic Mark Simpson after encountering “the 
real future. . . . [and finding that] it had moisturised.” Key metrosexuals 
included Spiderman, Brad Pitt, and David Beckham (Miller 2001; Simpson 
2002; Simpson 2004; Simpson quoted in Williams 2005).
 Historically, male desire for women has been overlegitimized, while 
female and male desire for men has been underlegitimized.2 The metro-
sexual represents a major shift in relations of power, with men subjected 
to new forms of governance and commodification. Simpson calls his dis-
course of metrosexuality “snarky sociology, which is no good to anyone.” 
But it has been taken up and deployed—as a prescription as much as a 
description—because it promises “highly profitable demography” guaran-
teed to stimulate any “advertiser’s wet dream” (Simpson 2003; Simpson 
2004). The metrosexual has been joyfully embraced by Western European, 
Australian, South Asian, Latin American, East Asian, and US marketers, 
who regard it as “about having the strength to be true to oneself,” rather 
than a sign of being a vain cat. Based on its rapid diffusion, acceptance, and 
national usage, “metrosexual” was declared word of the year for 2003 by 
the American Dialect Society, ahead of “weapons of,” “embed,” and “pre-
emptive self-defense.” Euromonitor’s 2006 report on the phenomenon 
was entitled The Male Shopping Giant Awakes. He even gave his name to 
a prominent 2006 Thai film (St. John 2003; Casqueiro 2003; Álvarez 2006; 
Nixon 2003: 6; Euromonitor 2006; Deepti 2005; Chan 2006; Salzman et al. 
2005: 55; Barboza 2007; “Bangladesh” 2006; Poblete 2007; American Dia-
lect Society 2004; Diego 2006).
 The metrosexual “might be officially gay, straight or bisexual, but this 
is utterly immaterial because he has clearly taken himself as his own love 
object and pleasure as his sexual preference” (Simpson 2004). He endorses 
equal-opportunity vanity, through cosmetics, softness, women, hair-care 
products, wine bars, gyms, designer fashion, wealth, the culture industries, 
finance, cities, cosmetic surgery, and deodorants. Happy to be the object 
Miller_final.indb   114 8/20/2008   10:36:21 PM
	 	 M e t r o s e x u a l I t y : 	 M a k I n g 	 o v e r 	 M e n 	 ✴ 
of queer erotics, and committed to exfoliation and Web surfing, this newly 
feminized male blurs the visual style of straight and gay (St. John 2003) 
in a restless search “to spend, shop and deep-condition.” He is supposed 
to be every fifth man in major US cities (Fenley 2004), despite the hys-
terical right’s claim that metrosexuality “reaches nary an iota of the general 
populace outside of sushi-sick San Francisco and nightlife-nauseous New 
York,” and despite American Chronicle’s divining that it falls outside “True 
masculinity” (Manes 2003; Austria-del Rosario 2006). Single straight men 
now embark on what the New York Times calls “man dates,” nights out 
together without the alibis of work and sport or the props of televisions 
and bar stools—although Yanquis shy away from ordering bottles of wine 
together. (That would be going too far, other than perhaps in a steak house 
[Lee 2005].) The last refuge of male-separatist brawn and flailing manbags 
at two paces (the Canadian ice-hockey changing room) has become a site 
for swapping recipes and swooning over dining ambience (Brown 2006). 
And in a triumph of nurture over nature, testosterone “has somehow been 
supplanted by urban living arrangements” (Williams 2006). Even avowedly 
antimetrosexual men swarm to Web sites such as basenotes.com in search 
of comparison tips on fragrances (Petridis 2006).
 Summed up by Jet magazine as “aesthetically savvy,” the metrosexual 
appeared 25,000 times on google.com in mid-2002; three years later, the 
number was 212,000; by the end of 2005, close to a million; and by mid-
2007, almost 1.5 million. He even managed to transform characters on 
South Park, which devoted an episode to the phenomenon through a con-
version narrative of its mildly amusing, banally offensive kind. And in case 
men aren’t sure they rate, an on-line metrosexual quiz is available. The 
average grade of the one hundred thousand who took it in its first year was 
36.5%. I scored 54%, and qualified. ESPN, the sports cable network, also 
offered a quiz (Yarborough 2004; Sender 2006: 132; Simpson 2004; Bach-
elor 2004; Gladden 2005).
 In 2003, Californian gubernatorial candidate Arnold Schwarzenegger 
told Vanity Fair he was “a major shoe queen.” The Metrosexual Guide to 
Style suggests that such a remark would have been “unthinkable ten years 
ago” but is now “deeply in touch with the Zeitgeist,” because the “new man” 
needs to display “style, sophistication and self-awareness” (Flocker 2003). 
The New York Times’s “Cultural Studies” section discerns a full-fledged 
“democratization of desire” (Trebay 2003), because men are increasingly 
key objects of pleasure for female and gay audiences. Male striptease 
shows, for example, reference not only changes in the gender of power 
and money but also a public site where “women have come to see exposed 
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male genitalia . . . to treat male bodies as objects only.” During the 1998 
men’s World Cup of association football, the French Sexy Boys Band, who 
had been performing in Paris since 1993 to sellout crowds, offered strip 
shows for “les filles sans foot” (girls without soccer/girls who couldn’t care 
less). The US Chippendales toured Northern Europe in 1999 to crowds 
of women—The Full Monty (1997) writ large, even though some female 
spectators found the reversal of subject positions far from easy, rather like 
women who find it hard “to date a guy that is prettier and better main-
tained than me.” For those who could face such things, straight male pole 
dancers were also available (Barham 1985; Burke 1999; Dyer 1992: 104; 
Harari 1993; Jenkins 1998: 92; Smith 2002; Rich 2006; Santer 2007).
 Such changes are referenced in the commodity form. In the mid-1980s, 
Calvin Klein caused a sensation with the first scopic ad campaign using 
the sculpted male form to sell briefs across magazines and billboards, an 
emergent discourse associated with such photographers as Bruce Weber 
and Herb Ritts. The International Male catalog from Southern California 
made postcoital languor and precoital tumescence into market niches. 
Mesh V Bodywear is underwear modeled on the condom, a form of gentle 
armature that combines lightweight packaging with intense visibility. And 
by late 1995, Calvin Klein underwear advertisements featured a sexu-
ally aroused model (Crowe 2007; Miller 1998). Underwear for men has 
recently expanded to incorporate “action bikinis” and “athletic strings,” 
some complete with condom pockets in the waistband and “sling sup-
port” to emphasize genitals. Worldwide sales of men’s grooming products 
reached $7.3 billion in 2002, accounting for 15% of all beauty products 
sold, and increased by an annual average of 5.7% between 1997 and 2005. 
In 2002, American Demographics claimed “baby-boomer” men allocated 
$26,420 a year to “youth-enhancing products and services,” and women 
just under $3,000 a year more, while both sexes devoted almost an hour 
a day to grooming (Euromonitor 2006; Weiss 2002; McCasland 2003). In 
2004, US men spent $65 billion on fashion and grooming. That year, AC-
Nielsen issued What’s Hot Around the Globe: Insights on Growth in Personal 
Care. A study of fifty-six countries predicated on the existence of metro-
sexuality, it duly discovered that personal care’s key sales growth comprised 
shower gels, deodorants, blades, and moisturizers—to men. Euromonitor 
predicted a 50% expansion in the male skin-care market between 2001 
and 2006, and Datamonitor expected a 3.3% annual increase in sales to 
men through 2008. In 2005, L’Oréal, with its new Men’s Expert line, saw 
a 49% growth in sales to men over the previous year. For the first time, 
men’s antiperspirants outsell women’s in the United States. Body sprays 
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targeted at boys aged 10 and up form part of “age compression” via the 
sexualization of men across age groups. Gillette’s TAG Body Spray for Men 
was promoted via an auction on eBay for teenage boys to buy a date with 
Carmen Electra, a married celebrity in her thirties, and was soon banned 
in several high schools because boys used the body spray instead of show-
ering after phys-ed class. Hair-color sales to young males increased by 25% 
in the five years from 1998. In 2003, men’s hair-care expenditure grew by 
more than 12% in the United States, to $727 million. “The Micro Touch” 
was released as the first “unwanted hair” application for men, organized 
around a metrosexual campaign; and a sample of college students disclosed 
that over 60% engaged in depilation to remove hair below the neck—an 
entirely new phenomenon (Trebay 2004; “ACNielsen” 2004; Lindsay 2005; 
Burbury 2003; Datamonitor 2004; Manning-Schaffel 2006; Beatty 2004; 
Neff 2005; Farran 2007; Euromonitor 2004; Postrel 2003: 29; Neff 2007; 
Fenley 2004; Boroughs et al. 2005).
 Mid-town Manhattan now offers specialist ear-, hand-, and foot-
waxing, with men comprising 40% of the clientele. Such sites provide pedi-
cures and facials to the accompaniment of cable sports and Frank Sinatra, 
using manly euphemisms to describe procedures—coloring hair becomes 
“camouflage,” and manicures are “hand detailing.” Both Target and Saks 
Fifth Avenue opened men’s cosmetics sections for the first time in the new 
century, aimed principally at straights, while Lancôme announced eight 
differences between men’s and women’s skins, necessitating new products. 
Meanwhile, apologists for Bush Minor’s economic record pointed to offi-
cially undercounted new jobs in spas, nail salons, and massage parlors as 
signs of national economic health. Truly a digitally led recovery from reces-
sion. And men are now the fastest-growing part of the jewelry market, up 
to 10% of sales thanks to executive masculinity. In 2004, Garrad, Georg 
Jensen, and Cartier all launched comprehensive selections of male jewels 
(Stein 1999; Burstyn 1999: 21; Hall 1999; Lemon 1997; Weiss 2002; Postrel 
2004; Flynn 2005).
 The metrosexual’s ecumenicism has encouraged white-oriented com-
panies to target Latin@s and blacks for the first time. In Britain, a metro-
sexual even appears in diaper commercials—not to reflect the division of 
child-care labor but to appeal to women consumers. The United States sees 
80% of grooms actively involved in planning weddings, as never before, 
and devoting vast sums to their own appearance thanks to advice from 
such services as groomsonline.com. Banana Republic, a chain dedicated to 
casual-wear clothing, recently found that its catalog contained items worn 
as business attire. It proceeded to establish partnerships with Credit Suisse, 
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Home Box Office, and First Boston, setting up ministores in these enter-
prises to dispense free drinks and fashion advice. Even Microsoft, seem-
ingly as impregnable to high style as a Roger Moore James Bond film, saw 
its campus populated by Prada as the century turned. Macho magazines 
in Britain, such as Loaded, were forced by audience targeting to supple-
ment their hitherto-exclusive appeal to antifeminist, lager-swilling brutes 
by interpellating “the caring lad in cashmere” as well (“ideavillage’s” 2004; 
Benady 2004; Caplan 2005; Dube 2007; Florida 2002; Robinson 2005).
 The area of plastic, cosmetic, or aesthetic surgery is a particularly not-
able part of this transformation. Records of Hindu facial surgery date from 
600 B.C.; Roman gladiatorial wounds led to reconstructions; and rhinoplas-
ties were undertaken in India from A.D. 1000. All such surgeries became 
more bearable and common with the appearance of antisepsis and anes-
thesia during the 19th century. In the United States, cosmetic surgery was 
associated with modifying immigrant features, which were often articu-
lated to nasal types. Debates over enhancement versus reconstruction saw 
plastic surgery marginalized within medicine, until the hand of the state 
made itself known: contemporary reconstructive surgery began as a means 
of treating male World War I veterans, who were motivated by the desire for 
economic autonomy. Following a return to disrepute and a debate over the 
right to self-invention, the cosmetic surgeon reemerged as a miracle worker 
in World War II, only to experience low esteem again with the peace, amid 
Papal condemnations of vanity. With the exception of military casualties, 
from that point to the 1960s, most US surgeons reported treating women 
and a few gay men, but they privately pathologized and ridiculed their 
patients. A binary was drawn between function and aesthetics, leading to 
a series of powerful debates from the 1920s that generally concluded with 
some level of agreement about a right to self-improvement. Certain men 
were undergoing procedures at this time to improve their marketability—a 
study of 50- to 60-year-old salesmen in 1961 disclosed that their incomes 
increased after face-lifts. And the gendered and sexualized nature of the 
cosmetic binary began to shift when the New York Times declared “Cos-
metic Lib for Men” in 1977 (the year after Clinique introduced its first male 
skin-care product). Three years later, Business Week encouraged its readers 
to obtain “a new—and younger—face.” The 1990s and since have seen the 
shop well and truly set up. Clinics in Plastic Surgery dedicated a special 
issue to men in 1991, and latter-day meetings of professional associations 
have been likened by the Annals of Plastic Surgery to “gender-bending,” 
with more and more male clients seeking what is politely euphemized as 
“body contouring.” Metrosexuality is welcomed as good business sense, as 
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men “stream into the salons like lemmings falling over cliffs” to undergo 
a “wallet biopsy.” The industry’s $12 billion in annual revenue attracts 
surgeons who lack formal training in the area. Over the past five years, 
new entrants have departed obstetric wards, dermatological suites, and 
emergency rooms in search of less risky and more lucrative places to cut, 
avoiding costly insurance premiums and anticipating huge paydays in the 
process (Heyes 2007: 18; Crawley 2006: 53–54; Feldman 2004; Burton et al. 
1995; Morain 2003; Kathy Davis 2003: 123; Holliday and Sanchez Taylor 
2006: 186; Collison 2006; Salzman et al. 2005: 92; Singer 2006).
 As noted in the Introduction to this book, Bob Dole parlayed a polit-
ical career representing Kansas into lucrative endorsements for Visa and 
Viagra after a face-lift made him telegenic, while John Kerry is rumored to 
have a Botox habit, and US military recruiters highlight free or cheap elec-
tive plastic surgery for uniformed personnel and their families (with the 
policy alibi that this permits doctors to practice their art). The American 
Academy of Cosmetic Surgery figures indicate that more than six thou-
sand five hundred men had face-lifts in 1996. In 1997, men accounted for 
a quarter of all such procedures, and the following year, straight couples 
were frequently scheduling surgery together (up 15% in a year). Between 
1996 and 1998, male cosmetic surgery increased 34%, mostly because of 
liposuction, and 15% of plastic surgery in 2001 was performed on men 
(Rosen 2004; “Force” 2004; “Marketplace” 1999; Avni 2002). Data from the 
American Academy of Facial Plastic and Reconstructive Surgery (2002) 
disclose a 316% increase in hair transplants from 1999 to 2001. Youthful-
ness is a key motivation for 50% of women and 40% of men, and dating for 
5% of women and 10% of men (Miller 2002).
 The top five male surgical areas (breasts, hair, nose, stomach, and eye-
lids) were not selected two decades ago. In 2002, US men had more than 
800,000 cosmetic procedures. Figures from the American Academy of 
Cosmetic Surgery (2003) and the American Society for Aesthetic Plastic 
Surgery (2002) are striking in the popularity of Botox and collagen proce-
dures, chemical peels, and hair surgery to conceal signs of aging, and lipo-
suction to reduce body weight, with similar rates for men and women (such 
numbers bizarrely tend to exclude circumcision and dental work [Holliday 
and Cairnie 2007: 58]). Over one million procedures were performed on 
men in 2003, and the American Society of Plastic Surgeons (2005b, 2006) 
saw a 44% surge in men seeking treatment in the five years to 2005 to 1.2 
million, including climbs of 156% for “tummy tucks” and 233% for Botox 
injections, alongside dramatic expansion to incorporate Latin@s, African 
Americans, and Asians into the fold. China’s cosmetic surgery numbers 
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are being swelled by the appearance of the “urban pretty man.” Estimates 
from Canada suggest that men composed 20% of clients in 2006, up from 
5% in 2001, while the British Association of Aesthetic Plastic Surgeons 
experienced an 80% increase in male clients in 2005. That year brought a 
study from the American Society of Plastic Surgeons (2005a) that found 
that three-quarters of men favored surgery for themselves or others, and 
the year also saw the launch of the first magazine dedicated to patients, 
New Beauty. Cable television, which the society said had helped the shift to 
men, was offering the graphic drama Nip/Tuck and the reality show Plastic 
Surgery: Before and After, where participants had a chance to release them-
selves from their bodily biographies. When an independent commission of 
inquiry into what went wrong on September 11 reported four years after 
the attacks, evaluating the federal government’s manifold failings before, 
during, and since, the bourgeois media subordinated coverage of these 
findings to trends in cosmetic surgery (Jameson 2006; Salzman et al. 2005: 
95; Collison 2006; “As Another” 2007; “Bankers” 2006; Goldenberg 2005; 
Mitchell 2005; Engelberg 2005).
 The new man is being governed as well as commodified. What the New 
York Times (Tien 1999) calls “the rising tide of male vanity” has real costs 
to conventional maleness. The middle-class US labor market now sees 
wage discrimination by beauty amongst men as well as women, and major 
corporations frequently require executives to tailor their body shapes to 
company ethoi. There is actually an income differential based on ugliness 
versus beauty that is more discriminatory for men than women: men who 
are deemed ugly lose 9% in salary, whereas ugly women lose 6%. Con-
versely, the beauty premium for men is 5% as opposed to 4% for women 
(“To Those That Have” 2007: 54). Fourteen percent of female patients 
versus 30% of male indicate that they wish to undergo cosmetic surgery 
for reasons connected to the workplace, a clear sign that men perceive 
age discrimination on the job. The American Society of Plastic Surgeons 
(2001) advises that male clients seek, inter alia, “a professional edge,” and 
plasticsurgery.org (2007) warns men that “society places a high value on 
looking young and fit” via “a more balanced nose, a rejuvenated face, a 
trimmer waistline,” which are worth it despite the lack of insurance to 
cover costs. Men even favor experimental “abdominal etching,” which 
promises “a muscular, rippled appearance.” Canadian cosmetic surgeons 
note a shift away from the desire for youthfulness as part of vanity: it is now 
more a matter of job protection. “Grooming” was deemed vital to business 
success by 89% of US men in 2003, and a 2004 ExecuNet (http://www.
execunet.com) survey of senior corporate leeches aged between 40 and 50 
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saw 94% complaining of occupational discrimination by age. One-third of 
all graying male US workers in 1999 colored their hair to counter the effect 
of aging on their careers to avoid what is now known as the “silver ceiling.” 
Studies by the hair-dye company Clairol reveal that men with gray hair are 
perceived as less successful, intelligent, and athletic than those without. 
Meanwhile, abetted by a newly deregulated ability to address consumers 
directly through television commercials, Propecia, a drug countering male 
hair loss, secured a 79% increase in visits by patients to doctors in search 
of prescriptions. Hair transplants were said to have grown 61% between 
1993 and 1995. Similar trends are evident in the rise of tanning salons. 
In 1977, there were none; now there are over fifty thousand, with annual 
revenue in excess of $5 billion and men catching up to women amongst 
participants. Men’s alibi is that indoor tanning is akin to muscle building. 
As the delightful authors of US marketing’s major study of metrosexuality 
cheerfully avow in explaining why men must strive like this, “we’re living 
in an era of infinite choice” (Hamermesh and Biddle 1994; Wells 1994; 
Freudenheim 1999; Rosen 2004; Salzman et al. 2005: 36, 60; Weiss 2002; 
Ahmed 2003; Herman 2006; Holliday and Cairnie 2007: 59; Vannini and 
McCright 2004: 310–11, 322–23).
 While the burden of beauty remains firmly on women, a new trend is 
unmistakable: the surveillant gaze of sexual evaluation is being turned to 
men as never before. The gaze is simultaneously internalized, as a set of 
concerns, and externalized, as a set of interventions. South Korean figures 
from 2005 indicated that 86% of men aged 25 to 37 saw career advantages 
from looks, and 56% were dissatisfied with their appearance (Johne 2006). 
In 1997, 43% of US men up to their late 50s disclosed dissatisfaction with 
their appearance, compared to 34% in 1985 and 15% in 1972. Playgirl mag-
azine’s male centerfolds have undergone comprehensive transformations 
over the past quarter-century: the average model has lost 12 pounds of fat 
and gained 25 pounds of muscle. GI Joe dolls of the 1960s had biceps to 
a scale of 11.5 inches, an average dimension. In 1999, their biceps were at 
a scale of 26 inches, beyond that of any recorded bodybuilder. And when 
Barbie’s boytoy Ken was re-released by Mattel in 2006, his musculature had 
increased as part of a makeover. Similar changes have happened to other 
dolls, such as Star Wars figures. These shifts signify a wider cultural shift. 
The psy-function now refers to “muscle dissatisfaction” among male TV 
viewers, while dietary supplements have migrated from the gym to the 
office in search of all-day amino acids. The new century has brought reports 
of a million men diagnosed with body dysmorphic disorder; psychiatrists 
have invented the “Adonis Complex” to account for vast increases in male 
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eating and exercise disorders, with 25% of US eating problems reported 
by men—as disclosed by pharmacorps-funded research. The National 
Comorbidity Survey Replication disclosed that anorexia affected 0.9% of 
women and 0.3% of men, and bulimia 1.5% versus 0.5%, while Euromon-
itor reported that young men were using steroids in unprecedented num-
bers, coded as “Metrodrug.” Not surprisingly, hypermasculinist citadels 
such as the Gold’s Gym franchise were beavering away at their image at just 
this time to reach out and interpellate men hitherto intimidated by muscu-
larity (Agliata and Tantleff-Dunn 2004; “Madeover Ken” 2006; Pope et al. 
2000; Esposito 2006; Gellene 2007; Family & Friends Action Council 2007; 
Euromonitor 2006; Thomaselli 2007).
 Clearly, we should not assume that progressive change is bundled with 
metrosexuality. Reifying all is not a good substitute for reifying some, while 
the $8 billion spent each year on cosmetics could put the children of the 
world through basic education across four generations. Schwarzenegger’s 
shoes may just register an “upgrade” of service-sector capitalism. Signifi-
cantly, the Metrosexual Guide ends with a description of “The Metrosexual 
Mind-Set: The Bottom Line,” which is: “Your life is your own creation.” 
Metrosexuals are neoliberal subjects governing themselves as new aes-
thetes generated from shifting relations of power and finance. They are 
“more responsible for creating their own individuality than ever before,” 
in the words of Britain’s Cosmetic Toiletry and Perfumery Association 
Director-General (Snyder 2006; Sardar and Davies 2002: 82; Flocker 2003: 
xi, xiii–xiv, 169; McRobbie 2002: 100; Flower 2004; McCarthy 2004).
 In related developments, the “pink dollar” has become more and more 
significant. Gay media have long circulated information to businesses 
about the spending power of their putatively childless, middle-class read-
ership. One magazine’s slogan in advertising circles was “Gay Money, Big 
Market; Gay Market, Big Money”; another said that its readers “live as well 
as the Joneses, [but] we live a damn sight better.” Advertising Age published 
occasional reports on gay marketing from the 1970s, and the Advocate pio-
neered market research in 1977 which disclosed that erotic/pornographic 
material needed to be marginalized, and production standards raised, in 
order to coax heteronormative companies to advertise. The exclusion of 
sexual material, and new investment in high style, attracted Seagram’s and 
Simon & Schuster, inter alia, and advertising revenue doubled between 
1990 and 1992. By 2006, the gay media received $276 million in advertising 
revenue, with almost two hundred Fortune 500 companies amongst their 
customers. The mainstream media eventually took notice as well, and 1997 
saw Advertising Age’s front-cover headline emblazoned with “Big Adver-
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tisers Join Move to Embrace Gay Market.” The New York Times made no 
references to queerness in its business pages throughout the 1970s, and 
male-oriented pieces appeared only occasionally in the 1980s. But news 
coverage tripled during 1992–93 and has remained significant, if incon-
sistent. During the 1990s, Hyundai began appointing gay-friendly staff 
to dealerships; IBM targeted gay-run small businesses; Subaru advertise-
ments on buses and billboards had gay-advocacy bumper stickers and 
registration plates coded to appeal to queers; Polygram’s classical-music 
division introduced a gay promotional budget; Miller beer supported Gay 
Games ’94; Bud Light was a national sponsor to the 1999 San Francisco 
Folsom Street Fair, “the world’s largest leather event”; and Dick Cheney’s 
daughter Mary devised domestic-partner benefits for Coors, supposedly 
counteracting its antigay image of the past. Advertising expenditure in 
lesbian publications doubled in the period 1997–2001. On television, 
we have seen Ikea’s famous US TV commercial showing two men fur-
nishing their apartment together, Toyota’s male car-buying couple, two 
men driving around in a Volkswagen searching for home furnishings, 
and a gay-themed Levi Strauss Dockers campaign, while 2003 Super 
Bowl commercials carried hidden gay themes that advertisers refused to 
encode openly. (Known as “gay window advertising” or “encrypted ads,” 
these campaigns are designed to make queers feel special for being “in the 
know” while not offending simpleton straights.) The spring 1997 US net-
work TV season saw twenty-two queer characters across the prime-time 
network schedule, and there were thirty in 2000—clear signs of niche tar-
geting. Although gay activists claim that the network share deteriorated 
to 2% of characters (fifteen people) in 2006–7, cable became a mainstay 
of gay representation (thirty-five in drama in that year), especially on 
reality shows; and daytime soaps were also providential, albeit mostly fea-
turing white men. In 2004, Viacom announced that MTV was developing 
a queer cable network. Investors were animated by $400 billion of con-
sumer power, not cultural politics. Within three years, Logo was in over 
27 million homes. In 2007, the Here! Network was on many cable systems 
and could also be watched via video-on-demand and through Internet 
TV providers. In the on-line domain, 1999 brought the first gay initial 
public offering, while gay and lesbian Web sites drew significant private 
investment. By 2005, the Web sites gay.com and planetout.com had estab-
lished themselves as the biggest queer-affinity portals. On the one hand, 
they provided informational services desired by readers. On the other, 
they provided surveillance services desired by marketers. This combina-
tion attracted over 8 million registered visitors and such major advertisers 
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as United Airlines, Citibank, Procter & Gamble, Chase, Miller Brewing, 
CBS, and Johnson & Johnson. Repeated market surveys sponsored by 
gay-friendly groups showed that queers were not more urban than rural 
and had consumer tastes across the board. Meanwhile, a five-year study 
of 3,000 professionals working for Fortune 500 companies indicated that 
employees of gay managers were one-third more satisfied at work than 
other people (Alsop 1999a; Alsop 1999b; Fejes 2002; Rawlings 1993; 
Elliott 1998; Mecca 2002; Wilke 2003; Lacher 2007; Sender 2005: 126–28, 
111; Ragusa 2005: 658, 655; O’Connor 1997; Bank 1999: B1; Hampp 2007; 
Mackie 2006; Jensen 2006; Urban 2006; Campbell 2005; “Study Reveals” 
2006; Hampp 2007; “Gay/Lesbian Consumer” 2005; Carter and Elliott 
2004; Friedman 2006). As Marx said, while a “commodity appears, at first 
sight, a very trivial thing, and easily understood . . . it is, in reality, a very 
queer thing” (1987: 76).
te lev is ion
EXTREME MAKEOVER aPPliCaTiOn
deadline—Saturday, march 31, 2006
maKinG an eXTreme videO
have fun! if you are not having fun making the video, we are not having fun 
watching it.
make sure whoever is filming you is someone you are comfortable with. do not 
read from cards or over rehearse what you want to say. Just talk to us like a 
friend.
making the video:
– Get creative and grab our attention immediately! introduce yourself and tell 
us a bit about you. We get tons of applications, so try to stand out and think 
outside the box. Why do you deserve the Extreme Makeover? how will it 
change your life? do you have any events coming up in the next few months 
that make this the perfect time?
– Go from head to toe explaining what you would like changed. you do not 
need to know the exact procedure, just tell us what you don’t like about your 
current features.
– Get good close ups, about 30 seconds, of your face, profile and body. also 
include close ups of any areas of concern that may be hard to see like 
teeth, complexion, scars etc. for your teeth, please get a good 10 seconds 
smiling from the front with teeth showing, bite closed. Then another 10 
seconds in the same position from the side.
– Please watch the video after to make sure the lighting is good and we can 
accurately see your problem areas. The light should be shining on your face 
and not behind you where it may cause shadows. also check for the sound 
quality.
 —application to appear on abC’s Extreme Makeover
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They call themselves the fab five. They are: an interior designer, a fashion 
stylist, a chef, a beauty guru and someone we like to call the “concierge of 
cool”—who is responsible for all things hip, including music and pop culture. 
all five are talented, they’re gay and they’re determined to clue in the cluttered, 
clumsy straight men of the world. With help from family and friends, the fab 
five treat each new guy as a head-to-toe project. Soon, the straight man is 
educated on everything from hair products to Prada and feng Shui to foreign 
films. at the end of every fashion-packed, fun-filled life-style makeover, a freshly 
scrubbed, newly enlightened guy emerges.
 —http://www.bravotv.com/Queer_eye/about
The application to appear on Extreme Makeover excerpted above per-
forms dual tasks. At one level, it is what it says it is—a recruitment device. 
As such, it is unreliable and rapidly becoming outmoded. In its second, 
covert, role—surveillance—it is a neatly targeted way of securing data 
about viewers that can be sold to advertisers, achieved under the demotic 
sign of outreach and public participation via plastic surgery for the soldier 
who thinks his career is being held back by ugliness and for the fast-food 
manager who wants to advance his job prospects (Heyes 2007: 25). Which 
is where we meet Extreme Makeover’s cousin in surveillance, commodifi-
cation, and governmentality—Queer Eye for the Straight Guy (QESG). It 
began in the northern summer of 2003 on the Bravo network3 and quickly 
became a crucial metrosexual moment and the station’s highest-ever rated 
hour, with 3.35 million viewers by the third episode. Parodies followed on 
Saturday Night Live and MAD TV, while Comedy Central offered Straight 
Plan for the Gay Man (Nutter 2004; Heller 2006: 3; Westerfelhaus and Lac-
roix 2006: 429). Simpson (2004) dubbed it Metrosexuality: The Reality TV 
Show, and the program avowed that it taught “the finer points of being 
a ‘metrosexual’” (http://www.bravotv.com/Queer_Eye//Episodes/207/). In 
the winter of its first season, survey research proclaimed that more men 
went shopping with male friends the day after watching QESG episodes 
than at any other point in the week (Cohan 2007: 178).
 What are its origins, beyond unfurling commodity interest in the queer 
dollar? QESG is part of the wider reality-television phenomenon, a strange 
hybrid of cost-cutting devices, game shows taken into the community, 
cinéma vérité conceits, scripts written in postproduction, and ethoi of 
Social Darwinism, surveillance, and gossip—bizarre blends of “tabloid 
journalism, documentary television, and popular entertainment.” Make-
over programs such as QESG take economically underprivileged people 
and offer them a style they cannot afford to sustain. QESG speaks to the 
responsibility of each person to master their drives and harness their 
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energies to get better jobs, homes, looks, and families. It is significant that 
US reality TV has offered queer characters on over a dozen shows and 
that the entire genre is suffused with deregulatory nostra of individual 
responsibility, avarice, possessive individualism, hypercompetitiveness, 
and commodification, played out in the domestic sphere rather than the 
public world (Ouellette and Murray 2004: 8–9; Hill 2005: 15; Banet-Weiser 
and Portwood-Spacer 2006; Heller 2006; Bennett 2006: 408; Deery 2006: 
161; Fraiman 2006). Bravo paired QESG with Boy Meets Boy, another gay 
reality show, on Tuesday evenings, thereby branding itself as an alterna-
tive to its corporate parent (Cohan 2007: 177). This allowed the network a 
certain chic quality “as the unofficial gay network” (DeJesus 2008: 46).
 The genre derives from transformations in the political economy of 
TV, specifically deregulation. When veteran newsman Edward R. Murrow 
addressed the Radio-Television News Directors Association in 1958 
(recreated in George Clooney’s 2005 docudrama Goodnight, and Good 
Luck), he used the metaphor that television must “illuminate” and 
“inspire,” or it would be “merely wires and light in a box.” In a speech to 
the National Association of Broadcasters three years later, John F. Kenne-
dy’s Chair of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), Newton 
Minow, called US TV a “vast wasteland” (Murrow 1958; Minow 1971). 
Murrow and Minow were urging broadcasters to show enlightened Cold 
War leadership, to prove that the United States was not the mindless con-
sumer world that the Soviets claimed. The networks should live up to 
their legislative responsibilities and act in the public interest by informing 
and entertaining, going beyond what Minow later called “white suburbia’s 
Dick-and-Jane world” (Minow 2001). The networks responded by dou-
bling the time devoted to news each evening, and TV quickly became the 
dominant source of current affairs (Schudson and Tiofft 2005: 32). But 
twenty years later, Reagan’s FCC head, Mark Fowler, celebrated reduction 
of the “box” to “transistors and tubes.” He argued in an interview with 
Reason magazine that “television is just another appliance—it’s a toaster 
with pictures” and hence in no need of regulation apart from ensuring its 
safety as an electrical appliance.4
 Minow’s and Fowler’s expressions gave their vocalists instant and 
undimmed celebrity (Murrow already had such celebrity as the most-her-
alded audiovisual journalist in US history). Minow, named “top news-
maker” of 1961 in an Associated Press survey, was on TV and radio more 
than any other Kennedy official. The phrase “vast wasteland” has even—
irony of ironies—provided raw material for the wasteland’s parthenogen-
esis, as the answer to questions posed on numerous game shows, from 
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Jeopardy! to Who Wants to Be a Millionaire? The “toaster with pictures” is 
less celebrated but has been efficacious as a slogan for deregulation across 
successive administrations, and it remains in Reason’s pantheon of liber-
tarian quotations, alongside Reagan and others of his ilk. Where Minow 
stands for public culture’s restraining (and ultimately conserving) function 
for capitalism, Fowler represents capitalism’s brooding arrogance, its neo-
liberal lust to redefine use value via exchange value. Minow decries Fowl-
er’s vision, arguing that television “is not an ordinary business” because it 
has “public responsibilities” (Minow and Cate 2003: 408, 415). But Fowler’s 
phrase has won the day, at least to this point. Minow’s lives on as a recalci-
trant moral irritant, not a policy slogan.
 Fowler has had many fellow-travelers. Both the free-cable, free-video 
social movements of the 1960s and ’70s, and the neoclassical, deregulatory 
intellectual movements of the 1970s and ’80s, imagined a people’s tech-
nology emerging from the wasteland of broadcast television, as portapak 
equipment, localism, and unrestrained markets provided alternatives to 
the numbing nationwide commercialism of the networks. The social-
movement vision imagined a change occurring overnight; the technocratic 
vision imagined it in the “long run.” One began with folksy culturalism, 
the other with technophilic futurism. Each claimed it in the name of diver-
sity, and they even merged in the depoliticized “Californian ideology” of 
community media, much of which quickly embraced market forms. Nei-
ther formation engaged economic reality. But together they established 
the preconditions for unsettling a cozy, patriarchal, and quite competent 
television system that had combined, as TV should, what was good for 
you and what made you feel good, all on the one set of stations—that is, a 
comprehensive service. Such a service was promised by the enabling legis-
lation that birthed and still governs the FCC, supposedly guaranteeing citi-
zens that broadcasters serve “the public interest, convenience and neces-
sity,” a tradition that began when CBS set up a radio network in the 1920s 
founded on news rather than its rival NBC’s predilection for entertainment 
(Mullen 2002; Barbrook and Cameron 1996; Scardino 2005).
 In place of the universalism of the old networks, where sports, weather, 
news, life style, and drama programming had a comfortable and appro-
priate frottage, highly centralized but profoundly targeted consumer net-
works emerged in the 1990s that fetishized life style and consumption 
tout court over a blend of purchase and politics, of fun and foreign policy. 
Reality television, fixed upon by cultural critics who either mourn it as 
representative of a decline in journalistic standards or celebrate it as the 
sign of a newly feminized public sphere, should frankly be understood 
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as a cost-cutting measure and an instance of niche marketing. The make-
over varietal has a special focus on dramatic aesthetic transformations 
(Heyes 2007). The Kaiser Foundation’s 2006 study of US reality TV (Chris-
tenson and Ivancin 2006) drew on encounters with television producers 
and health-care critics and professionals to get at the dynamics of how 
medicine and related topics are represented in the genre. It found that US 
reality TV, for all its populist alibis, constructs professional medical exper-
tise as a kind of magic that is beyond the ken of ordinary people—and 
certainly beyond their engaged critique. Again and again, whether it’s 
plastic surgeons or pediatricians, miraculous feats are achieved by heroic 
professionals who deliver ignorant and ugly people from the dross of the 
everyday, transcending what off-screen primary-care physicians have been 
able to do for them. For all the world reincarnated Ben Caseys, time after 
time these daring young doctors provide astonishing breakthroughs. The 
foundation’s study could find nothing in US reality TV even remotely crit-
ical of this model of what “they can do.” The representation of expertise 
deemed it ungovernable other than by its own caste. Such a landscape is 
not about powerful citizen-viewers; it’s about deities in scrubs. The use 
of the commodity form to promise transcendence through the national 
health-care system, as embodied in patriarchal medicine, is sickening. And 
as with makeovers of houses and personal style, it offers a transcendence 
of the grubby working and lower-middle classes that viewers cannot afford 
to emulate. Helpless and ugly, patient bodies testify to the surgeons’ skill 
(Heyes 2007: 19) as per fashion consultants confronting a lack of savoir-
faire. Enter Queer Eye.
 With excellent ratings, a soundtrack album that topped electronic-
music sales charts, and revenue from many parts of the world via both 
export and format sales, QESG won an award from the Gay & Lesbian Alli-
ance Against Defamation (GLAAD) and an Emmy for Outstanding Reality 
Program in 2004, and was variously heralded as a mainstream break-
through text for queers, an exemplification of male vulnerability, the virtue 
of popular culture in an era of conservatism, and the epitome of Yanqui 
imperialism—the encapsulation of the “ambivalent text” in its allegedly 
carnivalesque instantiation of “commodity and difference” (Rogers 2003; 
Hart 2004; Fraiman 2006; Di Mattia 2007; Allatson 2006; Pullen 2007: 194, 
207, 210). Metrosource places QESG in the pantheon of greatest moments 
of gay television: “it catapulted gay culture into the mainstream” (DeJesus 
2008: 46). The American Film Institute nominated Queer Eye as its major 
cultural development for 2003, alongside copyright (Cohan 2007: 178). 
Some inevitably criticized it for stereotyping, including out Congressman 
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Barney Frank, while from the other side of politics, the Family Television 
Council thundered that it appealed to an “element in our culture already 
earning an advanced degree in Sin Acceptance.” Media Research Center 
maven L. Brent Bozell III (as improbable as his name) called it “The Gay 
Supremacy Hour” and said, “I want to vomit.” NBC, Bravo’s network parent, 
first screened the show in 2003, drawing 6.7 million watchers despite some 
affiliates declining to screen the show until the middle of the night because 
of its queerness, leading to a write-in campaign orchestrated by GLAAD. 
Meanwhile, adherents of straightacting.com opposed the show because it 
didn’t suit their preference for sport-loving, macho gay men, while neocon-
servatives were sly in their mix of endorsement and critique. Boston Red 
Sox baseballers who participated insisted they did so only to aid charity, 
even as they subjected themselves to floral footbaths, waxing, and other 
procedures. Taboos were under erasure, as per unwanted hair (Berila and 
Choudhuri 2005; Council quoted in Sender 2006: 132; Dossi 2005; Bozell 
2003; “Tell” 2003; Rocchio and Rogers 2007; Clarkson 2005; Skinner 2003; 
Cometta 2005; Westerfelhaus and Lacroix 2006: 427; Allen 2006).
 QESG embodied the ethos of reality TV: originating on cable, an under-
unionized sector of the industry, with small numbers of workers required 
for short periods, and production funds derived in part from the producer’s 
credit-card award points (later turned into a marketing point by the card 
company). These flexible arrangements quickly led to a lawsuit on behalf 
of a queer star who was dispensed with after two episodes, while those left 
recognized that “we could be fired at any moment” (“David Collins” 2004; 
participants quoted in Giltz 2003). There was a furor when the Web site 
thesmokinggun.com disclosed that the Fab Five were receiving just $3,000 
each per episode, with tiny raises and none of the typical perks of celeb-
rity—they got mere fractions of the tens of thousands of dollars available to 
minor but unionized characters in broadcast drama. This contingent, flex-
ible labor is textualized in the service-industry world of the genre, which 
creates “a parallel universe” for viewers (Lewis et al. 2005: 17).
 QESG looked for its loser-male makeover targets in the suburban reaches 
of the tri-state area (New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut), men who 
needed to be transformed from ordinary guys into hipsters. Cosmopol-
itan queers descended on these hapless bridge-and-tunnel people, charged 
with increasing their marketability as husbands, fathers, and (more silently 
and saliently) employees. The program seemed to compromise its claims of 
“ideological edginess” in favor of turning “straight men into straight men 
with better shoes.” Change was predicated on affluence (Allen 2006). The 
program’s success can be understood in four ways. First, it represents the 
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culmination of a surge of US television that offers a sanitary, light-skinned, 
middle-class queer urban world of fun, where gays and lesbians are to be 
laughed with, not at. Their difference is a new commodity of pleasure—
safely different from, but compatible with, heteronormativity. Second, it is 
a sign that queerness is, indeed, a life style of practices that can be adopted, 
discarded, and redisposed promiscuously—in this case, disarticulated from 
its referent into metrosexuality. Third, it signifies the professionalization of 
queerness as a form of management consultancy for conventional mascu-
linity, brought in to improve efficiency and effectiveness, like time-and-
motion expertise, total quality management, or just-in-time techniques. 
And, finally, it indicates the spread of self-fashioning as a requirement of 
personal and professional achievement through the US middle-class labor 
force. Even the queer-language games of the show became systems of trans-
lation across cultures, while their camp ways showed the power of main-
stream containment and a bias toward urban living that offended the self-
regard of those who repeatedly laid noisy claim to being “the Heartland” 
(Weiss 2005; Lacroix and Westerfelhaus 2005; Rasmussen 2006: 812).
 In Alexander Kluge’s words, capitalism seeks “to designate the spec-
tators themselves as entrepreneurs. The spectator must sit in the movie 
house or in front of the TV set like a commodity owner: like a miser 
grasping every detail and collecting surplus on everything” (1981–82: 210–
11). And commodities were central to the secular transcendence of QESG. 
Viewers were gently led toward a makeover that would meld suburban het-
eronormativity with urban hipness. A virtual gay parachute corps solved 
a dilemma for capital: namely, that “white, heterosexual men have been 
hard to train as consumers” (Sender 2006: 133). QESG undertook “a full-
scale humanitarian relief mission: Queers Without Borders” that reached 
“a virgin makeover-market niche in basic cable” (Chocano 2003). They 
did so in accord with US self-help literature for men, which focuses on 
augmenting capital, rather than the women’s version, which seeks emo-
tional resolutions to private-public dilemmas (McGee 2005). The QESG 
Web site offered the following: “FIND IT, GET IT, LOVE IT, USE IT. You’ve 
seen us work wonders for straight guys in need of some serious help. Get 
the same results at home with the same great products, services and sup-
pliers that put the fairy dust in our Fab Five magic wands at ‘QUEER EYE’S 
DESIGN FOR LIFE PRODUCT GUIDE’ via www.bravotv.com/Queer_Eye_
for_the_Straight_Guy/Shopping_Guide/.” Sales were immense (Redden 
2007: 150). No wonder Terry Sawyer worries that this implies the status of 
minstrelsy for queers, via their incarnation as “materialistic vamps” (2003). 
“Q[ueer]E[ye] isn’t really about mutual understanding between homos and 
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heteros. It’s about mutual understanding between Bravo/NBC and Diesel 
. . . and Roberto Cavallia and Ralph Lauren and Via Spiga and Persol and 
Baskit Underwear,” said New York magazine, while the Village Voice thun-
dered that the “agenda is about tempting guys who have managed to get 
by without facials and instant tans to become consumers of same,” dis-
tilling yet concealing “the essence of the infomercial: It meets a need you 
didn’t know you had” (Dumenco 2003; Goldstein 2003). In that sense, a 
reactionary like Bozell is correct to call the program “almost a parody of 
product placement, a veritable plug-a-minute infomercial.” The problem is 
that he also derides it for being “drenched in references to raw, perverted 
homosexual sex” (2003) (anxieties about commercialism encourage the 
oddest frottage).
 The wholesale commodification of male subjectivity witnessed in 
QESG is actually about reasserting and resolidifying very conventional 
masculinity. The latter has long relied on women’s work and queer work, 
or gay work at least, for its style: women and gay men have always con-
tributed to straight men’s looks and professionalism. The question is, has 
their contribution ever led to a feminization of the public sphere or to 
recognition of the legitimacy and centrality of queerness? QESG was the 
ultimate in the commodification and governmentalization of queerness 
as a set of techniques that could be applied and then cast aside. When 
that is done in the service of retaining conventional straight masculinity, 
one has to ask how progressive it actually is. And, of course, the program 
did not last forever, with a huge 2004 ratings slump prior to the inevitable 
detour of a failing program by focusing on weight issues as well as per-
sonal style in an attempt to reinvigorate itself in the fall of 2006, before 
being cashiered the following year, with Bravo asserting it had “really 
helped open the closet doors on gays and their presence on television and 
in popular culture” and claiming credit for featuring queer leads (“Bravo’s 
‘Queer Eye’” 2006; Dossi 2005; Bravo quoted in Rocchio and Rogers 2007; 
Pullen 2007: 207).
Conclus ion
There is a . . . long history of gays and lesbians serving as priestesses, holy 
fools, minstrels, and other religious-cultural functionaries in pagan, medieval 
Christian, african, native american, and asian cultures. now their role has been 
translated: for the worshippers in the church of capitalism, they’re the priests 
of good taste.
 —dan friedman (2006)
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[The	metrosexual]	was	really	more	a	creation	of	Madison	Avenue	than	a	real	demo-
graphic.
 —Mediaweek (Tony Case 2006)
In addition to this intrication with commodity fetishism, the trends I 
have outlined also produced a backlash. Attempts by queer marketers to 
emphasize the affluence of upper-class, white, male consumers distort 
average queer wealth and lead to arguments by the American Family Asso-
ciation and Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia that there is no need for 
public subvention of AIDS research and prevention or antidiscrimination 
protections for queers, despite evidence from the Census and the Gen-
eral Social Survey that same-sex, unmarried people have less income than 
their straight counterparts (Lenskyj 2005: 287; Ragusa 2005: 656; Guidotto 
2006; Fejes 2002: 203–4).
 And has there really been a grand change in the prevailing forms of 
masculinity? Richard Goldstein (2003a) suggests that various testosterone 
tendencies in popular culture, such as masculinist hip-hop and talk radio, 
were preconditions for the rapturous turn to the right since September 
11, when hostile reactions to women have, in Molly Faulkner-Bond’s 
words, “the cultural upper hand” (2006). American Enterprise magazine 
headlined its post–September 11 cover “Real Men, They’re Back,” and it 
has been argued that hypermasculinity became not just patriotic but “a 
G[rand]O[ld]P[arty] virtue.” The Boston Globe hails a “menaissance” of 
“everyday men who wear work boots, change their own oil, get their hair 
cut at barbershops, and wouldn’t have the faintest idea where to get a pedi-
cure or mud mask” (Diaz 2006). When Harold Ford Jr.’s much-trumpeted 
2006 campaign for a Senate seat in Tennessee failed, his loss was partly 
attributed to the winner’s critique of him as “an attractive young man,” 
while the New York Observer worried that “Obama has more feminine 
allure than Hillary” (quoted in “Fit to Serve” 2007; Doonan 2007). JWT 
(previously J. Walter Thompson) announced the 2005 invention of the 
“ubersexual,” who smoked cigars and was tough at the same time as he 
was sophisticated. This was marked by some, such as Rush Limbaugh, as 
the defeat of feminism and the triumph of traditional masculinity. ABC 
News decreed the end of metrosexuality and the need for marketers to 
reassure men about their masculinity (“Metrosexual Is Out” 2006). So it 
comes as no surprise that the bourgeois media and the right fixated on 
John Edwards’s haircut during the 2008 election campaign. They did so 
to illustrate “the effete mannerisms of those who claim to speak for the 
common man and woman” (Younge 2007). 
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 Doubts were expressed about the “gender-wide” appeal of metrosex-
uality. Campaign, a British magazine covering advertising, accused the 
industry of focusing on “castrated dweebs.” And new forms of dividing up 
male consumers adopted four categories: “patriarchs” (supposedly 37% of 
men), “power seekers” (23%), “metrosexuals” (24%), and “retrosexuals” 
(16%) (Jargon 2006). Much was made of Miller Brewing’s 2006 “Men of 
the Square Table” advertising campaign. It featured “actor” Burt Reynolds, 
“wrestler” Triple H, and “footballer” Jerome Bettis forming a masculinist 
counterpublic sphere and an associated “Manlawpedia.” Right-wing cul-
tural critics gloried in this riposte to metrosexuality (Mullman 2007). Then 
there was the 2006 appearance of “fratire . . . a spate of testosterone-fuelled 
books about belligerence and debauchery, leglessness and legovers, which 
publishers hope will spawn the male equivalent of chick-lit” (Turner 2006) 
with such titles as I Hope They Serve Beer in Hell (a New York Times–certi-
fied bestseller), The Alphabet of Manliness, and Real Men Don’t Apologise. 
Young men rarely buy books in the United States or Britain, so this devel-
opment promised the prize of new markets (Harkin 2006). The Scotsman, 
which had earlier ranted at the narcissism of the metrosexual because he 
“likes what he sees reflected in the smoked glass of whatever fashionable 
bar he is in,” decreed 2007 “The Year of the Retrosexual,” a direct reac-
tion to QESG’s presumption that straight men were flawed, and the Los 
Angeles Times brayed that “Deadwood chic” was kicking “the metrosexual 
look out the saloon doors.” The very marketers who had promoted metro-
sexuality in 2003 predicted its demise (Trew 2002; Scotsman 2006; Keeps 
2007; Turner 2007). Terence Blacker, a columnist for the Independent on 
Sunday, derided metrosexuality not only as a marketing ploy but also as 
an ideological alibi for “vanity, self-obsession, stupidity, and a pointless, 
masturbatory, inward-looking obsession with sex” (2004).
 The London Times’s Andrew Billen (2006) confronted an unexpected 
dilemma:
What is the precise ratio between machismo and moisturiser that will get 
me laid?
Tomorrow, I unwisely wrote in these pages two and a bit years ago, belongs 
to us. The us I referenced were metrosexuals, sophisticated males who took 
trouble with their appearance, listened to women and suavely followed them 
to the table in the restaurant. We knew as much about arts, literature and 
cuisine as football and beer. We were, you know, just gay enough.
 As for tomorrow, that, I suppose, must be now. But last week I feared I 
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was wrong. Alarming publishing news from America made me wonder if 
metrosexuals had lost control of masculinity even before they had properly 
taken ownership. Condé Nast announced that it was closing Cargo, a male 
shopping magazine that, in the two years since its launch, had become the 
metrosexual source book. Its death followed those of Sync, which spoke to 
metrosexual man’s inner gadget-nerd, and Vitals, which sought to bring “the 
concierge” experience to readers’ lives.
His counterpart over at the Observer Magazine, Barbara Ellen (2007), 
argued:
Just as men have evolved—to suit women, it seems—females have also 
evolved, to suit women, too. And this new breed of women are not going to 
take kindly to Metrosexual Man . . . gently insisting that they put down their 
whiskey tumbler, stop vomiting on the coffee table and get a good night’s 
sleep. It may even come to pass that men begin daydreaming wistfully of 
a new breed of woman, who is sexy but house-trained, sensitive, and not 
forever ogling man-bits and so on.
In 2007, Rolling Stone magazine, primarily aimed at a youthful male audi-
ence, ran advertisements for Canadian Club that picture “YOUR DAD” as he 
was when young—going fishing, wearing Bee-Gees clothing, and sporting 
a perm—under the banner “YOUR DAD WAS NOT A METROSEXUAL.” For 
Simpson, though, these trends confirmed the onward march of metrosex:
The “menaisance” is mendacious. This isn’t retrosexual at all, but hummer-
sexual—a noisy, overblown, studied and frankly rather camp form of fake 
masculinity that likes to draw attention to itself and its allegedly old-fash-
ioned “manliness,” but tends—like driving an outsized military vehicle in 
the suburbs—to be a tad counterproductive . . . fetishized, “strapped-on,” 
unsustainable, gas-guzzling masculinity. (2006c)
 And the Miller Lite commercial? Sales plummeted by contrast to those of 
its rivals, and the campaign was ditched. After all, even NASCAR marketers 
were now promoting their “sport” metrosexually. Noted driver Jeff Gordon 
told KTLA Morning News that “you need to smell good” in an environment 
of “burning rubber and gasoline.” He endorsed wine, watches, and body 
spray, and colleague Brian Vickers outed himself as metrosexual. Mean-
while, Mark Gauvreau Judge identified as “a conservative Metrosexual.” 
Euromonitor continued to welcome the phenomenon, announcing that 
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“the male shopping giant awakes.” Foreign Policy magazine nominated the 
European Union “the world’s first metrosexual superpower” because it 
“struts past the bumbling United States on the catwalk of global diplomacy.” 
And epidemiologists proposed that men with “higher ‘femininity’ scores” 
lived longer and healthier lives (Harkin 2006; Ellison 2006; Donahue 2005; 
Kovacs 2005; Williams 2005; Jennine Lee 2005; Gladden 2005; Judge 2006; 
Khanna 2004; Euromonitor 2006; Globescan 2005; Hunt et al. 2007). Some 
of the hype surrounding metrosexuality may be overdrawn, but the num-
bers signal that the objectification and subjectification of men are on the 
move. Thanks to commodification and governmentalization, the male sub-
ject has been brought out into the bright light of narcissism and purchase 
in an epochal reordering of desire: “The Metrosexual isn’t dead, he’s just 
dead common” (Simpson 2006a).
 Of course, national identity comes into play with masculinity in the 
United States. The period since 2001 in particular has staged this drama 
via regressive attitudes toward war, toward militarism, toward seeking an 
“other” who can be blamed for a whole mixture of things involving national 
security and the state of the economy. We are frequently told that, however 
unsubtle, there is a justifiable and beneficially unswerving nature to con-
servative and neoconservative masculinity that has given a certainty and 
purpose to the country that Clintonian metrosexuality did not, because it 
was more open, looser, less disciplined. At the same time, it is argued that 
the world economy would collapse if there were not a continued obsession 
with consumerism on the part of the citizens and residents of this country, 
so there’s no doubt that the pro- and antimetrosexual forces within mar-
keting and the bourgeois media confront contradictory complexities. 
Often the most important of these occurs not at the level of geopolitical 
rhetoric—“we’ve got to show that we’re macho men”—but at the occupa-
tional level of advertising rhetoric: “we’ve got to invent a new neediness, a 
new nerdiness, a new style.” Marketing cannot rest. It never just sits down 
and says, “Let’s look at how old these people are, where they live, what 
their religion is and their race and gender.” It can never be satisfied with 
empirical research. It has to invent (or uncover) new forms of subjectivity 
on a regular basis—faster than it would be possible for men to change. It 
has to make itself over.
 Like most commodification and governmentalization, metrosexuality 
has numerous unintended consequences, coalescing with the new neolib-
eral world of TV to produce the phenomenon of QESG. In the words of 
the New York Times, QESG was a “postmodern television fairy tale” (Finn 
2003). Entertainment Weekly dubbed it “a full-scale humanitarian relief 
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mission: Queers Without Borders” (Chocano 2003). But its mission began 
with “that most suburban (and supremely straight) of vehicles, the family-
sized SUV” (Lewis 2008: 67). And that grotesque mobile monument to 
marketing, a hideous scar of consumption, is as environmentally violent 
as any equivalent vehicle of capitalism. The show and its kind may not be 
training the populace at large to legitimize queerness (Friedman 2006). 
But nor are they responsible for the shambolic nature of US TV. For that 
we must examine three decades of ill-advised deregulation and the subse-
quent turn away from the idea of the media as a public trust and toward 
Wall Street share valuations as the one true measure of their success. At the 
same time, a country of ghost-fearing, god-bothering Yanquis and alien 
visitors has embraced a new form of superstition: neoliberal queerness, 
with a hypercommercial, tolerant worldview.
 And the metrosexual’s sculpted features, chiseled waistlines, well-
appointed curves, dreamy eyes, administered hair, and casual threat that 
do not need traditional machismo to electrify? Like beauty and fitness of 
all kinds, the years will attenuate them. Age will weary them. But marketers 
will identify new names, new bodies, new Eros, new Euros. The makeover 
nation is always up for finding ways to remake itself anew.
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the	 eMinent  biologist Steven Rose suggests that “psychocivilised 
society” is a paradoxical blend of individuation and control, with consum-
erism pitted against sociality, and their relationship brokered by govern-
ment (2006: 266). What would it mean to stand for sociality, to seek salva-
tion in the secular world, the here and now—without divine intervention, 
the psy-function, or corporate commodities? Could we experience the 
self as working art, to be enjoyed through unpaid labor in a way that is 
not about deferred pleasure, is not tied to income, does not embroil us 
in commodity relations disguised as medicine, and does not catch young 
people in a net of adult obsessions? This would return us to Kant’s call 
for self-knowledge as an autotelic drive rather than an instrument, as an 
end it itself rather than a means toward some endlessly deferred or recur-
ring achievement (Manninen 2006). Such self-knowledge could produce 
a wisdom that transcended self-control through pharmacology, wage 
hikes through surgery, or job security through gel. It would be what Kant 
Where race, creed, and class divide us, health offers the possibility of a com-
mon language.
 —david healy (1997: 1)
[The] language of therapy . . . [is where] frauds, liars and cheats are always try-
ing to escape. Thus President Clinton’s spokesman claimed after his admission 
of his affair with monica lewinsky that he was “seeking closure.” like so many 
mendacious politicians, Clinton felt—as lord blair of Kut al-amara will no doubt 
feel about his bloodbath in iraq once he leaves no 10—the need to “move on.”
 in the same way, our psycho-babble masters and mistresses—yes, there is a 
semantic problem there, too, isn’t there?—announce after wars that it is a time 
for “healing.”
 —robert fisk (2007)
C o N C l u s i o N
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envisaged as “man’s emergence from his self-incurred immaturity,” inde-
pendent of religious, governmental, or commercial direction (1991: 54). 
It would elude what the British Medical Journal derides as “an unwinnable 
battle against death, pain, and sickness” waged at the price of adequate 
education, culture, food, and travel, in a world where the more you pay for 
health, the sicker you feel, and the “social construction of illness is being 
replaced by the corporate construction of disease” (Moynihan and Smith 
2002: 859; Moynihan et al. 2002: 886).
 We inhabit a world where flexibility is the mega-sign, and precarious-
ness its flipside; where one person’s calculated risk is another’s burden 
of labor; where inequality is represented as a moral outcome. But not 
everyone succumbs to the faux rhetoric of empowerment that comes with 
the corporate or governmental makeover required of today’s risky eco-
nomic settings. Consider the developing discourse of casualized workers, 
of flexible labor renaming itself as the Precariat/précaires/precari@s/pre-
cari and going under the signs of “San Precario” and “Our Lady of the Pre-
cariat,” who guard the spirit of the “flashing lights of life.” The movement 
embodies a new style, a new identity, formed from young, female, foreign 
workers within the culture industries, services, and the knowledge sector, 
struggling for security against the impact of neoliberalism (Foti 2005). 
Since 2001, the Euromayday Network has organized Precariat parades in 
twenty European cities by “contortionists of flexibility . . . high-wire art-
ists of mobility . . . jugglers of credit,” along with apparitions by San Pre-
cario to protect his children against evil bosses (“Sign the Call!” 2006). In 
2004, a group protested a new supermarket in Milan. In 2005, San Precario 
appeared in the form of a worker uniformed and supplicant on his knees, 
with a neon sign on his head. Participants note the instability of life today 
and hail a new class of sex workers, domestic servants, and creators at their 
Web site, http://maydaysur.org/. Their manifesto reads:
Somos precarios y precarias, atípicos, temporales, móviles, flexibles
Somos la gente que está en la cuerda floja, en equilibrio inestable
Somos la gente deslocalizada y reconvertida. (quoted by Raunig 2004)
[We are the precariat, atypical, temporary, mobile, flexible
We are the people on the high wire, in unstable equilibrium
We are the people displaced and made over.]1
The Precariat suggests a complex connection between “eslóganes de los 
movimientos sociales, reapropiados por el neoliberalismo” (social-move-
ment slogans reappropriated for neoliberalism). It recognizes that concepts 
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like diversity, culture, and sustainability create spectacles, manage workers, 
and enable gentrification (Raunig 2004). Similarly, Espai en blanc “afirma 
que vivimos en la sociedad del conocimiento y en cambio no existen ideas” 
(affirms that we live in a society of knowledge and change where ideas 
don’t exist) (http://sindominio.net/spip/espaienblanc/). Adbusters and 
culture jamming work in cognate ways (http://www.adbusters.org/home/.
 When the Precariat and culture jammers declare a new “phenomenology 
of labor,” born of a “world horizon of production” (Hardt and Negri 2000: 
364), they are reoccupying and resignifying the space of corporate-driven 
divisions of labor. When bodies like the British Medical Association and the 
Mental Health Foundation look at the impact of privatizing public services 
and increased testing and other forms of surveillance on the young in the 
UK, and note subsequent increases in mental illness (especially ADHD), 
the psy-function is transcending its prescriptive fetishes and turning to an 
appropriate form of social etiology (James 2006). Britain’s Centre for Eco-
nomic Performance Mental Health Policy Group may use instrumentalism 
as its alibi, but the claim that cognitive-behavioral therapy can be more effi-
cient than pharmacological intervention challenges decades of hegemony, 
setting the scene to broaden the psy-function beyond bottles and taboos 
(2006). And when the International Labor Organization’s World Commis-
sion on the Social Dimension of Globalization favors “una globalización 
justa, integradora, gobernada democráticamente y que ofrezca oportuni-
dades y beneficios tangibles a todo los países y a todas las personas” (a 
globalization that is just, integrated, democratically governed, and offering 
opportunities and tangible benefits to all nations and peoples), recognizing 
the necessity of “un enfoque centrado en las personas” (a focus centered on 
people) and trusting that “la revolución de las comunicaciones globales 
acentúa la conciencia de . . . disparidades” (2004: ix, xi) (the revolution in 
global communications augments consciousness of . . . inequality)—once 
more, this intervention occurs in the space of risk society, but challenges it, 
rejecting the fog of moral panics.
 The distinguished Guardian columnist Gary Younge argues that the 
“notions of personal reinvention and economic meritocracy that lie at the 
heart of the American dream are far more powerful and endearing than 
the kind of class consciousness necessary to redress the imbalance between 
rich and poor” (2007). The data presented in the Introduction found the 
US population gambling on gods, gamboling with ghosts, accosting aliens, 
attracting angels, soliciting souls—and doing so under the seemingly wel-
come spell of a militaristic and neoliberal clerisy. But that is not the full 
picture. Beck notes that international issues tend to fuel nationalism: war, 
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work, and immigration (2007). New forms and levels of inequality have 
arisen, in proportion to exposure to financial globalization and the inter-
national division of labor. Many people reject the nation’s re-enchantment 
of its world: across the 1990s, the secular proportion of the US population 
doubled, to 14%, while the horrors meted out to people by Protestantism 
were whittling away at its numbers: it ceased to be the country’s majority 
religious sect for the first time in 2005 (Portes and Rumbaut 2006: 308, 
310). There continues to be public mistrust of corporate power. Seventy-
seven percent of the US population believes that large companies wield too 
much power, 81% of the middle class realize that corporations operate in 
the interests of shareholders rather than employees, and 89% think busi-
nesses have a collective responsibility for workers and society. A 2006 poll 
disclosed that 80% consider executives overpaid. The National Election 
Study and the General Social Survey indicate that opinions on racial and 
sexual difference, schooling, and public prayer show significant harmoni-
zation over time, in a liberal direction (the main exception is abortion). 
Half the population recognizes the idiocy of involving Christian conserva-
tives in policymaking, while ratings for televangelism are tiny and focused 
in a few Southern states. The preposterous reallocation of money by phar-
macorps away from research and toward marketing has generated a back-
lash amongst both the medical profession and the public. And then there is 
environmental politics. The population tends to favor positions espoused 
by environmental groups over the policies of the Bush Minor administra-
tion, and prefers conservation to production as a focus of energy policy 
by 60% to 29%. A large majority supports policies consistent with the 
Kyoto Protocol international global-warming treaty on greenhouse-gas 
emissions, which Minor withdrew from. A majority opposes opening the 
Arctic National Wildlife Refuge in Alaska to oil exploration and rejects 
expanded use of nuclear energy. Three-quarters say that the government 
“should do whatever it takes” to conserve the environment. Over 80% of 
Yanquis favor reduction of greenhouse-gas emissions, and there is massive 
support for tax incentives to encourage corporate cleanliness, along with 
powerful endorsement amongst the youngest school pupils for protecting 
rainforests (Pew Research Center 2005: 17; DiMaggio 2003; Pew Forum on 
Religion & Public Life 2006; Wallechinsky 2006; Haste 2004: 420; Swatos 
2007: 4964–65; Westcott 2005; “Billion” 2006: 69; Saad 2003; Pew Center 
for Global Climate Change 2002; Revkin 2003; Pew Forum on Religion & 
Public Life 2004b; “In the Money” 2007). We have seen that young people 
are far more cosmopolitan and more internationalist in their perspective 
than their elders. They recognize the need to transcend the barren anger 
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of nationalism. Over two-thirds of nonsupervisory workers realize that 
their interests would be served by a more collaborative spirit, by working 
together in unions—and this is true of more than three-quarters of people 
aged under 30 (Lake Research Partners 2006). One in four people between 
18 and 29 has no religious affiliation, compared with 16% of the total pop-
ulation (Pew Research Center 2006).
 These are signs of hope, resources from within and outside the world of 
the makeover and the intellectual protectionism of US public life. They are 
signs that self-fashioning can go alongside progressive positions and even 
“raise questions about the legitimacy of both traditional social divisions 
and contemporary market values,” as “‘post-traditional’ identity” becomes 
generalized (Sarah Berry 2000: 189). Our agenda as leftists can be set and 
refined in concert with such opposition to worker flexibility and psy-func-
tion script-scribbling. A focus on sites of refusal, where the objects of moral 
panic turn against the prelates of risk society, must inform debates about 
the great Yanqui makeover, recognizing the ill effects of a situation where 
“risk appears to have become a condition in itself rather than a possible 
preliminary to one” (McHoul and Rapley 2005a: 443).
 This book began with the words of James Truslow Adams and his con-
viction that the “American Dream” characterized its history. Adams was 
writing during the Depression. He disparaged a focus on national income 
that did not consider its distribution in the face of “very marked injus-
tice.” Echoing the Edwardian Fabian Graham Wallas—and anticipating the 
Democratic President Lyndon Johnson—he called for the “Dream” to be 
made real through a “Great Society” that would elevate the population “not 
merely economically, but culturally.” Adams lit on the Library of Congress 
as an institution that “exemplifies the dream,” because it comes “straight 
from the heart of democracy”—a public entity that serves the population 
through freely available knowledge. He perorated by quoting an indigent 
migrant, Mary Antin, who wrote, perched on the steps of the Boston Public 
Library, that its treasures offered her a new “majestic past” and “shining 
future” (1941: 410–11, 413–14, 416–17). During the same period, Wallas’s 
former student Walter Lippmann spoke of “a deep and intricate interde-
pendence” that came with “living in a Great Society.” It worked against 
militarism and other dehumanizing tendencies that emerged from “the 
incessant and indecisive struggle for domination and survival” (1943: 161, 
376). Half a century later, Bruno Latour thinks that the interdependence 
generated by life in a risk society may have a similar effect in shifting us 
“from a time of succession to a time of co-existence,” where historicity and 
commonality prevail (Latour with Kastrissianakis 2007).
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 I have sought to explain the implausibility of the American Dream, 
exposing its ideologues and urging those hailed by it to think again. My 
wager is that the imbalance can be addressed and that our best hope lies 
with the skeptical attitudes to religion and positive attitudes to internation-
alism and solidarity expressed by young people. They may embrace the 
makeover, but they do so in a knowing and critical way. We do not need 
more moral panics about popular culture, or additional investments in risk 
society. We do need to address the inequality brought on by the importa-
tion of manufactures, political action against unionism and progressive 
taxes, and “insider self-dealing” by corporate executives (Krugman 2007). 
The public attitudes of the early 21st century adumbrated above show that 
this vision of past and future lies beyond commodification and beyond 
the psy-function. It resides in a zone of material equality and public cul-
ture—an entirely different kind of makeover.
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int roduct ion
 1. I owe these etymological insights to assistance from Peter Bliss of the University of 
California, Riverside Library System.
 2. “Latin@” and “Chican@” are emergent ways of referring to people without resorting 
to two ugly forms: sexism and slashes. 
 3. Of Latin@ and Euro ancestry, Adams grew up in Brooklyn and spent time in Europe. 
He saw himself as immune to “sectional prejudices,” conscious “only of being an Amer-
ican” and aware of “how different an American now is from the man or woman of any 
other nation” (1941: viii). His book contains grotesque racial distortions (Native Ameri-
cans had “unstable . . . nervous systems” and “were of a markedly hysterical make-up” [7]) 
and is blind to the foundational role of enslaved African and all unpaid female labor in the 
country’s emergence.
 4. I place shudder quotes around “football,” since the use of this word among 4% of the 
world’s population to describe that rather delicate US sport (in which most players are 
unable to use their feet to manipulate the ball) is touching but laughable.
 5. For more such instances, read D[irect]T[o]C[onsumer] Perspectives, the marketing 
magazine that looks to celebrity public relations as an alternative to manifest (honest) 
advertising.
 6. Contemporary media references include Muhammad 2006; Wright and Rosenfeld 
2003; Dewan 2000; Wilgoren 2002; A. Berry 2000; “New Guru” 2000; Lloyd 2002; Hender-
shott 2003; McLemee 2003; Shea 2003; Surowiecki 2004; Muschamp 2004; Barlow 2004; 
Ortiz 2005.
 7. The extreme right has also adopted the term to describe criticisms of human rights 
abuses by the US military in Iraq (Krauthammer 2004).
N o t e s
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Chapter  1
 1. The eminent scholar Kurt Danziger was struck when he visited this benighted land 
by “the tremendous hold that disciplinary loyalties had on social psychologists in North 
America when compared to their counterparts in some other parts of the world. For us, it 
really wasn’t that important” (Brock 1995).
 2. It might be more appropriate to say that pharma buys culture rather than sidestep-
ping it—corporations in this sector pay for 60% of compulsory continuing education in 
US medical schools (Carl Elliott 2004).
 3. We should note that such flights of fancy were no stranger than many from our own 
time, of the type described in this and the next chapter.
 4. Such rent-seeking conduct has always been part of the psy-function. Freud was 
a notable example of someone who sought to undermine more scholarly approaches 
(Hacking 1995: 44).
 5. While youth culture is increasingly commodified, it can, of course, produce counter-
publics (Giroux 2000: 13; Dolby 2003: 269).
Chapter  2
 1. Ritalin is a registered trademark of Novartis Pharmaceuticals.
 2. It would be wrong to assume that such conflicts of interest are unique to the 
United States, of course. The head of the Australian government’s 2007 review of ADHD 
announced that he saw no ethical dilemmas in being paid by Novartis and Eli Lilly to sit 
on their advisory boards (Fife-Yeomans 2007)!
 3. The DEA designation guarantees good data on levels of prescription, as the govern-
ment sets an annual quota on the production of Schedule II substances in response to 
pharmaceutical-industry requests and the amount of sales by pharmacies (Diller 1998: 
27).
Chapter  3
 1. These pieces were published by Connell as a man. He subsequently transitioned to a 
woman; hence my mixed nomenclature.
 2. I owe the wording and ideas here to Ann McClintock.
 3. The title was changed to Queer Eye in its third season, when targeted makeovers 
expanded to include both queers and women.
 4. Not surprisingly, Alfred Hitchcock said it earlier and said it better: “Television is 
like the American toaster, you push the button and the same thing pops up every time” 
(quoted in Wasko 2005: 10).
Conclus ion
 1. All translations are my own.
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